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The New Supreme Court
Commentators: The Principled, the
Political, and the Philosophical
By LAURENCE E. WISEMAN
Introduction
The power of a United States Supreme Court Justice to change
American society has inspired much scholarly debate. That five individuals could, without obstacle, prohibit racism, sexism, unfair treatment, and economic injustice within the country, is like a dream. That
five individuals could, without concern for that which the country
desires, and without restraint of the majority voice, create policy that is
merely a reflection of their particular prejudices, is a nightmare. Academics have sought to determine whether the power available to the
Justices of the Supreme Court is more likely to lead to a dream world
or a nightmarish existence.
In order to determine whether we should be under the influence of
a few superdecisionmakers, we must decide whether the decisions will
be made correctly. This question may be split into two parts. First, is
there such a thing as a right answer or a correct decision? Second, are
the Justices of the Supreme Court the people best situated to attempt to
pronounce "correct" decisions? Although the Supreme Court can decide only specific cases or controversies, 1 the precedential weight of its
decisions causes them to have widespread influence in our society. The
Justices of the Supreme Court must view their decisions as having general application, and therefore must consider the questions at hand on
an abstract and theoretical level. Consequently, the determination of
the correct answer to any specific question often involves the Court in
consideration of the broader question of what are the principles and
values of our government.
In the recent past, the academic commentators of constitutional
law have tended to favor the view that there are no right answers to
value questions independent of those answers that result from the
majoritarian processes in our country.2 Therefore, if any body is fit to
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. See Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholary Tradition and the Supreme Court, 84
HAly. L. REV. 769, 772-75, 781-83 (1971).
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make governmental decisions, it is the state or federal legislature, and
not the Court.3 Having the Court assert its decisions at the expense of
those made by the legislature is, in their view, nightmarish. In the
more recent past, however, several constitutional law commentators
have argued that indeed, where questions of values are raised, there are
answers whose validity is independent of legislative decision, and that,
further, the Court is the governmental body best fit for deciding such
questions.
Constitutional law commentators are not alone in asserting the
existence of values whose validity does not rely on a formalized monitoring of consensus.4 Recent work in moral philosophy has shown a
trend away from utilitarianism-essentially, a system of deciding moral
questions according to a tally of the preferences of every member of the
society-toward the assertion of determinate values as the basis of
moral systems. This article analyzes the relationship between the development of value-asserting theories among constitutional law commentators and the development of nonutilitarian theories in moral
philosophy. Part I provides the background of moral philosophy and
discusses several philosophers who have abandoned utilitarianism.
Part II describes the nexus between moral philosophy and constitutional law commentary. Part III analyzes the traditional constitutional
law commentary; and part IV presents and analyzes the new theories
emerging in constitutional commentary. Finally, this survey of authors
is used as a basis for comment on the foundations of these value-asserting constitutional theories. It will be argued that, to the extent modem
philosophers are correct in attacking utilitarianism, the new constitutional law commentators are correct in their attacks on the traditional
commentary.
I.

The Background in Moral Philosophy

H.L.A. Hart recently described the ongoing transition among philosophers, from a focus upon utilitarianism to concern with a doctrine
of basic human rights:
I do not think than [sic] anyone familiar with what has been published in the last ten years, in England and the United States, on
the philosophy of government can doubt that this subject, which
3. See generally Brubaker, From Incompetent Imperialismto PrincpledPrudence: The
Role of the Courts in Restoring "he State," 10 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 81 (1982).
4. The word "formalized" is used here to acknowledge that some of the recent antiutilitarian moral theories assert values on the basis that they are almobt universally held.
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 55-62, 82, and 115. This may be seen as involving
an appeal to consensus, but such consensus is not strictly a function of individual inputs as is
the utilitarian calculus. See infra text preceding note 152.
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is the meeting point of moral, political, and legal philosophy, is
undergoing a major change. We are currently witnessing, I
think, the progress of a transition from a once widely accepted
old faith that some form of utilitarianism, if only we could discover the right form, must capture the essence of political morality. The new faith is that the truth must lie not with a doctrine
that takes the maximization of aggregate or average general welfare for its goal, but with a doctrine of basic human rights, protecting basic liberties and interests of individuals, if only we
could find some sufficiently firm foundation for such rights to
meet some long familiar objections.5

Tracing the development of this philosophical movement over the past
ten years is a topic too broad for the present discussion. It is possible,
however, to gain insight into the movement and its effect on constitu-

tional law commentary by examining the works of several philosophers
abandoning utilitarianism who are most often cited in the recent works

of the new constitutional law commentators. This group comprises
professional philosophers and law faculty writing philosophy, and includes John Rawls,6 Thomas Nagel,7 Bernard Williams,' Ronald
12
Dworkin,9 T.M. Scanlon,10 Robert Nozick" and Charles Fried.
5. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLuM. L. REv. 828, 828 (1979) (emphasis in
original). See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITTION 71 (1977); Barry,
And Who Is My Neighbor?, 88 YALE LJ.629, 630-32 (1979).
6. Works citing Rawls include: Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in
EQUAL=rY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 84, 126 n.65 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon
eds., 1977) [hereinafter cited as Groups]; Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-ForewordIn Defense of the Anti-DiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 49 n.219 (1976); Karst,
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword Equal Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4 n.18 (1977); Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare
Rights: One View ofRawls' Theory ofJustice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962passim (1973); Perry,
Constitutional"Faimess'" Notes on Equal ProtectionandDue Process, 63 VA. L. REv. 383,
388 n.25 (1977); Sandalow, JudicialProtection of Minorities, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1162, 1168
n.14 (1977); Tribe, Ways Not to ThinkAbout Plastic Trees: New FoundationsforEnvironmentalLaw, 83 YALE L.J 1315, 1328 n.63 (1974); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.. 221, 243 n.57 (1973).
7. Works citing Nagel include: M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING
BY THE JUDICIARY 104 n.* (1982); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword- The

Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 13 n.29 (1979); Tribe, supra note 6, at 1330 n.71.
8. Works citing Williams include: Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy.- The
Essential ContradictionsoNormative ConstitutionalScholarshi, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1103
n.220 (1981); Karst, supra note 6, at 6 n.23.
9. Works citing Dworkin include: Brest, supra note 8, at 1074 n.75; Fiss, supra note 7,
at 9 n.24; Karst, supra note 6, at 42 n.228; Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory oLaw, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1043 n.74 (1978); Perry, Substantive Due
Process Visited- Reflections On (And Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 447
n.189 (1976), Sandalow, supra note 6, at 1166 n. 11; Tribe, The Puzzling PersistenceofProcess-Based ConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072 n.41 (1980); Wellington, supra
note 6, at 222 n.1.
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Their works, 13 taken together, suggest criticism of the old faith and formulations representative of the new faith.
A.

The Criticisms of Utilitarianism

L

Bernard Williams

Bernard Williams's criticism of utilitarianism 14 has been cited by
constitutional law commentators and by several of the philosophers
just mentioned.'" Williams addresses act utilitarianism or "direct" utilitarianism, 16 as well as other forms of utilitarianism, 7 as a possible
foundation for personal morality. He argues that act utilitarianism
must be a theory about how people should be motivated, since it is a
theory about which acts are right. That is, act utilitarianism, by
10. Works citing Scanlon include: L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 581 n.15
(1978); Brest, supra note 8, at 1091-92 n.171; Karst, The Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89
YALE L.J. 624, 633-34 n.46 (1980); Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal
Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 306 n.196 (1981); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression,
88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1121 n.86 (1979).
11. Works citing Nozick include: Fiss, supra note 6, at 126 n.65; Michelman, Political
Markets and Community Self-Determinatiom Competing JudicialModels of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.f. 145, 153 n.36 (1977); Perry, NoninterpretiveReview in Human
Rights Cases: A FunctionalJustfication, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 299 n.77 (1981); Tribe,
Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 66, 93 n.72 (1972).
12. Works citing Fried include: Karst, supra note 10, at 633-34 n.46; Michelman, Wel-

fare Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659, 681 n.ll0; Perry, 4bortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due
Process,23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 689, 733 n.203 (1976); Tribe, StructuralDue Process, 10 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 291 n.66 (1975).
13. It is interesting to note that several of these philosophers address legal audiences
specifically by occasionally writing for law journals. This is true of Nagel, Dworkin, ScanIon, Nozick, and Fried.
14. Williams,, Critique of Utilitarianism in J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973); see also Sen & Williams, Introduction, in UTILITARIANISM
AND BEYOND 1-21 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982).
15. Examples of citations to Williams's essay by philosophers mentioned in this article
are: C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 197 (1978); T. NAGEL, Subjective and Objective in MORTAL QUESTIONS 205 n.10 (1979); Barry, supra note 5, at 630 n.3; Hart, supra note 5, at 829
n.1; Scanlon, Rights, Goals and Fairness, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 96 n.3 (S.
Hampshire ed. 1978).
16. Act utilitarianism is defined as "the view that the rightness of any particular act
depends on the goodness of its consequences... where the goodness of the consequences is
cashed [sic] in terms of happiness." Williams, supra note 14, at 118-19. Indirect utilitarianism, on the other hand, (for example, rule utilitarianism) takes into account the utility of
rules, institutions, or dispositions of character. Id. at 119.
17. Williams appears more concerned with criticizing act utilitarianism than other
forms, since it is in some ways the "paradigm of utilitarianism," id. at 128, and since Williams's counterpart, JJ.C. Smart, writes in defense of act utilitarianism. See Smart, An
Outline of a System of UtilitarianEthics, in J. SMART & B. WILLIM S, UTILITARIANISM:
FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
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describing which acts are right, must prescribe the choice of right acts.
Yet, he finds no reason to believe that the actor would be able to recognize the rightness of the act. If act utilitarianism cannot be a statement
of motivation, then it is trivial: stating that right action should be maximized, without stating how."8 Furthermore, the assumed goal of utilitarianism-that society's good be maximized--does not result as a
matter of necessity from the maximization of right acts as defined by
the act utilitarian. It is possible, for instance, that a society could attain
its maximum utility only if its members could be spontaneous, i.e., not
driven by concerns of utility.' 9 Williams also provides arguments
against the position that utilitarianism could provide a decision procedure for social choice. He states that the assumptions on which such a
decision procedure is based are dubious. For instance, it is questionable that the resulting welfare of the individual can be quantified in such
a procedure, that the welfare of various individuals can be compared,
or that there can be a function which will adequately determine social
preference, even assuming that quantification of individual welfare is
possible and that a means of comparison exists.20
The most pervasive argument in the essay, however, relates to the
incompatibility of utilitarianism with common notions of moral integrity. This criticism forms not only the bulk of Williams's general attack
on utilitarianism as a theory of personal morality, but also forms part
of the argument against act utilitarianism, and part of the argument
against utilitarianism as a decision procedure for social choice. Williams argues that a necessary feature of utilitarianism is the attribution
of "negative responsibility," which holds the actor equally responsible
for states of affairs that obtain because he or she did not prevent them,
as for states of affairs that the actor brings about.2 ' If such were the
case, the "projects" of others would weigh quite heavily on one's decisions as to which act is the right act. In fact, the projects of others
could be expected, from time to time, to weigh so heavily that the actor
would be required to give up his or her own projects, even the "commitments" to which the actor's whole life is devoted. This type of
moral requirement would serve to alienate the actor from the actor's
own actions and convictions.2 2 Further, utilitarianism causes the actor
to regard his or her moral feelings as mere objects of the utilitarian
value. In this way, utilitarianism causes one to be alienated from one's
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Williams, supra note 14, at 124-29.
See id. at 129.
See id. at 140-48.
See id. at 95.
See id. at 115-16.
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moral identity.23 In short, Williams's criticisms lie in the fact that
moral actors are whole and distinct beings. It is not the case that the
world is made up of disembodied happiness causers and happiness recipients. The goals and needs of the individual actor, that is, the identity of the individual actor, must be relevant to the morality of the
actor's actions.
2. John Rawls
John Rawls presents several attacks on utilitarianism in4 Theory
of Justice.24 Some of these are in the same spirit as Williams's major
attacks. Rawls states that classical utilitarianism approaches decisions
for an entire society as if that society were a single person. All people
and their levels of satisfaction are merged into one by virtue of the
simple aggregation of satisfaction levels accomplished by the utilitarian
calculation. Consequently, the distinctions among persons are not
taken seriously.2 5 Along the same theme, Rawls notes that the acceptance of utilitarianism requires very strong identification with the interests of others, since many individuals will be denied advantages for the
greater good of the society as a whole. Without such strong identification the society would be unstable.26
Another major criticism presented by Rawls involves his concept
of the "original position." Basically the original position is the hypothetical initial situation in which citizens are to choose the principles of
justice for their society.27 Rawls sets up various constraints to insure
that the parties choosing are equal and unprejudiced by their future
positions in the society, that they rationally weigh the alternatives, and
that they choose rules which can function appropriately.28 Rawls argues that one who is choosing principles of justice in the original position, and who therefore has no knowledge of his or her ultimate place
in the society, would choose a system which guarantees from the onset
protection of liberties and a satisfactory standard of living for each individual. 9 Since classical utilitarian theory cannot guarantee that any
individual will be allocated even a minimum level of liberties or
wealth, it would not be chosen by those in the original position as the
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. at 103-04.
J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 177-78.
See id. at 118.
See id. at 118-50.
See id. at 150-61, 168-72, 175.
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foundation for conducting the actions of society. 3°
It appears that the general point which Rawls makes here is that a
system of morality or a system of justice cannot be merely a procedural
notion. One cannot simply assume that a procedure (such as the utilitarian tally) will somehow lead to reasonably even allocation of rights
and resources, so that no one will be forced to accept an intolerable lot
as the condition of adopting such a system of justice.3" Rather than
relying on various uncontrolled natural facts which will, like an invisible hand, guide the procedural system, it is preferable to have an ethical system or a system of justice that has substance. It is preferable,
that is, to have a moral system which is constructed with specific concrete results in mind. "Convictions of justice" should be embedded in
the first principles of the system.32
3. Charles Fried

The two major themes discussed thus far also appear in Charles
Fried's criticism of utilitarianism. He agrees with Williams that utilitarianism, because it focuses on the aggregation of undifferentiated pleasure, strips the individual of moral significance. For Fried, the
individual, rather than an abstraction like happiness or excellence,
should be the "ultimate entity of value."33 In addition, he states that
utilitarianism, even in its modem sophisticated formulation as "the
economic analysis of rights," is fundamentally incomplete as a moral
theory. According to Fried, "[t]he economic analysis of rights seeks to
discern which assignment of rights in the real world of costly and impacted bargaining best approximates the attainment of efficiency, that
Pareto-optimal situation which would obtain in the frictionless world
of costless bargaining.""' He argues that although the allocation of resources and rights dictated by the economic analysis of rights (EAR)
30. Rawls develops a theory that he believes is preferable for use by those in the initial
position. See infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
31. See J. RAwLs, supra note 24, at 156, 170-71.
32. Id. at 161. Note, however, that Rawls states his aim in employing the original position as using "the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory." Id. at 136. Nozick
remarks that it is odd for Rawls to insist on substantive, "end-state" principles to guide
society when his method for generating such principles--the original position-is a process,
and "any principles that would emerge from that situation and process are held to constitute
the principles ofjustice." R. NozICK, ANARcHY,STATE, AND UTOPIA 207 (1974). See also
id. at 208. Nozick himself favors invisible hand explanations and procedural principles of
justice. See id. at 18-22, 149-82. See infra text accompanying note 63, for Rawls's use of the
original position.
33. C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 33-34.
34. Id. at 92. Pareto-efficiency, which is equivalent to Pareto-optimality, is defined by
Fried as follows: "[A]n allocation of resources among competing uses is efficient, if no
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may conform with notions of efficiency, and although we may agree
that efficiency is desirable, such a solution to the problem of allocation
is a function of the initial situation, and thus the solution will be proper
only if the initial distribution is proper.3 5 Fried also argues that EAR,
which is based on a model of bargaining in the market place, assumes
that each party is the best judge of what his or her price should be, that
each has sufficient information to be a good judge, and that bargains
are made voluntarily. These assumptions are necessary to the outcome
of EAR, but, he points out, cannot be justified or explained by EAR.36
Similarly, EAR is deficient because it does not explain the assumed
"background entitlements which guarantee the integrity of the bargainers as intelligent, free agents."37 Both the criticism concerning distribution and the criticism concerning initial assumptions may be seen
generally as objections to the lack of content or initial judgments that
systems of ethics or of justice arguably require.38
Fried brings up two additional criticisms which stem from a perceived dissonance between the common view of morality and the consequences of a utilitarian theory. The first is that utilitarianism does
not leave the actor any choices that are not dictated by the moral system. He asserts that there is one right answer to every possible choice,
and there is moral responsibility for all of the consequences of one's
actions. 39 The second criticism is that utilitarianism views certain
acts-for instance, rape and theft-as morally neutral, and bad only
contingently.40 People generally, however, view such things as bad in
themselves.4" These arguments do not suggest theoretical deficiencies
in utilitarianism, as did the above arguments, but rather express distaste for the implications of utilitarian thought.
change in that allocation may be effected which would improve the situation of any of the
parties without worsening the situation of any of them." Id. at 89.
35. See id. at 93-94.
36. See id. at 100-04.
37. Id. at 100.
38. It is interesting to note that Fried sees his criticism of the initial assumptions as a
variation of the criticism concerning the moral integrity of the person. See id. at 104.
39. Id. at 13, 34.
40. That is, for a (direct) utilitarian, whether an instance of rape, for example, can be
considered "bad," depends on the circumstances. Only in those circumstances where the
utility accrued by the rapist happens to be less than the disutility resulting to the others
affected will the rape be bad.
41. C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 104.
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4. Ronald Dworkin

Arguments like these, that utilitarianism simply comes up with the
wrong answers, are common in the philosophical literature. Ronald
Dworkin, for instance, sets out a criticism of utilitarianism that does
not seem to dispute the foundations of the theory, but rather suggests
that utilitarianism can be corrupted.42 Dworkin states that a utilitarian
calculation is corrupted if it takes into account "external preferences,"
which are preferences "for the assignment of goods and opportunities
to others," as opposed to "personal preferences," which are preferences
for an individual's "own enjoyment of some goods or opportunities."43
Dworkin's objection to the use of external preferences in the calculus is
that the result may lead to inequality, or may deny equal concern and
respect." This dissatisfaction with the result seems to be all that lies
behind the criticism."
5. Summary of Criticisms

One can see three major lines of criticism that have developed
among the writers viewed. The first is that utilitarianism is not consistent with the observation that people are distinct beings with "moral
integrity." The second is that utilitarianism does not provide a complete moral system or system ofjustice, and that it cannot do so without
the injection of values or greater substantive content. The third line of
criticism is that the view of morality resulting from utilitarian theory,
or the results of decisions based on utilitarian theory, are simply wrong.
B. New Foundations
L

John Rawls

The trend in philosophy being discussed may be noted not only for
its criticism of the old faith, utilitarianism, but also for its constructive
work in laying the foundations of the new faith,46 which perhaps may
be called theory with content.4 7 Especially important to the establishment of the legitimacy of the movement as a whole is the manner in
which justification is sought for the methods used to arrive at the con42. See R. DwoRxN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 231-38, 274-77 (1978). As Dworkin
sees it, however, his criticism of utilitarianism, which seemingly only attacks the results of
utilitarian decisionmaking, cannot be taken as the expression of approval of the foundations
of utilitarianism. See id. at 257.
43. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
44. See id. at 236, 275.
45. See Hart, supra note 5, at 841-45.
46. See Barry, supra note 5, at 632-33.
47. See B. WILLIAMS, MORALrrY 80-82, 86-88 (1972).
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tent presented in the new moral theories. The moral systems presented
by philosophers of the new faith can all be seen as attempts to form
nonutilitarian theories that could not be considered to be forms of "intuitionism" as Rawls has defined it. According to Rawls, intuitionist
theories
consist of a plurality of first principles which may conflict to give
contrary directions in particular types of cases; and second, they
include no explicit method, no priority rules, for weighing these
principles against one another: we are simply to strike
48 a balance
by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right.
Rawls explains that intuitionism, which does not allow for an "objective" means of ordering principles, and thus for a systematic way of
deciding moral issues, is a type of pluralism. 49 The philosophers of the

new faith desire to establish what is morally correct without using one
very abstract principle, as is done in utilitarianism, and without throwing up their hands in despair and deciding what is right (or what is to
be its surrogate) by taking a popular vote.
Certainly, among the works of modem constitutional scholars, the
most widely cited attempt to construct a moral theory with content is
John Rawls'sA Theory ofJustice.50 Rawls presents a theory that incorporates two principles which are lexically ordered:5
First: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they
are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage,
and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.52
These principles are the substantive basis for Rawls's theory. They
"primarily apply.., to the basic structure of society. They are to gov48. J. RAWLS, supra note 24, at 34.
49. See id. at 35.
50. The book is more often cited for its theory than for its criticism. See supra articles
listed in note 6.
51. See J. RAwLs, supra note 24, at 42-44. Lexical ordering, as applied to moral principles, provides that a principle of lower priority cannot be applied unless each principle of
higher priority is either satisfied or inapplicable. This is reminiscent of the way that words
are ordered when they are alphabetized.
52. Id. at 60. This is actually only a tentative formulation of the principles. The final
formulation, with two rules for the ordering of these principles, is inid.at 302-03. It reads as
follows:
FirstPrinciple
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Second PrincpIe
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just
savings principle [i.e., that a generation cannot unduly burden a future generation,
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ern the assignment of rights and duties and to regulate the distribution
of social and economic advantages. 53 The principles are intended to

vindicate the "convictions of common sense" that "each member of society... [has] an inviolability founded on justice or, as some say, on
natural right, which even the welfare of every one else cannot
override."54

Rawls presents an elaborate framework, and an explanation of the
framework, in order to show the reader why and to what extent these

principles, and the system developed around them, are justified. At its
base, the theory seeks justification from hypothetical consensus. The

principles of justice are justified because everyone accepts them, or
after proper philosophical reflection." Rawls's
would accept them
"original position"5 6 acts as a guide to proper philosophical reflection
by providing reasonable constraints on that reflection. In doing so it
provides an environment from which the validity of the two principles
is more readily appreciated. Thus, through the use of the original position Rawls appeals to "consensus on reasonable conditions."57 That
the theory relies on "some consensus" for the justification of moral
principles should not be surprising, for "[t]his is the nature of
but rather each generation must carry its "fair share of the burden of realizing and
preserving a just society," Id. at 289], and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.
First PriorityRule ('he Priority of Liberty)
The principles ofjustice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can
be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases:
(a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared
by 4
(b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser
liberty.
Second PriorityRule (The Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare)
The second principle ofjustice is lexcially prior to the principle of efficiency and to
that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the
difference principle. There are two cases:
(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those
with the lesser opportunity,
(b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those
bearing this hardship.
General Conception
All social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the
bases of self-respect---are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution
of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored.
53. Id. at 61.
54. Id. at 27-28.
55. See id. at 21.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
57. J. RAwLs, supra note 24, at 582.
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justification.
In general, according to Rawls, a conception of justice finds justification to the extent that it causes our various considered opinions of
justice to converge.5 9 This approach to moral theory is not intuitionist
under Rawls's definition, because it operates under the assumption that
consensus supporting a coherent conception of justice at least can be
approached.6 0 By focusing on structuring our moral deliberations,
Rawls hopes to bring our considered judgments closer to a consensus, 6
62
and thereby to show that skepticism is unwarranted.
Rawls thus employs the construct of the original position as a theoretical tool to lend validity to the substantive principles. Those principles of justice that are recognized as likely to be chosen in the original
position are the "correct" principles of justice. The reason for this is
that the conditions for choice in the original position are intended to be
"fair." No consideration can be made for advantages stemming from
chance or contingencies, and no one can choose principles to favor oneself to the exclusion of others.63 But the original position, too, must be
subject to justification.' This system is not validated by appealing to
self-evident first principles from which the system is deduced.65 Rawls
is adamant that principles of justice cannot be derived from necessary
truths.6 6 Rather, justification is sought through an appeal to the overall
coherence of the various components of the theory.
Another philosopher, Joel Feinberg, explains that theories ofjustification that appeal to overall coherence--"coherence theories of ethical justification"-appeal to philosophers like Rawls who do not
believe it possible to base an ethical system on self-evident first principles.6 7 Coherence theories dispense with the need for immutable- first
principles.
58. Id. at 581. Rawls's appeal to "some consensus" is not unusual. We might think of
justification as an appeal to a consensus of the knowledgeable and perceptive among us, or
to a consensus of all of us in "our better moments." Yet note Socrates's warning that "the
holy is loved [by all the gods] because it is holy, and is not holy because it is loved." PLATO,
Euthyphro l0e in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 179 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns
eds. 1961).
59. See J. RAWLS, supra note 24, at 44-45, 579.
60. See id. at 50.
61. See id. at 44.
62. See id.at 39.
63. See id. at 12.
64. See id. at 579-80.
65. See id. at 578.
66. See id. at 21.
67. Feinberg, Justice, Fairnessand Rationality, 81 YALE L.J. 1004, 1019 (1972).

Winter 1983]

NEW SUPREME COURT COMMENTATORS

The individual who is trying to make up his own mind begins
with the set of moral beliefs and sentiments he already has, for
better or worse. . . .He places his beliefs then in an order of
conviction. . . .He then reaches the level of general principle by
extracting from his most confident convictions their apparent rationale. Then he applies his newly discovered principle to the
more difficult cases and decides them as the general principle directs. All goes well until his general principle directs him to a
judgment in a particular case that runs counter to one of his most
confident convictions. Then there is a crisis and something will
have to give. The problem for practical reason in such a crisis is
to reformulate the general principle. . . in such a way that it still
faithfully summarizes the whole body of one's singular convictions and no longer yields an unacceptable result.
This method can be used to discover one's own formulation of moral
principles, and also to prove the validity of principles to another, by
calling into question the coherence of the other's accepted principles.69
Attaining an integrated moral theory as the result of this "back and
forth" process of justifying the original position through its conformance to basic accepted principles, and justifying principles by appealing
to the original position, Rawls calls approaching "reflective
70
equilibrium."
Among the philosophers viewed in this essay, Rawls presents the
most detailed attempt at justifying the assertion of foundational principles or statements of value. It will be helpful, however, to view the
theories of other philosophers who also can be assumed to have had an
impact on the constitutional law commentators.
2

Ronald Dworkin

Ronald Dworkin's works are widely cited by the new constitutional law commentators. 7 1 He presents a theory of rights that is "antiutilitarian" because it provides for rights that must be respected by the
72
government even if it would not be in the general interest to do so.
Accordingly, these rights are not dependent on majoritarian justification for their existence.73 In his view, the function of rights is to protect
68. Id. at 1019-20.
69. See id. at 1020.
70. J. RAWLS, supra note 24, at 20.
71. See supra note 9.
72. See R. DwoRxnw, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191, 269 (1978); see also Regan,
Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, PrinciplesandPolicies,76 MICH. L. REv. 1213, 1216-17 (1978).
73. See R. DwoRKN, supra note 72, at 236-38, 255, 276-77. See also Nickel, Dworkin
on the Nature and Consequences of Rights, 11 GA. L. REv. 1115, 1118-19 (1977).
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individuals in specific ways from the dictates of the tally of interests.74
Dworkin does not distinguish legal rights from moral rights, for he sees
no fundamental distinction between legal standards and moral standards.75 All rights are political rights; that is, they justify specific kinds
of decisions by society in general or by political institutions.76 Thus,
rights are most properly topics of political debate and features of political theories describing and analyzing the institutions and sentiments of
that particular society. 7 They are not metaphysical entities. Nor is
there, even in theory, a mechanical procedure for determining exactly
which rights a person has.78 However, some arguments concerning
rights are better than others, and some political theories are better than
others. It is important that an attempt is made at good political theory
by political officials, especially judges, and that legal opinions are challenged and assessed as the manifestations of such political theory.79
The foundational right in Dworkin's moral theory is the right of
each individual to be treated with equal concern and respect by the
government.80 The justification for other rights lies in the protection
they afford to the central right to equal concern and respect. 81 The
justification for the central right itself is manifold. Four different
strains of argument in support of the existence of the right can be found
in Dworkin's writing. First, Dworkin states that anyone who takes
rights seriously must accept (and thus it appears that rights by their
very nature assume) that people are deserving of a kind of dignity by
virtue of their humanity, and that, therefore, all citizens are deserving
of the same concern by their government despite their economic standing. 82 Second, Dworkin appears to justify the existence of rights with
utilitarian arguments cleansed of external preferences, as discussed earlier.83 Dworkin states in his reply to critics that he does not endorse
this modified utilitarian approach as a constructive theory, but only as
a criticism of utilitarianism. 84 He does state, however, that his idea of
individual rights is "parasitic on the dominant idea of utilitarianism,
74. See R. DwoRKN, supra note 72, at 85, 277.
75. See id. at 7, 46, 60.
76. See id. at xi-xii, 93.
77. See id. at 79, 87, 92.
78. See id.at 81.
79. See id. at 86, 116-18.
80. See id. at 272-73.
81. See Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIc AND PRIVATE MORALITY 136 (S.Hampshire
ed. 1978); Regan, supra note 72, at 1219.
82. See R. DwoRKiN, supra note 72, at 198-99.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
84. See R. DwoRK N, supra note 72, at 357.
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which is the idea of a collective goal of the community as a whole,","
and his idea of rights
allows us to enjoy the institutions of political democracy, which
enforce overall or unrefined utilitarianism, and yet protect the
fundamental right of citizens to equal concern and respect by
prohibiting decisions that seem, antecedently, likely to have been
reached by virtue of the external components of the preferences
democracy reveals.8 6
Third, it appears as if perhaps Dworkin's view of rights is justified by
establishing its connection with the essence of "liberalism." Dworkin
argues that the right to equal concern and respect is central to liberal
thought, 87 but it is not always clear whether he seeks by this connection
to establish the value of liberalism or to establish the existence of this
central right.
More important, perhaps, is Dworkin's more theoretical justification for the scheme of rights. He appeals to coherence theory as
presented by Rawls and then clarifies it.88 He argues that the "deep
theory" or essence of Rawls's fundamental position, including the notions of reflective equilibrium, leads to the preferable rights scheme.8 9
Rawls's views of reflective equilibrium and coherence theory in general
are interpreted by Dworkin to imply a "constructive model," as opposed to a "natural model," for moral principles or principles of justice.
As Dworkin explains the distinction, the constructive model
treats intuitions of justice not as clues to the existence of independent principles, but rather as stipulated features of a general theory to be constructed, as if a sculptor set himself to carve
the animal that best fits a pile of bones he happened to find together. This 'constructive' model does not assume, as the natural
model does, that principles of justice have some fixed, objective
existence, so that descriptions of these principles must be true or
false in some standard way. It does not assume that the animal it
matches to the bones actually exists. It makes the different, and
in some ways more complex, assumption that men and women
have a responsibility to fit the particular judgments on which
they act into a coherent program of action, or, at least, that officials who exercise power over other men have that sort of
responsibility.9"
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at xi.
Id. at 277.
See Id. at vii; Dworkin, supra note 81, esp. 123-26.
See R. DwoRIN, supra note 72, at 160; Nickel, supra note 73, at 1119.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 72, at 158, ch. 6passirn.
Id. at 160.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY

332

''ol

10:315

One should have no trouble recognizing that the constructive model
describes the concept of rights as features of a political theory, as discussed earlier. 91 It should also be apparent that the constructive model
provides a role for a governmental decisionmaker, like a judge, whose
decisions, fairness dictates, must flow from a body of convictions
92
shaped by both the requirement of consistency and public debate.
Dworkin argues that the constructive model of moral principles, and
not the natural model, can be supported by a coherence theory justification because the constructive model is consistent with the constant
adjustment
of principles and moral convictions required by coherence
93
theory.

Dworkin finds the deep theory behind Rawls's notion of the social
contract to call for a deontological, "right-based" theory.94 Social con-

tract theory in general demands a right-based moral theory as opposed
to a goal-based theory or a duty-based theory, because the essence of
social contract is that the individual (theoretically) makes a choice concerning the nature of the future society based on his or her projected
interests.95 Rights protect these interests, while social goals or duties
might subjugate such individual interests. The concept of rights that
emerges from the deep theory behind contract theory, according to
Dworkin, is a concept of "natural" rights. By this, he means that "they
are not the product of any legislation, or convention, or hypothetical
contract," which follows from the assumption that "the best political
program, within the sense of [the constructive] model, is one that takes
the protection of certain individual choices as fundamental, and not
96
properly subordinated to any goal or duty or combination of these."

Given the premise that contract theory in general requires natural
rights, the deep theory behind Rawls's formulation of the contractagreement inthe original position-will place restrictions on what kind
of natural rights may exist. Because people in the original position are
ignorant of their interests, they are left to choose some abstract rights.
The two most likely to be chosen are the right to liberty and the right to
equality. Since the right to liberty does not ensure much protection for
the people in the original position, they would choose equality. Since
91. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
92. R. DwoRKiN, supra note 72, at 162-63.
93. See id. at 164-66.
94. Id. at 169, 171. For a definition of "deontological" see J. RAwNs supra note 24, at
30. According to him, a deontological theory "either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good." Id.
95. See R. DwoiRuN, supra note 72, at 174-75.
96. Id. at 176-77.
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equality of treatment by the government is more fundamental than
equality of wealth, Dworkin finds that the deep theory behind Rawls's
original position leads to the right to equal concern and respect as the
fundamental moral right.97
For further illumination of Dworkin's theory of rights, it is important to view some aspects of his theory of adjudication. Since Dworkin
sees no fundamental difference between moral standards and legal
standards, he finds judges to be in the business of moral as well as legal
decisionmaking. An examination of his theory of adjudication reveals
that, despite the centrality of the notions of natural rights and political
theory in his concept of morality, the concept incorporates constraint
by community morality. This is clear from Dworkin's view of the task
of a law judge. The judge is not left to make decisions based on his
own personal preferences, but is to find preexisting rights and base his
or her decisions on them.98 Rights are primarily features of a political
or moral theory and therefore it is the task of the judge to create a
theory that can accommodate the existing rights in a coherent manner.99 Yet, this theory must be constructed so as to fit or explain as well
as possible the relevant case law precedent, the relevant statutory law,
and, in addition, the judge's sense of the community morality.1°° Community morality, like law, is a matter of the best theory that can explain
all agreed upon applications of a concept like faimess. 1° 1 One looks to
the clear cases of, for instance, recognized fairness, familiar to each
who speaks the language spoken in that community, as well as to one's
own convictions as a member of that community, as the available data
for constructing a theory describing the community morality.10 2 Therefore, the role of the judge is to devise a theory incorporating a coherent
explanation not only of what courts and legislators within the jurisdiction have described as a binding contract, but also of what the commu97. See id. at 178-80. This theoretical justification provided by Dworkin for his rights
scheme seems to fill out or explain the rights scheme more than it seems to provide justification for it. If indeed chapter six (pp. 150-83) of TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY is intended to
provide justification for the rights scheme, and not merely to be an interesting but unconnected gloss on Rawls, then Dworkin's approach to justification is quite interesting. He does
not appeal to coherence theory itself as a foundation for the rights scheme as much as he
appeals to Rawls. Rawis's book appears to be treated as the primary source of validity, and
coherence theory is granted a subordinate position. This is not the last time that an appeal
to Rawls as a standard and not just another theorist will be seen in this essay. See infra text
accompanying notes 463-474.
98. R. DwoRiuN, supra note 72, at 81, 84-85, 87.
99. See id. at 105.
100. See id. at 116-17, 128-29.
101. See id. at 128-29.
102. See id. at 127-28.
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nity has considered to be fair, when, for instance, deciding a case upon
unconscionable contracts. The theory, which must involve legal doctrine and also political and moral philosophy, 1 3 can be expected to
adjust its conception of various rights with the advent of new precedent, and can be expected to differ from judge to judge.l°4
What emerges is a notion that the judge is free to theorize about
rights, but can do so correctly only if the basis of the theory is found in
the various "conceptions" the community has had of general moral and
legal concepts. 0 5 Thus, while the theory of natural rights frees the
judge from the need to rely on the preferences of the community revealed in any given poll, and also frees the judge from explaining why
a theory and not the poll should be heeded in decisions about rights, it
does not allow action on the basis of a theory relying solely on, for
instance, perceived universal moral truths. The theory must be based
on community morality and on legality revealed within the community
by the historical development of its social institutions and public sentiments. Thus, the moral theory of Dworkin seems to be tethered between something reminiscent of Burkean conservatism, calling for
slow; organic change of social norms,'0 6 and modem liberal reformism,"0 7 marching under the banner of moral rights such as equal concer and respect.
3. Charles Fried

Charles Fried presents a quite different theory of rights in Right
and Wrong. He describes a moral system based on norms of right and
wrong that are "categorical." The fact that certain consequences follow
from acts that are right or wrong does not alter the acts' status as such,
except in extreme cases.' 08 Therefore, Fried's theory is nonconsequen103. See id. at 117.
104. See id. at 116-17.
105. In Dworkin's system, "concept" describes a notion like fairness for which a number
of standard cases accepted by the community exist. "Conception" describes the theory of an
individual community member that takes into account the standard cases and attempts to
explain why each standard case is in fact a case of, for instance, fairness. Differing theories
of what constitutes fairness within that community-that is, differing conceptions of fairness-cause individuals to take opposing views on whether borderline, controversial cases
are cases of fairness. See id. at 134-35.
106. See E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France in REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVOLuTION IN FRANCE & THE RIGHTS OF MAN, 66-78 (1973).
107. See, e.g. the description of Earl Warren in G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC
LnE 327-69 (1982).
108. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 10-11 (1978). An example of an extreme case is
where "killing an innocent person may save a whole nation." Id. at 10.
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tialist. 1°9 Of course, these rights are not merely subjectively valid, and
(in Rawls' sense). 110

thus this theory must be seen as nonintuitionist
The foundation of this moral system is the Kantian "[r]espect for persons, for their integrity as free, rational, incorporated agents."'IIThis
is the basis for the existence of negative rights as well as positive
rights. 1 2 The latter, however, can be identified and113catalogued only
with the aid of a full economic and political theory.
The way in which Fried seeks to justify his categorical norms con-

trasts with the theories viewed up to this point. Rather than.justify his
view by appealing to some feature of the structure of his theory, Fried
seeks to justify his theory by appealing to history and to conventional
moral sense. Thus, Fried presents a theory that seeks validity from the

fact that it is grounded in traditional Judeo-Christian religious and social morality.1 4 Fried states this outright at the beginning. In the first

sentence of chapter one, he states, "This is the central concept of my
work. Ordinary moral understanding, as well as many major traditions
of Western moral theory, recognize that there are some things which a
moral man will not do, no matter what.""' 5 It is somewhat surprising
that this is the fullest treatment rendered the question of justification.
4. Other Theorists
Other members of the group of philosophers discussed in this essay have presented theories that do not deal at length with the question
of justification. Robert Nozick, in-Anarchy, State and Utopia, creates a

libertarian political theory which is derived from Kantian notions that
109. See Barry, supra note 5, at 629-32. For an example of nonconsequentialist constitutional law commentary, see Linde, Judges, Crtiesand the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227
(1972).
110. See C. FRIED, supra note 108, at 167. For Rawis's definition of "intuitionism," see
supra text at note 46.
111. Id. at 114. See id. at 118. One may note in the writings of several of the modem
moral philosophers, as well as in the writings of the new breed of constitutional law commentators, renewed appreciation for the Kantian perspective in moral philosophy. See, e.g.,
J. RAWLS, supra note 24, at 179-83; R. DwoRIN, supra note 72, at 198-200; B. ACKERMAN,
supra note 5, at 71-72; R. NozIcK, supra note 32, at 30-31; Michelman, supra note 11, at 14952.
112. Fried explains: "A positive right is a claim to something-a share of material
goods, or some particular good like the attentions of a lawyer or a doctor, or perhaps the
claim to a result like health or enlightenment-while a negative right is a right that something not be done to one, that some particular imposition be withheld." C. FRIED, supra note
108, at 110.
113. See id. at 118.
114. See Barry, supra note 5, at 633.
115. C. FRIED, supra note 108, at 7. For more explicit references to appeals to sense or
intuition, see id. at 20, 150-53.
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persons are ends and not means, that persons are inviolable, and that
persons have existences separate from society and separate from each
other. 16 According to this theory the individual possesses fights akin to
Locke's natural rights. These rights arise by virtue of personality,
and
17
not by virtue of association with a state or community.
T. M. Scanlon, in Rights, Goals, andFairness,presents a modified
or limited utilitarian approach in which the value of the consequences
of acts determines whether those acts are right, except that certain
rights may be specified to alter the outcome of a simple utilitarian calculation. 1 8 This "two-tier" modified utilitarian approach results from
Scanlon's assertion that subjective preferences do not provide the sole
basis for the valuation of acts and outcomes, but rather objective "benefits and burdens" are to be placed in this role. Scanlon submits that
happiness or the fulfillment of personal preferences is not the only
good, but that in addition the maintenance of fair procedures and the
promotion of equality in distribution are also to be valued, for they are
"moral goals" and are "among the properties that make states of affairs
worth promoting."' 1 9 As a result, certain rights, such as the guarantee
to basic material entitlements and to certain civil liberties, are derived
from this consequentialist scheme. The determination that such moral
rights exist is supported by an empirical determination that in the absence of such rights the resulting society would be unacceptable. 120
Thomas Nagel, in The Fragmentationof Value, voices skepticism
that any single theory or method could provide a means for finding
which decisions are morally correct. The reason for this is the existence
2
of diverse sources of values that are relevant to such determinations.' '
It is for this reason that Nagel finds fault with any form of utilitarianism.' 22 The fact that the success of a general theory of morality seems
doubtful does not mean, however, that work cannot be done in moral
philosophy, but only that the scope of any particular investigation must
be narrowed. The reason one must understand this limitation is so
that, among other things, one may avoid "romantic defeatism," which
causes one to abandon pursuit of a rational moral theory "because it
116. See R. NOZICK, supra note 32, at 30-33. See also Hart, supra note 5, at 831-32;
Nagel, LibertarianismWithout Foundations,85 YALE L.J., 136, 142 (1975).
117. R. Nozick, supra note 32, at 6-12, 45-51, 57-58.
118. Scanlon, supra note 15.
119. Id. at 98-100. See id. at 95, 97.
120. See id. at 103.
121. T. NAGEL, The Fragmentationof Value in MORTAL QUESTIONS 132, 134 (1979) (article
first published in 1977).
122. See id. at 131-32.
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inevitably leaves many problems unsolved."'"
One type of moral approach that Nagel favors is described in War
and Massacre. 4 In this essay Nagel examines the conflict between
two types of moral reason---"utilitarianism" and "absolutism." Utilitarianism, which involves maximizing the good, entails that "if faced
with the possibility of preventing a great evil by producing a lesser, one
Absolutism, on the other hand, conshould choose the lesser evil."''
cerns what people deliberately do, as opposed to what people bring
about.' 2 6 Thus, if an act is forbidden, an absolutist ought not commit

the wrong no matter what the resulting benefits might be. These two
types of moral reasoning stem from two different approaches to the
moral self.
Absolutism is associated with a view of oneself as a small being
interacting with others in a large world. The justifications it requires are primarily interpersonal. Utilitarianism is associated
with a view of oneself as a benevolent bureaucrat distributing
such benefits as one can control to countless other beings ....
The justifications it requires are primarily administrative."
1 28
Nagel presents "a somewhat qualified defense" of absolutism.
He defends absolutism because he finds that "it underlies a valid and
fundamental type of moral judgment-which cannot be reduced to or
overridden by other principles."' 129 The defense is qualified because he
finds that when utilitarian and absolutist considerations conflict, and
when the utilitarian considerations are "overpoweringly weighty and
extremely certain" then "it may become impossible to adhere to an absolutist position."' 30 Nagel concludes that when tragedy will result unless a great wrong is committed, there may be "no moral course for a
man to take, no course free of guilt and responsibility for evil."'13 1 It is
possible, that is, that these two forms of moral intuition, absolutism and
utilitarianism, cannot be placed into one comprehensive, coherent
32
moral theory. 1
123. Id. at 137.
124. T. NAGEL, War and Massacre in
lished in 1972).
125. Id. at 55.
126. Id. at 59.
127. Id. at 68.
128. Id. at 56.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 73-74.
132. Id. at 73.
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53 (1979) (article first pub-
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A review of the theories of this group of anti-utilitarian philosophers shows constructive attempts to break away not only from the tradition of utilitarianism, but also from intuitionism-the view that there
can be no standard moral justification. Some of these nonutilitarian
theories appeal for justification to the coherence of principles, postulates, and new information. Some appeal to traditional notions of morality. All of them (except perhaps for that of Nagel) assert that there
are basic rights or basic values which can support a system of moral
norms.
II. The Nexus Between Moral Philosophy and Constitutional
Law Commentary
As seen in the previous section, the trend in modern moral philosophy is to reject utilitarianism as the basis of ethical systems. 133 The
destructive achievements of the critics of utilitarianism left moral philosophers in danger of having no theoretical support for their ethical
judgments. Consequently, in order to escape intuitionism, the development of new theories with nonutilitarian justifications was necessary.
The question that must be confronted at- this point is why the
movement among certain philosophers away from utilitarianism and
intuitionism and toward rights-based moral theories would be of interest to academics concerned with constitutional law. The answer is that
constitutional law commentators are concerned with the ability of the
Supreme Court to make decisions in a manner consistent with notions
of democracy. Theories of utilitarianism and of intuitionism bear both
upon the validity of our notions of democracy, and upon the ability of
the Supreme Court to make correct decisions.
One value which seems to have been accepted by all constitutional
law commentators is the value of having a sufficiently democratic government. John Hart Ely, an opponent of the search for values that has
begun in constitutional commentary, states:
We have as a society from the beginning, and now almost instinctively, accepted the notion that a representative democracy must
be our form of government.
Our constitutional development over the past century has
...substantially strengthened the original commitment to control by a majority of the governed. Neither has there existed
among theorists or among Americans generally any serious challenge to the general notion of majoritarian control." 134
133. See supra text accompanying notes 15-45.
134. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 5, 7 (1980).
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Therefore, for the purposes of inquiry into matters of constitutional
law, in general that which upholds democracy is good, and that which
restricts democracy is bad.
Part of the constitutional law commentators' interest in the rise
and fall of utilitarianism is generated by the perceived link between
utilitarianism and democracy. 135 Utilitarianism can be seen as providing some reassurances that majoritarian processes are indeed as valuable as believed. Utilitarianism, therefore, appears to be good. Attacks
on utilitarianism are worrisome. Ely states that an important means of
defending or justifying our attachment to democracy is by establishing
the connection136between democracy and the philosophical tradition of
utilitarianism.

What is important to an attempt to understand the seemingly inexorable appeal of democracy in America is that whether we admit it or not-which is largely a function of whether our
descriptive eye is distracted by the side constraints and distributional corrections or rather remains on the underlying system being corrected-we are all, at least as regards the beginnings of
our analysis of proposed governmental policy, utilitarians.' 7
This begins to reveal some of the fire that may lie behind the utilitarian
controversy. Is Ely claiming, in the interests of democracy, that Rawls,
Fried and Nozick are not American or merely that they are distracted?
Ely presents several connections between utilitarianism and democracy. He draws an analogy between the registering of preferences
in the utilitarian calculus and the registering of choices in voting. He
also points out that both systems assume that only the individual can
determine what makes him or her happy. Ely further analogizes the
metering of strength of preference in the utilitarian calculus to the ef135. Even in the early stages of the development of utilitarian theory, the connection
with the democratic process was perceived. In an essay suggesting certain types of parliamentary reform, Jeremy Bentham states, "Take for the description of the ultimate end, advancement of the universal interest. In the description of this end is includedcomprehension of all distinguishable particular interests... with exception to as small an
extent as possible, interests all to be advanced: without any exception, all to be considered.
1. In the character of a means, in this same description is moreover included-if it be not the
same thing again in other words-practical equality of representation or suffrage." J. BENTHAM, ParliamentaryReform Catechism in A BENTrAM READER 310, 324 (M. Mack ed.

1969). See also id. at 320-21, where Bentham equates the "democratical interest" with the
"universal interest."
136. See Ely, Constitutionallnterpreivisfrt Its Allure andImpossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399,
405 (1978). One should not think that Ely's attachment to utilitarianism is a function of
ignorance of the modem literature attacking utilitarianism. He cites some of it during the
discussion being reviewed. See, e.g., id. at 405-06, nn.24-27.
137. Ely, su~pra note 136, at 406. For a contrasting view, see Rawls, Social Unity and
PrimaryGoods, in UImr.rARuNisM AND BEYOND 182-83 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982).
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fects of persuasion launched by one who is especially activated by a
1 38

cause or candidate.

One may argue that the more the virtues of democracy are accepted, the less one should accept the intrusion of the Supreme Court
into various controversies. 39 This is especially true when the effect of
the intrusion is to invalidate or supercede the commands of a popularly
elected legislative body. All of this assumes, however, that "democracy" means allowing as many decisions as possible to be made by the

people, or perhaps, by their representatives. It is not clear that everyone accepts this meaning of democracy, nor is it clear how allegiance to
a constitution can be incorporated into this kind of democracy. Part of
what characterizes the positions of the new wave of constitutional law
commentators is that they are not satisfied with these notions of democ-

racy, nor with trends in decisions made under the present version of
democracy which reflect these notions. Thus, it becomes important for
them to attack such notions of democracy and their foundations, or at
least to weaken the influence of these notions on theories of judicial

review.
Striking parallels exist between the dissatisfaction with the results
of the majoritarian process on the part of the new constitutional law
commentators, and the dissatisfaction with the results of utilitarianism
as noted by Williams, Dworkin and Scanlon. Even Ely finds that un-

corrected utilitarianism leads to improper results.14° Ely's response to

this is to attempt to correct the analogue of the utilitarian system---the

democratic system-by making it more democratic. However, another
course is possible. As Dworkin and Scanlon argue, one can correct the

process through the assertion of values despite the utilita138. See Ely, supra note 136, at 407-08. Drawing an analogy between the monitoring of
preferences in the utilitarian calculus and the monitoring of preferences in a vote, in legislative decisionmaking, or in the marketplace, is central to many of the observations made in
this article. It is not the case, however, that all utilitarian theorests view the utilitarian
calculus as an aggregation of preferences. Some, like Scanlon, see it as an aggregation of
"benefits and burdens." Scanlon, supra note 15, at 95-98. Such theories do not provide close
analogies to voting, etc. Also, even if one conceives of utilitarianism as the monitoring of
preferences, the utilitarian calculus cannot necessarily be identified with the vote or market
outcomes. Those types of preference monitoring may be perceived as not sufficiently accurate or comprehensive.
139. See Sandalow, supra note 6, at 1163, 1165. The democracy being discussed here is
"pure (representative) democracy" and that which comes closest to approaching it. Certainly it may be argued that judicial activism is necessary and desirable for the furtherance
of the values of "constitutional democracy." See Wright, supra note 2, at 787-88. It will be
important throughout the perusal of these various arguments to discern exactly what each
theorist means by "democracy."
140. See Ely, supra note 136, at 406.
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rian/democratic tally. This alternative course has been adopted in various ways by the new trend constitutional law commentators. This
option is undoubtedly undemocratic in the "pure" sense, but possibly
141
not undemocratic in the broader, "constitutional" sense.
Dissatisfaction with strictly majoritarian notions of democracy
and with the results of the majoritarian process is the first link between
the new commentators and the anti-utilitarian philosophers. The commentators could look to the philosophers' criticism of utilitarianism to
help convince themselves and others that strict adherence to the results
of popular or representative votes is not necessarily the ultimate answer
to political questions. The second link is the commentators' need to
convince themselves and others that the Supreme Court has the ability
to make correct decisions, that is, that values other than the values of
strict majoritarianism could and should be asserted by the Court. This
possibility is supported by the development of new nonutilitarian theories and the fight against intuitionism waged by the philosophers.
Ely has chosen a "representation-reinforcing" orientation as opposed to one calling for the judicial imposition of "fundamental values," not only because in his estimation the latter is "inconsistent with
representative democracy,""14 but also because he feels that there is no
foundation for the assertion of such values. Such values are not justifiable; they are not sufficiently universal. 143 These two reasons imply
that the only "true" values are those that result from the majoritarian
process. Ely's doctrine is an example of the pluralism that Rawls found
closely linked to intuitionism. 1 4 On the other hand, to the extent that
the philosophers can provide nonutilitarian, nonintuitionist moral theories, support is thereby provided to the constitutional law commentators who wish to argue for the assertion of values by the Court and the
abandonment of the various versions of representation-reinforcement
theory.
Aside from democracy, there is another source of legitimacy which
can be attacked through an attack on utilitarianism-the free marketplace.1 45 Just as .democratic notions may grant legitimacy to certain
141. See supra note 139.
142. J. ELY, supra note 134, at 101-02. For a discussion of Ely's representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review, see infra text accompanying notes 201-05.
143. See J.ELY, supra note 134, at 43-72, esp. 56-69. Other traditional constitutional law
commentators would agree that the wholesale injection of values by the Court is undemocratic and unjustifiable, but unlike Ely, might turn to extreme judicial restraint rather than
to the support of representation-reinforcing values. See Wright, supra note 2, at 773-83.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
145. The similarities between democracy and the free market system, because of their
similarity to utilitarianism, can be seen (although they are not commented on) in
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laws no matter how unfair, approval of the free enterprise system may
grant legitimacy to the present economic situation, no matter how uneven the distribution of wealth within the society. The economic analysis of rights (EAR) strikes Charles Fried as a sophisticated utilitarian
theory in urgent need of refutation. 146 EAR is an analogue to, or application of, utilitarianism that attempts to justify the allocation of rights
made by an unencumbered, frictionless market situation. Just as utilitarianism seeks to structure society so as to lead to the greatest aggregate pleasure as measured by the utilitarian calculation, EAR seeks to
allocate rights so as to maximize efficiency and thus approach Paretooptimality. 7 Thus, where the utilitarian finds pleasure, happiness, or
the fulfillment of preferences to be the only source of good, analogously
the EAR theorist finds wealth or the fulfillment of preferences to be the
only source of good. The only reliable guide to what will fulfill the
preferences of the individual is the bargaining behavior of the individual in the marketplace. Therefore, in the ideal situation (i.e., in which
there are no transaction costs), 1 48 the good comes about as the result of
1 49
bargaining in the perfectly free marketplace.
The EAR theorist is concerned with the proper entitlement of
rights in the real world, as opposed to the ideal world-one free of
transaction costs. However, the EAR theorists would like to achieve a
market situation that approximates the ideal, unrestrained market; thus
they will argue for an allocation of rights that would cause an actual
market to tend to function like an ideal market and, consequently,
would maximize efficiency.150
Accordingly, EAR may legitimate the present workings of the
market in three ways. First, to the extent that the present market approaches the frictionless, unrestrained market, the market is good, for it
will correctly allocate goods. Second, since preferences are the only
indication of the good, and preferences are evidenced faithfully only in
bargaining in the marketplace, then whatever is purchased is at least
prima facie good and thus the results of bargaining in the market are
prima facie good. Third, since efficiency is the moral goal, the collecMichelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong With Raionality Review, 13
CREIGHTON L. REv. 487,passim (1979).

146. See C. FRIED, supra note 108, at 85-86.
147. See id. at 89, 92. For a definition of Pareto-optimality, see swpra note 34.
148. Transaction costs are "the costs of effecting a transfer of rights," presumably property rights. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30 (2d ed. 1977). See C. FIED,supra
note 108, at 89.
149. See C. FRIED, supra note 108, at 89-91.
150. See id. at 92.
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tive goal of business-to maximize profit-is at least prima facie good,
so long as externalities are kept low. Thus, EAR and utilitarianism can
be seen to legitimate the current workings of the market, at least in the
eyes of those who will argue that the current market is as close as can
be expected to either a frictionless market, or to a market without significant externalities. Or, alternatively and perhaps more in keeping
with the intent of the EAR theorists, it could be argued that no alteration of the society's economic situation can be allowed under EAR unless those alterations further the efficiency of the marketplace. More
important, EAR supports a view that workings of the unencumbered
market provide the only indication we have of what is to be valued. 5 1
The new constitutional law commentators may wish to discredit
the results of the workings of the marketplace. The marketplace may
deny rights that the commentators find implied in the Constitution or
implied in the function of the Supreme Court. Most notably, various
welfare rights might find legitimacy if the marketplace, which denies
these rights, were not itself seen as morally legitimate. To the extent
that utilitarianism (and thus EAR) can be discounted, the present
workings of the marketplace can be discredited, leaving room for the
assertion of various welfare rights. It should be noted, in addition, that
the evils of the workings of democracy and the evils of the workings of
the marketplace are not isolated. One of the perceived problems of
modern democratic systems might be the extent to which wealth influences the outcome of elections and legislative decisions. Because of
advertising and lobbying, in fact, it is difficult to separate the two.
Therefore, those who are disheartened by the present status of legal
rights would be well served by a theory which could discount the legitimacy of both democratic processes and products of the marketplace.
The nexus that has been suggested is a theoretical nexus only; the
theories of the philosophers can be seen to fit the theoretical needs of
the commentators. The new commentators would like to assert that the
Court has the right in some cases, especially when fundamental rights
are threatened, to nullify legislative commands. They would like to
assert that the Court can rectify situations that deny fundamental
rights. Their cause would be bolstered by the presentation of good arguments supporting first, the existence and force of such fundamental
151. Some economic analyses conclude that legislatures on the whole do not promote
economic efficiency. See Michelman, Constitutions,Statutes andthe Theory ofEfflcientAdjudication, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 431, 440-41 (1980). This renders the analogy between legislative
action and classical utilitarianism, which would uphold the prima facie validity of legislative
action, more complicated. It is possible, then, that a utilitarian would prefer the economic
analogue to the legislative one, and place trust (for day to day issues) solely in the market.
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rights, and second, the assertion that in many cases the Court is more
qualified than a legislature to discern and enforce those rights.
Within the utilitarian perspective, there exist no rights except those
which would maximize the society's aggregate pleasure. If one assumes
that pleasure is the fulfillment of an individual's preferences, and that
each individual knows best what his or her respective preferences are,
then there exist no rights other than those which would be favored as
the result of monitoring the preferences, either through polls (or representatives) or through the market. From this perspective there would
be no rights over which the Court could claim dominion. Arguments
discounting the utilitarian perspective and supporting the existence of
objective rights, discerned through some exercise of reason, would meet
both of the needs of the new commentators. Such arguments would
claim the objective existence of fundamental rights, and would give a
reason why the Court might be more qualified than the legislature in
discerning those rights-because the Court is a detached, reasoning
body.
Whether there is any type of causal relation between the theories
of one and the writings of the other may only be surmised. Three types
of relations may be involved. First, since the work of at least one of the
philosophers viewed 1 52 (if not his most relevant work) was cited by
each of the commentators, it is possible that the writings of the philosophers actually influenced some commentators and thus directly or indirectly influenced others. All of the philosophical materials reviewed in
this article are quite accessible to any individual commentator. Second, this trend in philosophy as well as this trend in constitutional law
commentary may reflect some great change in social perspective, and
may be epiphenomena of some more basic intellectual shift. Third,
there may have been some conditions that forced a change among commentators, which, coincidentally, is well serviced by a parallel trend in
153
moral philosophy.

III. The Traditional Commentary
The trend currently developing in theories of Supreme Court adjudication that favors an appeal to determinate values, provides an exam152. The philosopher is, of course, John Rawls, who is cited for his book, A THEORY

OF

JUSTICE (1971).

153. Martin Shapiro has suggested that the younger commentators' exposure to the Warren Court and lack of exposure to the Court's role in the New Deal may be responsible for
this recent trend toward the assertion of values among the Supreme Court commentators.
See Shapiro, Fathersand Sons: The Court,the Commentators, andthe Searchfor Values in
THE BURGER COURT (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
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ple of the seesaw effect in intellectual movements. 154 In some ways this
new trend, which proposes that the Court may be justified in providing
and asserting values rather than exercising deference to the various legislative bodies, can be likened to the formalism that dominated the theories of Supreme Court adjudication before the turn of the century. It
was against this formalism that the legal realists launched their attacks.1 55 In some ways, the present conventional constitutional law
commentary is an extension of the realist tradition. The new movement toward the assertion of values is, in turn, a reaction to the skeptical doctrines of the realists and their progeny.
There is, however, a profound difference between those who subscribed to nineteenth century formalism and those who are forming this
most recent movement. The difference is, basically, that a member of
the former group would have believed that the values required for
Supreme Court adjudication were to be found within the Constitution, "56
' even if the Constitution was seen merely as the vehicle for
enumerating "natural rights" which are independently valid. 157 The
assertion of values from within the Constitution, although attacked by
the realists since the early part of the century, still had an impact on
decisions well into the new century.1 51 Yet as the confidence in objective values waned, reliance upon democracy as the sole source of values
took firmer hold. As time passed, however, restlessness with this crisis
in values 159 and impatience with its material results have invited a rebirth in the assertion of values. This time, the values embraced are
154. Compare the Hart quote about the current shift away from utilitarianism in the text
accompanying note 5, supra, with the following statement by Roscoe Pound: 'There has
been a notable shift throughout the world from thinking of the task of the legal order as one
of adjusting the exercise of free wills to one of satisfying wants, of which free exercise of the
will is but one. Accordingly, we must start today from a theory of interests, that is, of the
claims or demands or desires which human beings, either individually or in groups or associations or relations, seek to satisfy, of which, therefore, the adjustment of relations and
ordering of conduct through the force of politically organized society must take account."
Pound,.4 Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1, 1 (1943).
155. See Sandalow, supra note 6, at 1172-73; Wright, supra note 2, at 773-75. See also A.
BicKEr., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 13-24 (2d ed. 1978).
156. See Sandalow, supra note 6, at 1164-73.
157. See Perry, supra note 12, at 696-97, esp. 696 n.38.
158. See Sandalow, supra note 6, at 1173.
159. See Fiss, supra note 7, at 16-17. See also Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L. REv. 739, 741 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Objectivity], in which he states, "The
nihilism of today is largely a reaction to [the] reconstructive effort of the sixties. It harks
back to the realist movement of an earlier era, and coincides with a number of contemporary
phenomena-... [including] a social and political culture dominated by the privatization"
of all ends."
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culled not from within the Constitution, but from without. 160 For this
reason, the new assertion of values is more dissonant with democratic
notions than was the assertion of values through nineteenth century
formalism. At least if the values were claimed to have been derived
from the Constitution, their use would be justified by virtue of the democratic adoption of the Constitution. In this situation, the justices
could reply
to attacks on the values used, "We didn't do it-you
16 1
did."

As with all blossoming intellectual movements, even small ones,
the trend towards the assertion of values by constitutional law commentators can be better appreciated after acquaintance is made with
the precedent theories. The doctrine developed by the predecessors,
which, for the purposes of this article, may be called the "traditional
commentary," has been shaped to some extent by the legal precedents
ofLochner 6 2 and its comrades, 163 the historical conditions surrounding

the New Deal," and the culture's philosophical atmosphere, 6 5 which
embraced what Rawls would call intuitionism. 16 6 Thus, the traditional

commentary was developed in order to disfavor judicial activism because of its harmful results and because of the perceived absence of a
possible theoretical foundation. Of course, judicial review is a tradition
that cannot be done away with completely, and it is the task of any
constitutional commentator, traditional or innovative, to carve out theoretical justification for the desired degree of judicial power. 161 Therefore, the traditional commentators are forced to justify some minimal
160. The author does not mean to imply that the new commentators see no connection
between the Constitution and the asserted values. However, their definition of these values
and support for the assertion thereof do not begin and end with the text of the Constitution.
Those who seek to receive all guidance from the text of the Constitution have been labeled
"interpretivists," and their opponents, "noninterpretivists." See J. ELY, supra note 134, at 1;
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. Rnv. 703 (1975). One should not
assume that because the commentators who are now arguing for the assertion of values are
noninterpretivists, all modem noninterpretivists belong to this group of value-asserting commentators. Ely, for instance, criticizes the assertion of values and is a noninterpretivist.
There is doubt, however, as to whether a noninterpretivist can really create a theory devoid
of asserted values.
161. Grey, supra note 160, at 705.
162. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
163. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). See also Grey, supra note 160, at
711; Perry, supra note 12, at 702-03.
164. See Shapiro supra note 153.
165. See Wright, supra note 2, at 781.
166. See supra text accompanying note 48.
167. See Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court'sRole in
American Government, 66 GEo. L.J. 1191, 1203 (1978).
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amount of judicial review by calling on the only sure things in the
modem world, democracy and the intellectual prowess of the lawyer.16
Many of the features of the conglomerate of theories comprising
the traditional commentary can be seen in the opinions of Justice
Frankfurter. The primary tenet to which the traditional commentators
profess faith is the necessity of deference by the Court to legislatures
and majoritarian decisionmaking. Frankfurter champions the cause of
judicial modesty.169 In his view, judicial review must be kept well con170
fined, for it "prevent[s] the full play of the democratic process."
Thus, the Court, in deference to the democratically responsible organs
of government, should set aside legislative pronouncements only in extreme cases-when, for example, there is no "reasonable basis" for the
judgment below, or the statute to be reviewed is not sufficiently specific
to meet the requirements of due process, or the procedure under review
is unfair. 17 1 For Frankfurter, political problems are a matter of conflicting interests of the citizenry. Therefore, resolution of political
problems, or creation of good policy, cannot be achieved by applying
absolute rules, but only by "candid and informed weighing of the competing interests." 172 The idea that interest balancing is the proper
means for making policy helps to explain not only how the Court is to
make its decisions (seen especially in First Amendment cases), but also
why deference must be paid to legislative decisions. Since there is no a
priori hierarchy of interests, balancing should be done in a way that is
most faithful to all of the interests of the society bound by the statute.
Therefore Congress, or the state legislature, should be allowed its policy judgments, for it is more sensitive than the Court to the interests of
the relevant society.173 The Court, according to Frankfurter, may not
divorce constitutional provisions from their historical contexts in order
to justify the nullification of legislative judgments. 174 Thus, the country
must trust in the fact that, except where constitutional provisions are
clearly abridged, personal freedom is best protected by the majoritarian
175
process, as long as that process remains unobstructed.
168. See Wright, supra note 2, at 773-74.
169. See Shapiro, Judicial Modesty: Down With the Oldl-Up With the New?, 10
U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 533, 543-48 (1963).
170. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 650 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
171. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525-26 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
172. Id. at 525.
173. Id.
174. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940).
175. See id. at 599.
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Similar justifications for judicial modesty and deference to legislatures are presented by various other adherents of the traditional commentary. Learned Hand, for instance, preached extreme judicial
modesty. Finding no basis for judicial review in the Constitution,
Hand states that the only justification for the institution of judicial review is the practical need in our government for one organ to settle
disputes among the federal branches, or between the federal government and the states, so that the system does not collapse. The Court
may exercise its power to nullify statutes only when the responsible
organ has overstepped its constitutionally granted power in enacting
the statute.176 The Court should not substitute its substantive judgments for those of the legislatures, for it has no basis for doing so. Policy choices are simply a matter of determining how much satisfaction
will result in the society from the choice, after the conflicting preferences of individuals cancel each other. 177 Given the fact that democratic participation is indeed valuable, and that there is no reason to
believe that any objective values exist, legislative choices must be favored, and the majoritarian process must be trusted to bring about a
good society.

178

Alexander Bickel argued for judicial modesty in a different way.
Bickel, who in 1962 argued for the role of the Court as enunciating,
ordering, and applying "certain enduring values of our society," 1 79 retracted to a position of values skepticism and judicial modesty in 1969.
Taking the stance that the Court functions properly only if its decisions
are "effective," "good," and "acceptable to society,"' 80 Bickel claims
that the Court should not assert values and thereby make policy, for the
Court cannot do so and function properly. According to Bickel, the
Court acts legitimately only insofar as it decides on the basis of reason
and immutable principles. Because the Court must must be bound by
unyielding principles and because the Court is removed from the people, it cannot produce effective or good decisions by introducing policy
that will be responsive to change, and to the changing interests of the
18 1
people.
Robert Bork agrees with Bickel that the Court may exercise its
176. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 27-30, 66-67 (1958).
177. See id. at 38.
178. See id. at 73-74.
179. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 23-27, 58, 235-36 (1962).
180. A. BICKEL, supra note 155, at 107. This book was first published in 1970.
181. See id. at 75. Bickel, incidentally, seems to have defied whichever forces have been
at work to create the trend charted in this article.
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power legitimately only when it makes principled decisions.' 8 2 Further, Bork argues that the Court may use only such principles in its
decisions as derive from the text and the history of the Constitution,
and "their fair implications."' 1 3 As long as the Court restricts the ambit of its power to interpretation of the Constitution, it cannot be said to
be countermajoritarian, for the people have consented to the dictates of
the Constitution." 8 Bork proclaims that the will of the majority, and
the Constitution by virtue of its being adopted by the majority, comprise the only sources of values for principled decisionmaking, for
"[t]here is no principled way to decide that one man's gratifications are
more deserving of respect than another's or that one form of gratification is more worthy than another."' 8 5 Bork goes on to say,
A right is a form of property, and our thinking about the category
of constitutional property might usefully follow the progress of
thought about economic property. ... The modem intellectual
argues the proper location and definition of property rights according to judgments of utility---the capacity of such rights to
forward
other value. We may, for example, wish to maximize the some
total wealth of society ....186
Bork, then, provides a clear example of how utilitarian definitions of
rights or values have become integral to the argument for judicial modesty inthe traditional commentary. The utilitarian influence seen in
the priority given to interest accommodation, is present also in these
sketches of the theories of Frankfurter, Hand and Bickel.
The view that generalizable principles must guide the Court in its
decisionmaking, seen especially in the approaches of Bickel and Bork,
was given its classical enunciation by Herbert Weschler. According to
Wechsler, the Court's decisions must be principled, for "the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely
principled. 18 7
A principled decision, in the sense that I have in mind, is one that
rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons
that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved. When no sufficient reasons of this
182. See Bork, NeutralPrincilesandSome FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 12 (1971). See also Kurland, Foreword- "Equalin Originand Equalin Title to the Legislative
andExecutive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964).
183. Bork, supra note 182, at 5-8. See also id. at 17.
184. See id.at 2.
185. Id. at 10.
186. Id.at 18.
187. H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Princioles of ConstitutionalLaw, in PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS AND FutNDAMENTAL LAW 21 (1961). The essay also appears as an article at 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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kind can be assigned for overturning value choices of the other
branches of the Government or of a state, those choices must, of
course, survive.18
This requirement constraining the choice of principles used in adjudication is presented as being perhaps more fundamental than the requirement that the Court base its decisions on the Constitution, for
such "neutral principles" must be used in the interpretation of the Constitution. 189 Perhaps the underlying assumption is that the Constitution
is fundamentally unclear, and therefore neutral principles may be the
only truly meaningful restriction on the Court's decisionmaking. It was
this sentiment to which Bork responded, reasserting the centrality of
the text of the Constitution in Supreme Court adjudication. 190 Although it is not clear that this was Wechsler's intention, the "neutral
principles" doctrine was used by the traditional commentators, especially Bickel and Bork, to argue for severe restraint by the Court.1 91
Wechsler's neutral principles criterion for proper judicial decisionmaking is characteristic of the traditional commentary because of its
procedural nature. Much of the traditional commentary is aimed at
defining a role for the Court in which substantive judgments are absent
and procedural rules for decisionmaking suffice. Thus, Wechsler may
be read as arguing that primary importance lies not with which principles are used by the Court, but rather with whether the Court follows
the procedure of applying the same principles to like cases.' 92 Indeed,
Robert McCloskey has presented an argument for judicial modesty
premised on the view that the Court should limit itself to "non-substantive scrutiny" consisting of "procedural fault-finding and statutory interpretation,"' 93 because therein lies its competence.1 94 McCloskey
associates the policy of non-substantive scrutiny with Frankfurter. 95
Certainly Frankfurter's notion of baiancing interests is ostensibly a
formula for non-substantive scrutiny. When the Court resorts to interest balancing, usually in First Amendment cases, it need inject no sub188. H. WECHSLER, supra note 187, at 27.
189. See id. at 23-24.
190. See Bork, supra note 182, at 7-8.
191. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 155, at 96-100, 175-77; Borksupra note 182, at 5-12.
192. See A. BICKEL, supra note 179, at 50, where he describes Wechsler's proposal as
creating a "process" for judicial review.
193. McCloskey, Useful Toil or the Pathsof Glory? Civil Liberties in the 1956 Term ofthe
Supreme Court, 43 VA. L. REv. 803, 830 (1957) [hereinafter cited as McCloskey, 1956 Term];
McCloskey, The Supreme Court Finds a Role: Civil Liberties in the 1955 Term, 42 VA. L.
REv. 735, 758 (1956) [hereinafter cited as McCloskey, 1955 Term].
194. See McCloskey, 1956 Term, supra note 193, at 832-35; McCloskey, 1955 Term,
supra note 193, at 760.
195. See McCloskey, 1955 Term, supra note 193, at 758.
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stantive policy choice. It may simply determine the strengths of the
conflicting interests-which presumably exist independent of the preferences of the Justices-and go through the procedure of balancing or
comparing. When the raw materials for proper policymaking lie scattered among the populace-that is, when proper policymaking involves
monitoring the preferences of the people-a contentless procedure is
well suited for aiding the decisionmaker.
Since in utilitarian and majoritarian theories there can be no relevant input for policymaking besides the manifestations of personal
preference, what a policymaker needs is a method for polling the preferences-a procedure-which will not betray the influence of other factors. Therefore, it is not surprising that those traditional commentators
who hold theories of judicial modesty based on the belief that personal
preferences form the only possible foundation for proper policy decisions, would defend a model for decisionmaking such as interest balancing on the basis of its procedure-like quality. Accordingly, Wallace
Mendelson argues in support of interest balancing because in his opinion there can be no objective standards relevant to the proper resolution of First Amendment conflicts.
It is largely because of the absence of defining standards, I suggest, that the Court has resorted openly to balancing in free
speech cases. We have had too many opinions that hide the inevitable weighing process by pretending that decisions spring fullblown from the Constitution. . . . Open balancing compels a
judge to take full responsibility for his decisions . . . . Above

all, the open balancing technique is calculated to leave "the sovereign prerogative of choice" to the people-with the least interference that is compatible with our tradition ofjudicial review.196
Those attacking interest balancing, attack, at least in part, on the basis
that it is merely a procedure without substance. First Amendment balancing has been attacked for reducing First Amendment rights to a
calculation of expediency with respect to competing interests,1 97 for removing the Constitution from constitutional matters, 198 and for being
unprincipled, or at least not openly principled. 99
196. Mendelson, On the Meaningof the FirstAmendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50
CALIF. L. REv. 821, 825-26 (1962).

197. See, ag., Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1440

(1962).
198. See, e.g., Frantz,Is the FirstAmendment Law?-4 Reply to ProfessorMendelson, 51
729, 732-37 (1963).
199. See, e.g., id. at 732, 748-49. The possibility that mere "procedures" like interest
balancing might be hiding something, like a "substantive" underpinning, becomes very important as the debate for and against value assertion progresses. It is important to decide
CALIF. L. REv.
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Another procedural model for judicial modesty characteristic of
the traditional commentary is based on notions of legislative failure
and Justice Stone's footnote four in Carolene Products." John Hart
Ely has developed a theory of judicial review based on the message of
footnote four, which he takes to be that we should "focus not on
whether this or that substantive value is unusually important or fundamental, but rather on whether the opportunity to participate either in
the political processes by which values are appropriately identified and
accommodated, or in the accommodation those processes have
reached, has been unduly constricted."20 1 Under this theory, the Court
steps into the policymaking fray only when the government is "systematically malfunctioning" because the political process, as facilitated
through the representative organs, is preventing political change or systematically disadvantaging some minority. The Court is well equipped
to play the role assigned by this "representation-reinforcing approach"
not just because lawyers are expert in procedure, but because judges
are removed from the political pressures which would tempt legislators
into restricting the political process in the first place.2" 2 When there is a
"stoppage" in the representational aspect of the political system the
Court should "unblock" it.2 0 3 Since the Court must affirmatively institute that which the hypothetical blocked system would have produced,
it is unlikely that the Court under Ely's theory would be kept free of
whether the procedure-substance dichotomy really makes any sense, or instead whether
decisionmaking "procedures" are inescapably "substantive."
200. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). It reads as
follows:
"There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth ...
"It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. [Citations are given for
cases] [oin the right to vote, .. ..on restraints upon the dissemination of information ...
and. . . as to prohibition of peaceable assembly ....
"Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious .. .or national .. .or racial minorities . ..: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." (citations omitted).
201. J. ELY, supra note 134, at 77. For an earlier footnote four analysis see M. SHAPIRO,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW ch. 1 (1966).
202. See J. ELY, supra note 134, at 102-03.
203. Id. at 136.
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substantive determinations. 2°4 Therefore, Ely's theory is not procedural in the sense that the judge's decision is merely a function of procedure, as in Frankfurter's balancing. 0 5 Rather, Ely's theory is like
Wechsler's, in that a procedure defines the bounds of judicial prerogative. What all of these procedural theories have in common is the assumption that proper policy decisions will more likely be arrived at
from reliance on (what might be called "contentless") procedures, including the procedure of polling preferences, than from reliance on the

assertion of substantive moral premises.20 6
Finally, faithfulness to the text of the Constitution is another aspect of some versions of the traditional commentary. While Bickel and
Ely construct their theories on the assumption that the text of the Constitution is not sufficiently informative to lead the Court to specific
holdings on most issues,20 7 Hand and Bork have assumed otherwise.
Hand appears to have believed that whatever power the Court might
have must be derived from the words of the Constitution and the "his-

torical setting" in which the particular provision was written.208 Being
true to the text and to the historical setting makes it impossible to base
decisions on some of the vague constitutional clauses, a consequence
that fits well with Hand's extreme judicial modesty. As mentioned ear-

lier, Bork agrees that the Supreme Court decisions must be based on
the text and history of the Constitution.20 9 Bork, however, who is willing to consider the "fair implications" of the text and history, and who
finds the Constitution more useful in decisionmaking than does Hand,

argues that faithfulness to the Constitution should be a guideline for
judicial decisionmaking that would complement the neutral principles
requirement. Hans Linde, who believes that constitutional law should
204. See Fiss, supra note 7, at 8-9.
205. Frankfurter does not appear to have been a fan of at least the first paragraph of
footnote four. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526-27 (1951). He may, however,
have endorsed footnote fours second paragraph. See H. HIRsCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER 198 (1981).
206. See J. ELY, supra note 134, at 75 n.*, as to why he believes that his theory does not
call for the assertion of a substantive moral premise-that is, why participation is not a value
like other values. But cf. Tushnet, Darknesson the Edge of Town: The ContributionsofJohn
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045-48 (1980) ("The fundamental
difficulty with Ely's theory is that its basic premise, that obstacles to political participation
should be removed, is hardly value-free." Id. at 1045.).
207. See A. BICKEL, supra note 155, at 177; J. ELY, supra note 134, ch. 2.
208. See L. HAND, supra note 176, at 3, 33-35. See also Perry,supra note 12, at 709-13.
For another theory of strict construction, maintaining that the Court may only make decisions based on interpretation of the text of the Constitution in light of the intentions of the
Framers, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
209. See Bork, supra note 182, at 5-8. See also Grey, supra note 160, at 704.

354

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[VoL 10:315

focus on what the government should do, and not what judges should
do, argues that the dictates of constitutional law should be comprehensible to the government, so that a conscientious government official
could understand how to comply with the dictates without the leadership of judicial decisions at every step. According to Linde, the idea
that constitutional law is to be the concern of the entire government
and not the Court alone necessitates that the emphasis in constitutional
law be placed on the Constitution as the manifestation of "prior political law making" and not on the decisionmaking of the Court. Therefore, judicial review must be confined to "determining the present
scope and meaning of a decision that the nation, at an earlier time,
articulated and enacted into constitutional text."21 0 Linde's view that
the Court should anchor decisions in the constitutional text is to be
contrasted with "another view that sees constitutional clauses as merely
selections of more or less suitable pegs on which judicial policy choices
are hung. 21 1
Several themes may be discerned from the body of traditional
commentary. In general, the purveyors of traditional commentary argue in favor of judicial modesty and legislative supremacy in the field
of policymaking. The belief that values are inescapably personal and
subjective, whether this belief is part of a utilitarian outlook or a
strictly intuitionist outlook, supports the preference for judicial modesty. Since there exist no objective values, the best that can be done is
to please most of the people most of the time, which will be best accomplished by listening to what the people or their representatives have to
say.
The assumed absence of objective values leads the traditional
commentators to put their faith not only in legislatures but also in
(what they see to be) contentless procedures, as contrasted with substantive value choices. One such contentless procedure is the balancing
of interests which, in most cases, is better left to legislatures. Other
procedures are adherence to neutral principles in adjudication, and adherence to legislative failure or representation-reinforcing schemes of
judicial prerogative. Neutral principles and legislative failure perspectives do not rid the Court of substantive decisionmaking, but severely
restrict it.
Apart from the appeal to contentless procedures, the only justification for the assertion of values by the Court against the design of a
legislature is a showing that the value assertion can be supported by the
210. Linde, supra note 109, at 251-55.
211. Id. at 254.

Winter 1983]

NEW SUPREME COURT COMMENTATORS

355

text of the Constitution. Some traditional commentators hold more
trust in the ability of the Court to base decisions on constitutional provisions than others.
IV. New Theories in Constitutional Commentary
The traditional theory of the role of the Supreme Court is being
challenged by a group of constitutional law commentators who have
introduced and developed their rebellious theories in the past ten years.
Kenneth Karst, Paul Brest, Terrence Sandalow, Michael Perry, Harry
Wellington, Owen Fiss, Laurence Tribe and Frank Michelman have
been chosen to represent this new trend in constitutional law commentary. As a group, they argue for a more activist stance by the Court in
order to insure the establishment of certain rights or entitlements. Special attention will be paid to the way in which each justifies the establishment of such rights or entitlements. Justification of the existence of
such rights, or of the accessibility to the Court of a scheme of rights and
values, is the largest obstacle before the new commentators in their
challenge to the traditional theory.
A. The Principled212
L

Kenneth Karst

Kenneth Karst has argued for various principles and values that
he feels should carry weight in constitutional discussion, and which in
some sense reflect truth. These principles and values presumably are
valid despite disapproval manifested by a legislature. They are substantive; they reflect proper ends for processes. One of these principles
is the "principle of equal citizenship."
212. The three classifications that this article imposes on the commentators-namely, the
principled, the political and the philosophical-are not mutually exclusive. Rather, the
three categories are used to emphasize a type of deviation from the traditional commentary
which those assigned to the category exemplify. Thus, the principled create theories that
assert specific substantive moral principles to be used in legitimate Supreme Court
adjudication, in rejection of the insistence by the traditional commentators that substantive
moral principles not embodied in the Constitution should not be asserted by the Court. The
political create theories ofjudicial review that assert that the Court is a political organ with a
policymaking function as legitimate as, although not identical to, a legislature's
policymaking function. The concept of the Court as a political policymaker challenges the
traditional commentators' notion of judicial modesty and legislative supremacy in policy
decisions. The philosophical present philosophically sophisticated theories of judicial
review which deal significantly with questions of the moral validity of and the philosophical
justification for the values asserted in the process of constitutional adjudication. These
theories directly challenge the reliance by the traditional commentators on utilitarianism.
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The essence of equal citizenship is the dignity of full membership
in the society. Thus, the principle not only demands a measure
of equality of legal status, but also promotes a greater equality of
that other kind of status which is a social fact-namely, one's
rank on a scale defined by degrees of deference or regard. The
principle embodies "an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem"
[citing to Rawls]; it often bears
its fruit in those regions where
2 13
symbol becomes substance.
This principle embodies the value of respect for one's basic humanity,
as well as the value of allowing each to participate as a member of the
community, and the value of holding each responsible to the community of which he or she is a member.2 14 Karst presents this principle as
a norm or guideline which a judge should use for guidance in
decisionmaking.2 15
[T]he principle [calls] for judicial intervention when economic inequalities make it impossible for a person to have "a fully human
existence" and the political branches of government turn a blind
eye.
The judicial task, when presented with such a claim, is not
deduction from an authoritative text, but the exercise of judgment. The two subordinate values of equal citizenship-participation and responsibility-may be aligned on opposite sides of
the constitutional balance. But the more that a particular inequality tends to stigmatize or dehumanize its victims, or impair
their ability to participate fully in the society, the more the principle of equal citizenship demands justification2 1in
6 terms of a governmental interest of compelling importance.
It appears, then, that Karst is arguing for a means of social change
which is antimajoritarian. He sets out a program in which the Court is
to be guided not by notions of democracy or democratic failure, but
simply by principles or values. These principles or values cannot be
fully actualized merely by removing barriers to participation in the
political process. 2 17 Rather something further, and by definition antimajoritarian, is required.
Karst is not explicit as to what justifies the use of this principle by
the courts-that is, what makes this principle politically or morally (or
legally) correct. Part of the justification he gives lies in the fact that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to make a principle of
213. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword Equal Citlizenshol Under the
FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1977).
214. See id. at 8.
215. See id. at 42.
216. Id. at 62-63.
217. See id. at 25-26.
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equal citizenship part of the Constitution.2" 8 A foundation in the Constitution, however, is not Karst's primary intended source of justification for the principle. The actual language used by the Constitution in
setting out the principle is relatively unimportant to Karst in this regard. Not only does Karst claim that those provisions supporting the
principle were intentionally made vague so as not to restrict the application of the principle to each era's society, 2 19 but he further states that

it does not "make much functional difference which clause the Court
uses in protecting the values of equal citizenship. What does matter is
that those values be protected, and that we recognize the legitimacy of
their protection by the judiciary."'220 Clearly, then, the legitimacy of
this principle has roots elsewhere than in constitutional language.
Perhaps justification for the principle of equal citizenship derives
from some sort of underlying consensus. 221 It appears that consensus
has at least some role in determining the scope of the principle. For
instance, the rights and duties that arise out of responsibility to one's
community are a function of "our sense of what it means to be a participant in the society. ' 1'2 2 Apart from through an appeal to consensus,
application of the principle by the Supreme Court can be justified
somewhat by the fact that some of the Court's decisions can be explained as applications of this principle, that is, that the principle organized a body of cases into a coherent whole. 223 Karst does not
expend much energy convincing the reader of the moral or legal validity of his principle of equal citizenship. What seems important to him
is that the principle is manifest in some decisions of constitutional law,
that it can be applied to some extent as a neutral principle, that it explains and legitimates some Warren Court decisions, and that its use is
a good thing.' 24
In addition to the principle of equal citizenship, Karst believes that
218. See id. at 17.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 27. See also Karst, supra note 10, at 652-53.
221. Karst hints in a later article that he does not find any necessary validity in the
dictates of conventional morality. See Karst, supra note 10, at 690 n.299, 691-92 n.304. For
a definition of "conventional morality," see infra note 303.
222. Karst, supra note 213, at 9-10. See generally Karst, Equaliyand Communty: Lessonsfrom the Civil Rights Era, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 183, 186 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Karst, Equality and Community].
223. See Karst, supra note 213, at 38-39.
224. See id. In a later article cleary influenced by sociological and social psychological
writings, Karst supports his principle of equal citizenship by arguing that its enforcement or
realization is necessary to the maintenance of modem government and to the viability of
modem communities. Karst, Equality and Community, supra note 222, at 200-03, 206-07.
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there exists a "principle of equal liberty of expression." 2 The central
notion involved is that the government may not promote or inhibit
speech because of its content.226 The ambit of this principle extends to
all of the "interdependent 'decision-making processes' of a complex society." 227 Also, in a more recent article, Karst argues for the existence
of the "freedom of intimate association." 228 This freedom can be likened to one of his principles. 229 Of particular interest is the fact that he
argues in favor of this type of freedom by listing specific values that are
promoted by its existence. His list of values includes the ability to enjoy the company of selected others, the opportunity to care for and be
committed to another, the opportunity for intimacy, and the ability to
shape one's own identity. These values are submitted as the source of
worth for this particular freedom.3 0 In one sense, it is no more remarkable that Karst would present substantive values than that he
would present substantive principles as a basis for constitutional decisionmaking. However, this does merit attention, since constitutional
law commentators have always dealt with constitutional principles, and
thus Karst's innovation is somewhat cloaked by that appellation
("principle"). When Karst speaks of values rather than principles, the
pretense of conventionality is removed.
A court or commentator might recognize such principles and values from trends in Supreme Court case law. Trends are noted, principles found to exist, and then subsequent cases may be judged in light of
the principles. This process is illustrated in a statement by Karst with
reference to the principle of equal liberty of expression:
Although the Supreme Court has only recently recognized the
centrality of the equality principle in the first amendment, the
principle was implicit in the Supreme Court's "public forum" decisions as well as in its decisions protecting the associational
rights of political minorities. More fundamentally, the principle
of equal liberty lies at the heart of the first amendment's protections against government regulation of the content of speech.
Proper appreciation of the importance of the equality principle in
the first amendment suggests the need for a reconsideration of the
results reached by the Supreme Court in several doctrinal
225.
(1975).
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Karst,Equalityas a CentralPrincilein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. Cm. L. Rv. 20
See id. at 53.
Id. at 20.
Karst, supra note 10, at 624.
See id. at 627.
See id. at 629-37.
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23 1

subspheres.
These principles also may be found in works evidencing exemplary
reasoning. Thus, Karst states that the principle of equal liberty of expression emerges from, or is at least supported by, such sources as the
Declaration of Independence and the writings of Locke, Rawls, and
Rousseau. 232 Once distilled, these principles and values may aid a
court or commentator in solving "puzzles," or problems of doctrinal
consistency raised by constitutional issues, by clarifying the purpose of
the specific constitutional protections in question.3 In other words,
analysis of whether a situation fits within the ambit of a constitutional
doctrine may be facilitated by viewing the values that motivate adherence to the doctrine. In addition, these principles and values may provide a court with needed substantive guidance in its task of "interest
balancing." For instance,
[t]he freedom of intimate association, like other constitutional
freedoms, is presumptive rather than absolute. In particular
cases, it may give way to overriding governmental interests. The
freedom does not imply that the state is wholly disabled from
promoting majoritarian views of morality. What the freedom
does demand is a serious search for justifications by the state for
any significant impairment of the values of intimate association.
And, like the First Amendment, which is one of its doctrinal underpinnings, it rejects as illegitimate any asserted justification for
repression of expressive conduct based on the risk that a competing moral view will come to be accepted. Because different governmental actions will invade the values of intimate association
in different degrees, the influence of this freedom will vary from
one case to the next.
The freedom of intimate association is thus a principle that
bears on constitutional interest balancing by helping to establish
the weight to be assigned to one side of the balance.2 34
231. Karst, supra note 225, at 21. See also id. at 28-29; Karst, supra note 10, at 626-27.
In particular, Karst notes: "There is a tension in this Article-as in most writing that addresses emerging legal doctrines-between advocating the recognition of a 'new' freedom
and arguing that it is a freedom already protected sub silentio." Karst, supra note 10, at 626
n.8.
232. See Karst, supra note 225, at 23-25. It appears that Karst views these works as the
manifestations of exemplary reasoning rather than as manifestations of evolving conventional morality.
233. See Karst, supra note 10, at 650-51. He also states: "We need help in these cases,
and we aren't going to find it in conclusory statements about the appropriate standard of
review. The only way to make sense of the equal protection and substantive due process
jurisprudence of the future is to seek guidance in substantive values. And that is where the
freedom of intimate association enters this dimly lit stage." Id. at 669.
234. Id. at 627. See also id. at 692.
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These principles are not simply a means of rationalizing past decisions. They have moral worth, and should be used actively by the
Court. Karst reveals a desire for judicial activism guided by such
principles.
Activism, it is often said, risks the independence of the judiciary.
Judges who are "intransigent," Judge Hand warned, "will be
curbed."... [N]ow, as we approach the end of the unusually
activist decade of the 1960's, one detects in some of the critical
writings a feeling approaching sadness that somehow, against all
the formerly accepted rules, the Court has managed to get away
with it. How can that be?
The answer may be that there is something wrong with the thesis.
Perhaps activism is not the only relevant variable. Perhaps, in
other words, activism offers no particular risk to the judiciary's
independence unless it is directed at the wrong substantive ends.
Is it not clear that the achievements of the Supreme Court during
the three decades of Justices Black and Douglas have been possible precisely because of the political strength the Court gained
during its most activist years? It is reasonable to conclude that if
the present Court is making the right historical choices, it will
emerge from this period of activism and constitutional growth
strong enough to make its contribution to the solution of the next
generation's problems.235
Although as a proponent of judicial activism Karst favors a
nonmajoritarian route to social change, he relates correctness of substantive judicial decisions to public support over time. Thus, he speaks
of the test of the validity of the Court's decisions as being whether they
are "right, in this historical sense.' '1 36 Karst's notion of which principles are good, then, appears to involve, inter alia, an understanding of
what the people really want. Perhaps this is not reflected well by any
particular vote, or vote of representatives, but it can be perceived with
the aid of the test of time.
In addition, Karst's notion of what is a good principle may involve
an evaluation of the effects of the application of the principle. Thus,
there are elements of consequentialism in Karst's writings. In an "ex235. Karst, Invidious Discrimination JusticeDouglasandthe Return ofthe "Natural-LawDue-ProcessFormula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716, 746-47 (1969).
236. Id. at 748. It is important to keep in mind the notion of true consensus as revealed
over time, as being what people really want. Karst clearly is not swayed by ordinary consensus, as, for instance, in the case of women's desire still to be called "Miss" or "Mrs." instead
of "Ms." See Karst, '"4Discriminationso Trivlak" A Note on Law and the Symbolism of
Women's Dependency, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 546,553 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Karst, Women's
Dependency].
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amination of the core values of a constitutional principle of equality,"
Karst writes,
If a city segregates the races on a public beach, the chief harm to
the segregated minority surely is not that it is deprived of the
enjoyment of a few hundred yards of surf. Jim Crow was a system of degradation imposed by laws that were primarily aimed at
symbolizing the inferiority of blacks ....
Inequality is harmful chiefly in its impact on the psyches of
the disadvantaged. .

.

. In modem constitutional parlance, race

is a suspect classificationprimariybecause the dignity of being
recognized as a person-a citizen-is itself a basic right, a "fundamental interest."
Furthermore, the dignity of citizenship is fundamental in the
same way that the right to vote is fundamental: it is instrumental
in the attainment of a wide range of other goods in an achievement-oriented society. 37
Nevertheless, Karst does not specifically pursue a consequentialist theory. It is, in fact, difficult to pin Karst down as to how he would place
his principles in a general theoretical framework. It appears, however,
that Karst is not unhappy about his lack of theory concerning the justification of his principles. In a book review, Karst states:
Innovation, by definition, is hard to justify by reference to the
received wisdom. The beginnings of new judicial doctrine, like
other human beginnings, often are more easily felt than syllogized. Ultimately, of course, if constitutional values are to be
translated into constitutional law, coherent explanation must
come to replace the vague sense of doing the right thing. But it is
only a partial truth that "reason is the life of the law and not just
votes [in the Court, presumably] for your side."23 8
Substance rather than form seems to be Karst's primary concern.
2. PaulBrest
Paul Brest argues, like Karst, for principles that should guide the
237. Karst, Women's Dependency, supra note 236, at 550-51. But see Karst, supra note
10, at 635, where he states, "Mhe core associational value of intimacy [a value which supports the freedom of intimate association] is not to be reduced to its instrumental uses. It is
valued for itself, for the emotions it generates immediately, and not merely for 'the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association."' (quoting Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)).
238. Karst, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1028, 1033 (1976) (reviewing G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975)). Elsewhere, Karst states
that intuition as well as reason guides the law, "and a justification for judicial review that
rests on reason alone is an incomplete justification." Karst, Equality and Community, supra
note 222, at 205. But see Karst, supra note 10, at 629-30.
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Court in its decisions. 23 9 Brest presents a principle quite similar to
Karst's-the "antidiscrimination principle." 2'
"Stated most simply,
the antidiscrimination principle disfavors race-dependent decisions and
conduct-at least when they selectively disadvantage the members of a
minority group. By race-dependent, I mean decisions and conduct...
that would have been different but for the race of those benefited or
disadvantaged by them."2 4 This principle is one of many principles of
justice, and applies by definition only to race-dependent decisions.2 42
The Court, Brest claims, as one of the governmental policymakers,
should apply this principle through judicial review. The Court is well
suited to apply this principle, since it can consider the long range implications of racial policy decisions and employ its "studied reflection" in
this tempestuous area of the law. 24 3 Furthermore, the Court, by its very
nature, is a principled policymaker and must assert its influence as a
guardian of values, especially in times of failure of majoritarian process
or crisis. 2 " To the extent that Brest intends policy decisions to be made
through the application of principles that are not derived primarily
from the Constitution, he intends nonmajoritarian enforcement of
values.
Once again, of course, consensus enters through the back door as
part of Brest's justification of his principles. It does not arrive through
the constructive consensus embodied in the text of the Constitution, but
rather through some underlying moral agreement.
The antidiscrimination principle rests on fundamental moral values that are widely shared in our society. Although the text and
legislative history of laws that incorporate this principle can inform our understanding of it, the principle itself is at least as
likely to inform our interpretations of the laws. This is especially
true with respect to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The text and history of the clause are vague and
ambiguous and cannot, in any event, infuse the antidiscrimination principle with moral force or justify its extension to novel
circumstances and new beneficiaries. Therefore, the argument of
this section does not ultimately turn on authority, but on whether
it comports with the reader's reflective understanding of the an239. See Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term--Foreword In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 53 (1976).
240. Id. at 1. It might be more fair to state that Karst's principle is similar to Brest's,
since Brest's article predated Karst's by a year.
241. Id. at 6.
242. See id. at 5.
243. Id. at 22.
244. See id. at 6, 22.
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tidiscrimination principle.2 4 5

Thus the antidiscrimination principle, and presumably the other principles of justice, are manifestations of the society's morality, and not the
society's manifested desires at any particular time, nor the society's old
social compact.
The antidiscrimination principle would have no validity if it did
not represent the moral leanings of a significant segment of the society,
yet it is not the result of any actual vote taken in the society or in a
meeting of its representatives. Rather, as a moral principle, it is supported by more basic moral principles, for instance, those that describe
fairness and moral worth. 2 6 However, Brest also argues for the principle on consequentialist grounds--on the basis of the injuries which
might be avoided if the principle is heeded.247
Brest is concerned not only with the constructive task of the new
constitutional law commentator-helping to engineer a new type of
theory of judicial review-but also with the destructive task of criticizing central features of the traditional commentary. In fact, he concentrates more on this destructive task in his more recent articles, perhaps
because of his growing skepticism concerning the possibility of justifying any specific moral principle or moral stance to be maintained by
the Court. Brest challenges Ely's representation-reinforcing procedural
model for judicial review as being no less dependent on the assertion of
fundamental values by the Court than the fundamental rights theories
which Ely attacks.248 Ely's model, which allocates to the Court the role
of invalidating legislation tainted by prejudice, is impotent, according
to Brest, without some asserted values. Without some choice of values,
the Court could not distinguish between, for instance (this example is
actually Ely's), laws that disadvantage burglars as a class and laws that
disadvantage homosexuals as a class. 249 Brest finds the task of distinguishing which prejudices should be allowed a society and its legisla245. Id. at 5-6. Brest states in a later article, 'The Court has commonly interpreted social morality--or what might be called the 'social text'-in articulating public values." He
continues, "How can a court perform the essential constitutional task without interpreting
the social as well as the written text?... [I]f the social text plays a significant role in factand I agree with Professor Fiss that it must-judges would do well to bring it to the surface,
to understand how it interacts with the written text, and to confront it directly. Suppressing
consciousness of social values, far from constraining the judges' discretion, gives them free
reign-unchecked by self-scrutiny and the criticism of others." Brest, Interpretationandlnterest, 34 STAN. L. Rv. 765, 767-68 (1982).
246. See Brest, supra note 239, at 8, 48. See also id. at 49-50.
247. See id.at 8-11.
248. See Brest, The Substance ofProcess, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981).
249. J. ELY, supra note 134, at 154, 162-63.
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ture (for instance, prejudice against burglars as opposed to prejudice
against homosexuals) to be inherently value-laden.25 ° He expresses
doubt that 1a value-free scheme for judicial review could ever be
developed.

25

Brest also challenges the notion, held by many of the traditional
commentators, that the Constitution supplies all of the values that may
be used in legitimate constitutional adjudication. Brest concludes that
both types of "originalism"--"textualism," which makes the language
of the Constitution the source of constitutional law, or "intentionalism," which makes the intentions of the Framers the source of constitutional law--create impossible tasks for the person involved in
constitutional adjudication.252
The [originalist] interpreter's task as historian can be divided into
three stages or categories. First, she must immerse herself in the
world of the adopters to try to understand constitutional concepts
and values from their perspective. Second, at least the intentionalist must ascertain the adopter's interpretive intent and the intended scope of the provision in question. Third, she must often
"translate" the adopters' concepts and intentions into our time
and apply them to situations that the adopters did not foresee.253
Each of these steps is more difficult than the former, and it is hard to
believe that this process can be undertaken with the reliability and determinacy which motivates the desire for originalist analysis in the first
place.254 Given that originalism cannot be the source of legitimacy in
constitutional decisionmaking, and given that it is unclear why the historical adoption of the Constitution has any binding force on modem
society anyway, 255 Brest proposes that the focus of constitutional adjudication should be the enforcement of (only) those values which are
fundamental to our society.2 16 Such constitutional adjudication "treats
the text and original history as important but not necessarily authorita250. See Brest, supra note 248, at 134-37, 140-41. Brest also claims that many substantive due process claims can be readily translated into representation-reinforcing terms. Id.
at 138.
251. See id. at 142.
252. See Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV.
204, 205, 209 (1980).
253. Id. at 218.
254. See id. at 218-22. The problems of reliably translating the text do not provide the
only obstacles to one who wishes to adjudicate in terms of the Constitution alone, according
to Brest. An additional problem is posed by the fact that "the principles that can be derived
are too vague to help resolve particular cases." Brest, Accommodation of the Majoritarianism
andRightsoHuman Dignity, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 761,763 (1980). See also, Brest, supra note
8, at 1089; Brest, Interpretationand Interest, supra note 245, at 769.
255. See Brest, supra note 252, at 225.
256. See id. at 227.
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tive." 7 By changing the focus of constitutional adjudication from the
Constitution to fundamental values, a more conscious and efficient

form of decisionmaking develops. Brest concludes, "To put it bluntly,
one can better protect fundamental values and the integrity of democratic processes by protecting them than by guessing how other people
8
meant to govern a different society a hundred or more years ago. '25
Brest, who in 1976 argued for the existence of a constitutional antidiscrimination principle with roots in the moral order, and who

thereby implied a moral justification for antimajoritarian judicial review, had withdrawn somewhat by 1981. Brest concludes in his more
recent work that the theories of judicial review proposed by both the

proponents of judicial activism and the proponents of judicial restraint
lack theoretical justification.2 59 Such theories can have no justification;

they are doomed to incoherence, because the very notions of liberalism
and constitutional democracy on which they rely create what has been
termed the "Madisonian dilemma." The Madisonian dilemma is said
to exist between the liberty granted to the individual to pursue his or
her self-interest and the mandate of the state to mediate in conflicts of
self-interest, or equivalently, between the rule of the majority and the
rights of the individual in the face of majority preferences. Judicial

review, the institution that protects the rights of the individual against
the majority, is thus inextricably tied to the Madisonian dilemma.

Brest maintains that this dilemma is, as such, "not susceptible to resolution in its own terms."260 Although Brest's new position does not per257. Id. at 228.
258. Id. at 238.
259. See Brest, supra note 8, at 1063, 1089, 1096. Notice, however, that still in 1982 Brest
appears to support the legitimacy of judicial appeal to "social morality." See supra note 245.
260. Brest, supra note 8, at 1105; see id. at 1096-1109. Robert Dahl, whom Brest cites
with respect to Madisonian democracy, id. at 1096 n.191, says the following: "[Tihe logical
and empirical deficiencies of Madison's own thought seem to have arisen in large part from
his inability to reconcile two different goals. On the one hand, Madison substantially accepted the idea that all the adult citizens of a republic must be assigned equal rights, including the right to determine the general direction of government policy. ... On the other
hand, Madison wished to erect a political system that would guarantee the liberties of certain minorities whose avantages of status, power, and wealth would, he thought, probably
not be tolerated indefinitely by a constitutionally untrammeled majority. Hence majorities
had to be constitutionally inhibited." R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 31
(1956). Judicial review was possibly not part of Madison's own scheme, see B. WRIGHT,
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITuTIONAL LAW 18 n.24, 23, 26-27 (1967), but in today's
America the Court and judicial review provide the most prominent voice to the Constitution. So, if Madisonian democracy is an arrangement in which the people rule but the
Constitution also rules, then judicial review is central to the workings of today's Madisonian
democracy. Madisonian democracy, then, pits the Court as the voice of the Constitution
against Congress as the voice of the people. Resolving the question of when the Court
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mit him to argue that there exists a moral justification for the assertion
of certain principles by the Court, it does not preclude argument in
favor of the application of such principles by the Court, if only as the
persuasion of an advocate. For, despite his skepticism, Brest asserts
that "if it would be arrogant to think that we could change the
world, it
2 61
couldn't.
we
if
as
act
to
irresponsible
more
would be even
The theories of Supreme Court decisionmaking presented by
Karst and Brest provide a good introduction to the work of the new
school of constitutional law commentators. Two features of their theories should be noted in this regard. The first is the use of principles.
Certainly, it is not an innovation to argue that the Court should guide
its decisionmaking through the use of principles. As discussed earlier,
the notion that decisions should not be made on the basis of attraction
to a particular result in a particular case, but rather on the basis of
principles that can be applied unfailingly to all cases, is a feature of the
traditional commentary.262 But the role of principle in the theories of
Karst and Brest is much different. Principles or neutral principles in
the traditional view can most properly be seen as means of containing
the power and prerogative of Supreme Court Justices. They prevent ad
hoc decisions; their use, however, does not insure justification for particular decisions.2 63 Therefore, talk of principles has in more traditional commentary generally had a somewhat destructive task. What is
innovative in the works of Karst and Brest is a constructive use of principles. The authors present specific substantive principles on which
they place their trust, and argue for their use by the Supreme Court.
Whereas in traditional commentary the plan for correct social order
involved constraining judicial prerogative, these two commentators envision a social order in which the Justices must push forward, armed
with theoretical weapons, with substantive principles.
Although it may be true that Karst and Brest seem particularly
intent on unearthing correct constitutional principles, there is little
doubt that the more traditional commentators would also appreciate
having correct principles. (Representation-reinforcement comes to
should have the upper hand over Congress (so viewed) is therefore the same as resolving the
dilemma introduced by Madisonian democracy.
261. Brest, supra note 8, at 1108. Compare the approach of Frank Michelman, who
notes the existence of the dilemma, and states: "It is a contradiction that will endure, I
suppose, for as long as our civilization endures. But partial resolutions are possible. Indeed,
it is possibility of partial resolutions that allows us to experience the contradiction as generative tension rather than as dead end." Michelman, PropertyAs A Constitutional Right, 38
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097, 1110 (1981).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 187-91.
263. See J. ELY, supra note 134, at 54-55.
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mind.) The larger gap between the two groups seems to lie in the notion of what would make a principle correct. The traditional commentators are perhaps less interested in the constructive use of principles
because their standard for justification of any such principle insures
that few "substantive" principles would ever be justified. The notion
held by the traditional commentators that "procedural" principles are
somehow value-free, and thus that each group of participants can insert
its own values, makes procedural principles more easily justified, and,
by contrast, makes substantive principles more difficult to justify. 2 "
For the traditional commentators, a proposition of law is justified
insofar as it has resulted from the democratic process. The law can
have virtually any content, as long as it has had a procedurally sound
genesis. Since the basic means of justification is "procedural," the basic
principles of constitutional law must be "procedural." Therefore, it is
more likely that the traditional commentators would settle on seemingly procedural principles, like those inspired by footnote four, rather
than on "substantive" principles, like the principle of equal citizenship
or the antidiscrimination principle. 26 5 Procedure, then, and not substance, is the focus of traditional constitutional justification, and procedure lends itself much more easily to criticism of improper decisions
than to support of affirmative decisions.
With this in mind, the major point of interest is the source ofjustification of propositions of constitutional law. The fact that the newer
commentators do not pay homage to the theories of judicial deference
and majoritarian justification supported by the traditional commentators allows them to develop and argue for substantive principles. It is
264. This type of distinction (between procedure and substance) is still commonly accepted, it seems, and figures significantly in the latest books by Ely and Ackerman, as well as
in the economic analyses of rights. See J. ELY, supra note 134; B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). Yet the view that there could be a value-free decision process seems internally inconsistent. Is it not the case that a value can be defined as
that which directs one to choose between one alternative and, another? The distinction between procedure and substance in the context of moral and legal principles is, at best, elusive. Does the representation-reinforcing model provide a procedure for finding which
statutes are unconstitutional, or does it provide a definition of which statutes are
unacceptable?
265. It might be asked why utilitarianism or footnote four jurisprudence constitute
merely procedural systems, whereas Rawls's system or a system dependent on conventional
morality does not. As just stated, it is difficult to believe that in the context of moral and
legal decisionmaking there is a clear distinction between procedural principles and substantive principles. One may, however, draw a distinction from the fact that the first two are not
used to derive specific "substantive" moral or legal principles to be used in later theorizing.
On the other hand, Rawls, for instance, uses his perhaps procedural original position to
generate substantive principles ofjustice. Similarly, Brest and others use substantive principles derived from conventional morality in their theories. See supra, note 32.
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apparent that neither Karst nor Brest holds the view that the
majoritarian process, manifested through the text of the Constitution,
the will of the legislature, or the curing of democratic dysfunction, is
the only justification for a principle of law. Karst seems to find justification for his constitutional principles in underlying consensus of the
people, or in theoretical or moral attractiveness. Brest seems to have
found justification in conventional morality and in consequentialist
concerns.
The change in focus from seemingly procedural principles to substantive principles parallels the trend in modem moral philosophy. For
the utilitarians, the source of moral truth is the utilitarian calculus, a
means of arriving at that which is proper. However, some modem
moral philosophers, notably Rawls and Fried, have criticized utilitarianism because it is merely procedural and therefore contentless and
incomplete.2 6 6 Put another way, the procedural nature of utilitarianism
is attacked because it distracts the observer from the actual substance
imbedded in the theory, which substance is insufficient as a foundation
for (a good) morality. The underlying sentiments among such moral
philosophers seem to be that there are things which are right and
wrong, good and bad, that these are the focus of moral philosophy, and
that the value of any procedure for discovering what is right or good is
dependent on the validity of the results, not vice versa. Allegiance to a
system that does not guarantee the maintenance of certain rights and
wrongs, but promises only internal consistency, is not prudent.
The philosopher's criticism of moral systems that are intended to
be merely procedural may be applied to the commentator's view of
constitutional law in two ways. The first is that an analogy can be
drawn between the theory of what the Court should do to shape constitutional law and the theory of what an individual or society should do
to shape the society. In this way, the procedural theory of the role of
the Court stemming from footnote four, for instance, can be likened to
the procedural ethical theory in utilitarianism. Thus, one could say
that a theory of constitutional law that does not guarantee substantive
rights can be criticized in the same way as a moral theory that does not
guarantee substantive rights. The second, which does not so directly
view the Court as a moral actor, is that procedural theories of the correct judicial role could be viewed with respect to their underlying assumptions and preferences, instead of being viewed with respect to
their vacuousness. For instance, footnote four theories are based on
certain assumptions: e.g., that there is nothing of value other than that
266. See supra text accompanying notes 27-38.
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which each individual desires, that individuals' desires can be discovered only through their votes (if monitored correctly), that the desires
of one citizen can be nullified by the opposing desires of another, and
so on. Philosophers' criticisms of procedural theories like utilitarianism can be used to discredit traditional constitutional law commentaries by attacking the validity of their underlying moral premises, which
are typically procedure supporting. It should be clear that neither
Karst nor Brest, nor any of the philosophers discussed would accept
entirely these underlying moral premises.
B. The Political
Karst and Brest present principles and values which the Court
might add to its arsenal to defend against social backwardness. Were
the Court to employ such principles openly, the actual or perceived role
of the Court might be affected significantly. However, Karst and Brest
do not really deal with this fact. Sandalow, Perry, Wellington, and
Fiss, on the other hand, support the assertion of values and substantive
principles by the Court, and in doing so discuss the consequential role
change. In fact, their theories focus more on suggesting a proper role
for the Court as a political, policymaking organ, than on suggesting
proper principles for use in adjudication.
1. Terrance Sandalow

For Terrance Sandalow, as for Karst and Brest, a search for substantive principles and values is central to Supreme Court adjudication.
Sandalow, however, unlike the other commentators viewed here, believes that the present majoritarian process in America is the ultimate
source of legitimacy for propositions of law.2 67 The determinations of
Congress, therefore, are necessarily quite legitimate, especially when
these determinations are the product of full deliberation by the body.268
The decisions of the Court, in contrast, are not automatically legitimate. Whereas Congress is majoritarian by design, the Court is not. If
there exists justification for the Court's decisionmaking powers, it must
be sought out. To the extent that such justification exists, Sandalow
finds it in the validity of substantive principles and values.
In traditional commentary, two types of theories are invoked to
justify the assertion of the Court's rule in potentially legislative realms.
The first is the view that whatever the Court can derive from the text of
267. See Sandalow, JudicialProtection ofMinorities, 75 MIcH. L. REv., 1162, 1177-78
(1977).
268. See id. at 1188.
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the Constitution can be asserted without frustrating the democratic
process because of the original consent. The second is the notion that
the maintenance of the democratic process requires that the Court step
in on certain occasions. Sandalow refers to these theories in the following way:
Now a decision can be justified in only two ways, either by demonstrating that it conforms to a controlling standard or that it is
the result of a process that is appropriate for making such decisions. Courts traditionally have attempted to justify constitutional decisions in the former way. Justice Stone's emphasis on
the deficiencies of the legislative process looks toward the second
type of justification: courts can legitimately substitute their judgments for those of legislatures, at least when they are determining
the validity of legislation directed against minorities, because the
judicial process is more appropriate than the legislative for making the choices that are required in that setting.2 69
Sandalow rejects Justice Stone's footnote four reasoning "in its pure
form,"27 0 and he rejects use of the Constitution as the controlling standard. He does not, however, rule out the use of other types of
standards.
A procedural justification for the Court's assertion of its views is
not plausible in Sandalow's eyes, 27 1 for he finds that footnote four theory lacks content.
Even with the gloss placed upon it by Professor Ely [that the costs
of legislation damaging a minority are not reliably reflected in
the legislature because of uneven allocation of the ill effects],
Stone's suggestion is less persuasive than might be supposed from
its broad acceptance. Neither Stone nor Ely contends that all legislation directed against a "discrete and insular minority" is invalid. But if such legislation is sometimes valid and sometimes
invalid, there must be standards by which a determination can be
made. Yet, neither Stone nor Ely explicitly addresses the question how courts are to establish the legitimacy of standards they
employ to make the determination.27 2
269. Id. at 1177.
270. Id.
271. See id. at 1179-80.
272. Id. at 1175. See also Sandalow, The Distrust fPolitics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446, 466
(1981), where he states, "Democratic theory does not provide an equivalent of the econo-

mist's model of perfect competition; except in the most egregious cases, we have no means of
ascertaining by an examination of the inner workings of the political system whether all or
any of the interests in society are adequately represented. In the absence of a model of
perfect democracy, it is difficult to understand how, without appraising results, judgments
could be made about whether one or another group has the 'right amount' of political influ-

ence, or at least sufficient influence to obviate the need of special judicial solicitude for its
interests."
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Further, no qualities of the Court's procedure, such as fairness or impartiality, can justify the overriding of legislative decisions when popular participation is the only value to be promoted.2 73 Therefore, any
legitimacy attaching to the Court's decisions must stem from substantive standards.
Substantive standards, according to Sandalow, cannot come from
the text of the Constitution. "In substance, if not in every particular,
we have, in Grey's phrase, 'an unwritten constitution.' Its content is
not fixed by the limits that the framers imposed upon the power of a
majority. ' 274 There are not pre-existing rules of constitutional law embedded within the Constitution that can be discovered and applied to
cases. 275 Therefore, the Court is in an insupportable position when, for
instance, invalidating legislation specifically on the basis of constitutional provisions such as the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.27 6
Judgment depends on principles that are necessarily value-laden,
principles that are an extension of views concerning the appropriate role of government in society and, ultimately, proper ends of
society. No doubt, such premises are necessary whenever the
constitution is invoked to limit legislative power. Judicial review
has been a persistent source of controversy for precisely that reason. The democratic commitment of our age requires-or at
least has seemed to many to require--that important value
choices rest with institutions that are more politically responsible
than the courts. The judiciary's warrant for curbing legislative
power is especially vulnerable when the limits that are imposed
depend on giving substantive meaning to the due process or
equal protection clauses. The absence of a textual foundation for
whatever substantive principles are proposed to be read into
those clauses diminshes the likelihood that the necessary value
choices are rooted in constitutional tradition and thereby weakens whatever claim the judiciary might have for withdrawing
277
those choices from other institutions of government.
Given this, on what substantive principle is the Court to rely, and when
may it do so? Substantive principles may not be extracted from the
Constitution. Therefore, constitutional law must be seen as the "expression of evolving societal norms.""27 Thus, it is the "changing cir273. See Sandalow, supra note 267, at 1177.
274. Id. at 1165. See Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1033,
1046 (1981).
275. See Sandalow, supra note 267, at 1168.
276. See Sandalow, RacialPreferencesin Higher Education: PoliticalResponsibility and
the JudicialRole, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 659 (1975).
277. Id. at 657.
278. Sandalow, supra note 267, at 1185.
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cumstances and values of our society" 279 that provide the substance
upon which decisions of the Supreme Court should be based.
The legitimacy of decisions made by the Court stems from the
Court's ability to monitor and apply the dictates of the society's norms.
"The central problem in devising a satisfactory theory of judicial review is, thus, to define and justify the process by which societal norms
should be constructed for the purpose of giving content to constitutional law." 28 0 The Court is well qualified to monitor and apply the
dictates of societal norms.
Deciding whether one or another action is consistent with our
values requires reflection. Judicial review, in Justice Stone's familiar phrase, offers the opportunity for a "sober second
thought," an occasion for considering whether challenged governmental action is consistent with broadly shared societal values. By subjecting such action to the test of principle-a test of
conformity of principles that are themselves subject to being
tested by the results that they imply--courts can increase the
prospects that governmental action will conform to those values.
Of course, courts are not the only institutions of government capable of testing action against principle, but experience suggests
that because of their practices and their place in the governmental system they are more likely than others to do so.
However, despite the Court's ability to register social norms, it is not
the primary policymaking body. Congress is the body most appropriate for such decisions, and thus the Court should never be able to invalidate any judgment made by Congress, especially after full debate.2 82
It would appear that the Court may be allowed the power of invalidation through judicial review only for rules adopted by bodies that are
not like legislatures-for instance universities that draw up and adopt
279. Sandalow, supra note 276, at 700. See Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation,
supra note 274, at 1054-55.
280. Sandalow, supra note 267, at 1185. It appears that for Sandalow the process involves, inter alia, tallying the results of legislative decisions in the various states. Sandalow
agrees with Rehnquist's criticism of the result in Roe v. Wade that the fact that the majority
of states had restricted abortions showed that the right to abortion in this nation could not be
fundamental. See Sandalow, Federalism and Social Change, 43 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
29, 35, 36 (1980).
281. Sandalowsupra note 267, at 1186. But see Sandalow, The DistrustofPolitics,supra
note 272, at 457-60, where he argues that whereas courts are particularly suited for undertaking "the protection of individual and minority rights," they are not suited for "the definition
of the rights that individuals and minorities should have." Id. at 460.
282. See Sandalow, supra note 267, at 1186-87. Sandalow sees "legislation recently enacted by most states" as being just as invulnerable as judgments made by Congress. Id. at
1187. But see infra note 283.
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preferential admissions policies.283
It is important to acknowledge all that lies beneath these statements. Sandalow states that the substance for constitutional decisionmaking must come from societal values, and not from the Constitution.
It is clear that he believes that statements concerning this body of
widely shared values can be determined valid through appeal to coherence theory. 4 This is betrayed by the words from the quote above:
"By subjecting such action to the test of principle-a test of conformity
of principles that are themselves subject to being tested by the results
that they imply-courts can increase the prospects that government action will conform to those values." In another work Sandalow states,
A constitutional principle that government may not distribute
burdens or benefits on racial or ethnic grounds is required neither
by the "intentions of the framers" nor by a more general piinciple of constitutional law. Adoption of the principle would be required therefore only if the principle were necessary to justify
one or several more particular decisions that the Court would feel
compelled to make.285
He ends this statement with a citation to Feinberg's description of coherence theory.286 Thus Sandalow appears to believe that there exists a
body of widely shared values, which at any given time is sufficiently
coherent to admit of more or less verifiable ethical propositions as confirmed through coherence theory.
What is puzzling is how, after saying this, Sandalow can claim that
a legislature is always a more proper policy-producing organ than the
Court. Sandalow states,
If constitutional law is to be understood as expressing contemporary social norms, it is hard to see how courts can, in the end, set
their judgment concerning the content of those norms against a
deliberate and broadly based political decision, say, one made by
Congress after full debate or embodied in legislation recently en283. See Sandalow, supra note 276, at 698-99. Sandalow remarks that the widespread
recognition of nationally held fundamental norms may be responsible for the trend limiting
the prerogative of individual states to set the boundaries of personal rights. Thus, in the
area of family relationships and reproduction, for instance, the Court has been making decisions for the whole nation, treating state statutes, much like the conclusions of administrative agencies or universities, as being subject to national norms. See Sandalow, supra note
280, at 33-34.
284. As discussed earlier, coherence theory is characterized by justifying ethical systems
through constantly testing the axioms by the validity of the principles which may be derived
from them, and through constantly testing the principles by their consistency with the axioms and by their consistency with observed phenomena. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
285. Sandalow, supra note 276, at 675.
286. See supra notes 67-70.
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acted in most states. Political decisions such as these ought to be
considered controlling not because they evidence societal
norms-were they only evidence they would, presumably, be
subject to refutation by other evidence-but because the process
that has led to them is the ultimate source of law's legitimacy in a
democratic society. That process confers legitimacy upon the decision not merely because it registers consent in some abstract
way, but . . . because "political responsibility is crucial to the
democratic ideal that governmental policies ought to respond to
the wishes of the citizenry. . . ." A consensus achieved through
a broadly representative political process is, thus, as close as we
are likely to get to the statement
of a norm that can be said to
287
reflect values of the society.
It appears that the society's values are to be the source of proper governmental action. If this is so, how is it that legislative action is something better than evidence of societal norms? It is not societal norm
itself. Is there something intrinsic to the legislative process that brings
it legitimacy aside from the proximity of legislative enactments to societal norms? This would seem to run contrary to Sandalow's ultimate
democratic wish, which he expresses at the close of this paragraph, that
the government get "as close as we are likely to get to the statement of a
norm that can be said to reflect the values of the society. ' 288 It appears
that Sandalow is torn between two visions of democracy. One is a vision of a polity in whichpopularparticipationis the primary value. In
this version of democracy, legislative decisions would be given precedence, despite their content, because of the perceived connection with
popular participation. The other is a vision of a polity in which the
values of thepeople guide governmental decisionmaking. In this version of democracy, those decisions which are most faithful to the "values of the society" would be given precedence.2 89
It is difficult, therefore, to know whether Sandalow is better characterized as one who agrees with the traditional constitutional doctrines
or not.290 But to the extent that he believes that there exist societal
287. Sandalow, supra note 267, at 1186-87.
288. Id.
289. Note the connection between this tension and the "Madisonian dilemma" discussed
by Brest. See supra text accompanying notes 259-60.
290. The difficulty in finding exactly where Sandalow stands is demonstrated by the contrast between two articles which appeared in 1981. In one he states, "To argue that neither
the language of the Constitution nor the intentions of those who employed it controls the
meaning that may subsequently be given to the Constitution is not, of course, to argue that
they lack relevance to the process by which the meaning is derived. Constitutional law is the
means by which we express the values that we hold to be fundamental in the operations of
government. Judges, or others who wish to appeal to the Constitution, must demonstrate
that the principles upon which they propose to confer constitutional status express values
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values that are best monitored by some means other than majoritarian
processes or resort to the Constitution, to the extent that he believes

that there exist norms that can be isolated, defined, and used coherently
and meaningfully in legal or moral argument, and to the extent that he
believes that the Court as a governmental organ is equipped to base
policy decisions on the proper examination of such values, he is a

member of the renegade movement of constitutional law commentators
being viewed here.
2

Michael Perry

Michael Perry, unlike Sandalow, supports judicial activism. He
seeks a source of content for Supreme Court decisions that legitimates

expansive judicial policymaking. Again, important here is a search for
content, and a dissatisfaction with the reliance on procedure. Perry, in

most of his writings, argues that the Court ought to employ principles
or values that are actually held by the citizens, rather than to conduct
itself with deference to the results of procedure which may only simulate approval of the citizens.29 ' Perry envisions an active role for the
Court in the creation of governmental policy. Although he accepts the

doctrine that judicial decisions must be supported by principled explanations, Perry rejects as impractical the view that the Supreme Court
may only interpret and apply the text of the Constitution-the "textual
approach."2'9 2 Further, he rejects the view that the policymaking pro-

cess that is the most majoritarian is necessarily the best.
that our society does hold to be fundamental. One way in which that can be done is by
showing that those values are rooted in history, that they are not merely the result of the
interests or passions of the moment. . . . [A]U history is relevant for that purpose ..
Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation,supra note 274, at 1069.
In another article he states toward the beginning: "The distrust of politics is evident
. . in
m much recent discussion of constitutional law. During the past quarter century, the
answers to an extraordinary variety of questions of public policy have been found in the
Constitution. Issues that traditionally were regarded as within the domain of legislature
have thus come to be decided by courts. The justifications advanced. . . rest on the notion
that there are important areas of public policy in which the political process cannot be
trusted.. . ." Sandalow, Distrust of Politics,supra note 272, at 446-47.
He concludes the second article by stating, "The distrust of politics, in sum, often reflects merely a disagreement with the results it yields, and the attempt to reduce its influence
on governmental policy nothing more than an effort to substitute a process of decision that
will advance interests and values that might not prevail in the political process .... [Wlhen
politically made, the decision rests upon the foundation of democratic theory. We have as
yet no theory that explains how judges may justify preferring the interests and values of
some individuals to those of others." Sandalow, Distrust of Politics,supra note 272, at 468.
291. But see infra text accompanying notes 308-314.
292. See Perry, supra note 167, at 1202-11; Perry,supra note 10, at 284-301.
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If governmental policymaking-of which majoritarian policymaking is one aspect, albeit the principal one-is, on balance,
more responsive to society's professed ideals and sensibilities as a
result of constitutional policymaking by the Court, then, assuming we do not reject society's professed ideals, why should we
reject that Constitutional policymaking?. . .Perhaps for him to
whom moral values have no objective integrity, the process by
which policy is made is more precious than the content of
whatever policy is made; perhaps he believes it to be the summum
bonum that the processes of governmental policymaking should
be exclusively majoritarian. But surely [any supporter of judicial
restraint, in this case Raoul] Berger does not mean to suggest that
radical moral skepticism is an obligatory philosophical stance.
Certainly it is not the traditional American stance.
Clearly, Perry, like others viewed in this section, wishes to see the
Court promote social change in specific ways. Frustrated by deference
to contentless (and thus undirected) process, Perry wishes to define an
acceptable role for an activist Court.
In Perry's account of the judicial role, two functions belong to the
Court. The first is to arbitrate individual disputes. The second is to
propound "general, fundamental ethical principles for the moral education and guidance of the political processes." He calls this second the
"ethical function of judicial review."2'94 As is apparent from the segment quoted above, Perry believes that the government should act in
accord with the values of the citizens. As a governmental body, the
Court must be sensitive to these societal norms. But, as a policymaker,
it must further develop and clarify these norms.
[Ilt oversimplifies the judicial function under expansive judicial
review to suggest that the judge's responsibility is merely to discern societal ideals and sensibilities and to apply them to the cage
at hand. Societal ideals, when we make the heroic effort necessary to articulate them, are quite broad and imprecise. The judicial function will usually be one of working out the implications
of broad, imprecise moral ideals or principles. And in applying
an ideal or principle as a decisional norm in a particular case, the
Court necessarily redefines the ideal with greater precision by
specifying the ideal's "content." Thus, the Court does not play a
passive role in determining societal morality but an active,
even
295
creative one: the Court gives shape to that morality.
293. Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 685, 698 (1978). Perry does not, however,
reject the "principle of electorally accountable policymaking," i.e., that governmental policymaking should be subject to the control of electorally accountable officials. See Perry,
supra note 10, at 263.
294. Perry, supra note 12, at 716.
295. Perry, supra note 167, at 1228. But see Perry,supra note 11, at 286-87 (by trying to
define or refine traditional values the Court is merely fabricating tradition).
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The Court, according to Perry, is particularly qualified to further the
development of societal norms because it is not likely to be swayed by
morally irrelevant factors, such as lobbying and bartering.2 9 6 In addition, the Court can deal with moral issues in a way that a legislature
likely would not. Unlike legislatures, the Court has traditionally
served as "a forum for the subtle dialectical interplay of complex, principled ethical discourse." 297
Justification of judicial activism does not require a showing that
the Court is better able than a legislature to make policy decisions.2 98
One need show only that the Court is competent as a policymaker and
that it makes policy in a fashion different from legislatures.2 99 Perry
envisions a dialectical process involving the two different types of
policymakers, which would give rise to better policy as a result of the
synthesis than either organ could produce alone .3 0
[T]he interplay between Court and society is dialectical. Relying
in large measure on the preliminary efforts of other courts, the
Supreme Court derives various working principles from the totality of the American experience-past and present. The derivation is tentative and incremental. Occasionally, as in Roe v.
Wade, it is inchoate. But it is not, nor can it be, value-neutral.
In turn, society responds to the Court's work, and in responding
it will accept or reject, or more often simply moderate, the principles the Court has established. The Court, in turn, will respond
by assimilating society's response, and by treating that response
as a new facet of the evolutionary American experience that will
underlie and inform the Court's future efforts to refine its working principles and to derive new ones. The Supreme Court's role
in the dialectical process has been 3likened
to that . . . of a
01
teacher "in a vital national seminar."
296. See Perry, supra note 12, at 728.
297. Id. at 729.
298. See id; Perry, supra note 167, at 1228.
299. Perry states, "There is no plausible textual or historical justification for constitutional policymaking by the judiciary.... The justification for the practice, if there is one,
must be functional: if noninterpretive review [i.e., review of constitutionality not based on
the value judgements embodied in the text of the Constitution, and associated with judicial
policymaking] serves a crucial governmental function that no other practice realistically can
be expected to serve, and if it serves that function in a manner that somehow accommodates
the principle of electorally accountable policymaking, then that function constitutes the justification for noninterpretive review." Perry, supra note 10, at 275.
300. See Perry,supra note 12, at 718-19. See also Perry,supra note 11, at 307-10 (explaining the dialectical process).
301. Perry, supra note 167, at 1229. Perry states that legislatures are reliable voices for
society's interests, and thus one may assume that the interplay between the Court and legislatures constitutes a significant part, if not the major part, of the "interplay between Court
and society." See id. at 1228.
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Perry describes the Court as an unmistakably political entity with an
affirmative policymaking role. 30 2 The Court is to be one of the governmental policymakers.
The one assumption that underlies the entire theory is that society
has a body of widely shared values, which provides the means for evaluating governmental policy. Sandalow's theory shares this assumption
to a significant extent. A value judgment is, under this assumption,
valid if it comports with the dictates of society's norms.
IMluch constitutional adjudication involves judicial application
of norms---"basic shared national values"-not found in the
Constitution, but rather in "conventional morality." By "conventional morality," I mean the basic moral, political, and philosophical principles to which society professes commitment, not
specific positions on moral issues taken by a majority in society at
a given time. The legitimacy principle [that a law which abridges
private interests is invalid unless it furthers legitimate governmental objectives] is the basic doctrine that the judiciary uses to
constitutionalize and thereby vindicate conventional morality.
The principle requires that every governmental resolution of
competing values be legitimate, and the criterion of this legitimacy is conventional morality.30 3
It is important to note why the dictates of conventional morality, as
perceived by Perry, are not necessarily the same as the results of a vote
or of a vote of representatives. Any particular vote may involve mo302. See Perry, supra note 12, at 717.
303. Perry, supra note 6, at 387-88. Perry notes that similar suggestions as to the role
played by conventional morality in constitutional law can be found in Grey, supra note 160,
at 703, and Wellington, supra note 6, at 265-311. See Perry, supra note 6, at 387. Grey
states, "Much of our substantive constitutional doctrine is of this kind. Where it arises
"under" some piece of constitutional text, the text is not invoked as the source of the values
or principles that rule the cases. Rather the broad textual provisions are seen as sources of
legitimacy for judicial development and explication of basic shared national values. These
values may be seen as permanent and universal features of human social arrangements-natural law principles-as they typically were in the 18th and 19th centuries. Or they may
be seen as relative to our particular civilization, and subject to growth and change, as they
typically are today. Our characteristic contemporary metaphor is "the living Constitution"--a constitution with provisions suggesting restraints on government in the name of
basic rights, yet sufficiently unspecific to permit the judiciary to elucidate the development
and change in the content of those rights over time." Grey, upra 'note 160, at 709. See
generally Wellington, supra note 6, at 243-49.
Professor H.L.A. Hart describes conventional morality as "standards of conduct which
are widely shared in a particular society, and are to be contrasted with the moral principles
or the moral ideals which may govern an individual's life, but which he does not share with
any considerable number of those with whom he lives." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 165 (1961).
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tives that the society would deem immoral. 3° Conventional morality,
by contrast, involves a society'sprofessed ideals, its "underlying moral
vision," and is independent of the actual practices or current preferences of the society. 305 Perry perceives a societal disunion between theory and practice. These principles of conventional morality are not
30 6
eternal, however, but are redefined by each generation.
According to Perry, the dictates of conventional morality are the
substance of correct judicial decisions. Conventional morality provides
content, leaving deference to the majoritarian processes less necessary.
Perry believes that principles of conventional morality can be isolated
and employed in legal and moral discussion. For instance, he enunciates three fairness norms, which he believes to be among the principles
of conventional morality and thus deserving of implementation in constitutional decisions.
First, we think it unfair for one person or group to inflict harm on
another on the basis of a judgment about relevant facts that no
reasonable person could endorse, a factual judgment not even
plausibly accurate. Any action, whether public or private, inflicting harm on the basis of a palpably inaccurate factual judgment offends our shared sense offairness-as-accuracy. Second,
we think it unfair for one person or group to inflict harm on another on the basis of the latter's possession of a trait that we regard as morally irrelevant. Such action offends our shared sense
offairness-as-nondiscrimination. Third, we think it unfair for one
person or group to inflict on another a harm incommensurate
with whatever good the infliction of the harm might achieve.
Such action offends our shared sense of fairness-asproportionality.
The function of the legitimacy principle in equal protection
is chiefly
the constittionalization of these three fairness
30 7
norms.

In a recent article, Perry repudiates that part of his theory describing conventional morality as the source for judicial policymaking, for
the reason that "there are no consensual values sufficiently determinate
to be of help to the Court," and if there were, "there would probably be
little need for the Court to enforce them frequently against electorally
304. See Perry, supra note 167, at 1226. Recall the discussion of Dworkin's notion of
external preferences. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44, 83-86.
305. See Perry, supra note 167, at 1226.
306. See Perry, Book Review, supra note 293, at 697-99.
307. Perry, supra note 6, at 390. How this second principle of fairness underlies equal
protection doctrine is further developed in Perry, Modem Equal Protection: 4 Conceptualization andAppraisal,79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023 (1979). See also Perry, The PrincipleofEqual
Protection, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 1133 (1981), where he discerns the normative content of the
equal protection principle in a particularly consequentialist fashion.
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accountable officials."30 Perry sees the Court not as the guardian of
the conventional morality, but when involved in making decisions not
founded in the text of the Constitution ("noninterpretive review"),
as a
3 °9
participant in the "religious" conception of American politics.
In dealing with ["political-moral"] issues, the Court, when acting
at its best, has not relied on established moral conventions. To
the contrary, the Court has used such issues as occasions for
moral reevaluation of established conventions and for possible
moral development, leading. . . to the establishment of morally
sounder conventions. . . . Noninterpretive review has served an
important, even indispensible function. It has enabled us, as a
people, to keep faith with two of the most basic aspects of our
collective self-understanding: our "democratic" understanding
of ourselves as a people committed to electorally accountable
policymaking and our "religious" understanding of ourselves as a
people committed to struggle incessantly to see beyond, and then
to live beyond, the imperfections of prevailing moral
conventions.3 10
Perry feels that the centrality of this religious self understanding implies that neither moral skepticism,3 1 1 nor utilitarianism, 3 12 is central to
American culture. Although Perry does not believe that there exists
some single, valid moral theory, he does believe that there may exist
right answers to moral questions of human rights. "[A] right answere.g., that racial segregation is wrong or that state governments ought
not to impose civil disabilities on non-Christians-frequently represents a point at which a variety of philosophical and religious systems
of moral thought and belief converge. 3 13 Such answers "are right or
wrong independently of what a majority of Americans happens to believe, either in the short term or in the long term. ' 3 14 Because Perry
finds moral validity in the convergence of perhaps all or most existing
systems of moral thought, the extent to which Perry actually distances
himself from reliance on conventional morality is unclear.
308. Perry, supra note 11, at 284.
309. Perry states, "I use the word 'religious' in its etymological sense to refer to a binding
vision, a vision that serves as a source of unalienated self-understanding, of 'meaning' in the
sense of existential orientation or rootedness. I do not use the word in any sectarian,theistic,
or otherwise metaphysicalsense." Id. at 288-89 (emphasis in original).
310. Id. at 294-95.
311. See id. at 299-301.
312. "The American people still see themselves as a nation standing under transcendent
judgment; they understand, even if from time to time some members of the intellectual elite
have not, that morality is not arbitrary and that justice cannot be reduced to the sum of the
preferences of the collectivity." Id. at 291..
313. Id. at 304.
314. Id. at 307.
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3. Harry Wellington
Harry Wellington presents a theoretically refined understanding of

the judicial role based on a distinction between "principle" and "policy" akin to that presented by Dworkin. 315 For Wellington, a policy is
an instrumental or consequentialist justification for a rule, and a principle is a nonconsequentialist, moral justification for a rule.316 In his
view, a court involved in common law adjudication acts legitimately
only when it justifies the rules that underlie its decisions with principle,
or with policy that is both widely regarded as socially desirable and

relatively neutral. 317 The source of moral guidelines or principles that
are to be used by courts is conventional morality, which Wellington
defines as "underlying values and attitudes, that translate into 'stan-

dards of conduct which are widely shared in a particular society.' ,,31

By limiting the source of legitimate judicial decisionmaking to the society's body of social norms and to widely held and neutral preferences

of outcome, the courts are denied the opportunity for autocratic behavior and are kept within the bounds of fairness and the dictates of democratic theory.3 19 Democratic theory may favor the society's widely held

moral norms over the results of any particular vote or legislative compromise, and thus a court may legitimately decide contrary to legisla315. Wellington does not attribute this distinction to Dworkin, but does mention that
Dworkin too is concerned with the distinction. See Wellington, supra note 6, at 222 n.1.
Bruce Ackerman argues that in fact Wellington and Dworkin mean different things by the
principle-policy distinction. According to Ackerman, Wellington's principles need be based
only on the society's dominant practices and expectations, while Dworkin's principles must
be based on a coherent political theory. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 171-74.
316. See Wellington, supra note 6, at 222-24.
317. See id. at 226-28, 236. By "neutral" Wellington appears to mean that the policy
does not impose "disproportionate burdens on a particular group (as contrasted with the
population generally) unless there are special reasons that can be adduced for imposing
these burdens." Id. at 236. One of the problems that Wellington sees with judicial decisions
made according to policy in general is that "they may have more finality than is healthy for
a constitutional solution based on problematic assumptions." Wellington, The Nature of
JudicialReview, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 513 (1982) [hereinafter cited as JudicialReview]. The
finality of constitutional decisions is, for Wellington, an appropriate cause for concern about
the institution of judicial review. See id. at 519.
318. Wellington, supra note 6, at 231 (quoting H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 165
(1961)).
319. See Wellington, supra note 6, at 236-38; H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS 17-19 (1968). Wellington argues, in fact, that the criticism of judicial review as
antimajoritarian is generally overstated, for "[t]he power to act in derogation of the immediate or apparent wishes of the majority is peculiar neither to constitutional adjudication nor,
more generally, to the courts." Wellington, JudicialReview, supra note 317, at 487. He continues, "It is possible to view these countermajoritarian forces in the Constitution, legislatures, the bureaucracy, and private associations as flaws in our democratic system. . . .But
such a view seems mistaken." Id. at 490.
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320
tive intent if it can justify the decision on the basis of principle.
The legitimate exercise of power by the Supreme Court in matters
of constitutional law is much like the legitimate exercise of power by
any other court. Courts are granted the authority to assert legal conclusions that can be justified by principles because the courts as institutions are best equipped for providing principled legal justifications.3 2 1
The Supreme Court functions, therefore, to "translate conventional
322
morality into legal principle," since it is well suited for doing so.
The Supreme Court, like other courts, has wide discretion when its decisions can be justified by principle, and restricted discretion when its
decisions must be justified primarily by resort to constitutional policy.
Additionally, the Court is restricted to the use of principles that may be
"related to constitutional text." 323 Yet the text of the Constitution
alone rarely provides sufficient guidance in the definition of principles.3 24 Judicial review of statutes should be guided by the assumption
that policy justifications for the statute are valid, since the legislature is
institutionally more competent than the Court in evaluating policy arguments, but the arguments of principle that might be raised with respect to the statute deserve scrutiny. 325 Consequently, the Court may
reject a statute because it violates the dictates of conventional morality,
but may not reject a statute because it is otherwise unwise or
3 26
inefficient.
Central to Wellington's theory of adjudication is the ability of
judges, including the Justices of the Supreme Court, to understand and
apply the dictates of conventional morality.
[When dealing with legal principles a court must take a moral
point of view. Yet I doubt that one would want to say that a
court is entitled or required to assert its moral point of view. Unlike the moral philosopher, the court is required to assert ours.
This requirement imposes constraints: Judicial reasoning in concrete cases must proceed from society's set of moral principles

320. See Wellington, supra note 6, at 264, 286-87, 291. "It is certainly not difficult to
imagine that the moral ideals of the community are often less than scrupulously regarded in
the give and take of the legislative process with its necessary compromises, trade-offs, and
essential goal orientation." Wellington, JudicialReview, supra note 317, at 514.
321. See Wellington, supra note 6, at 280.
322. Id. at 267.
323. Id.
324. See Wellington, supra note 10, at 1109-10.
325. See Wellington, supra note 6, at 284.
326. Wellington faults Ely for equating legislation or majority rule with conventional
morality. See Wellington, The Importance of Being Elegant, 42 OHIo ST. L.J., 427, 428
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Importance]. See also Wellington, JudicialReview, supra note
317, at 514 n.133.
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and ideals, in much the same way that the judicial interpretation
of documents (contracts, statutes, constitutions--especially constitutions) must proceed from the document. And that is why we
must be concerned with conventional morality, for it is there that
society's set of moral principles and ideals are located.3 27

and moral
Conventional morality is an evolving set of moral 3ideals
28

principles that develops organically within a society.
The American people have a history and tradition which interact
with their common problems to fashion attitudes, values, and aspirations that tend toward a dynamic, but nevertheless relatively
cohesive, society, and that make it possible to discern a conventional morality. This morality may impose obligations that
sometimes are beyond the capacity of some normal adults; therefore, compliance with its obligations may not be "a matter of
course." Yet, it is a morality that is at least knowable to socialized
persons. This is not to imply that individuals would always agree
about the implications of a moral duty or the particular behavior
that a moral principle requires. It is merely to insist that normal
adults know when particular behavior raises serious moral
questions.32 9
The way in which a person would discern the strictures of the society's
conventional morality would be to "live in it, become sensitive to it,
experience widely, read extensively, and ruminate, reflect, and analyze

situations that seem to call moral obligations into play. This task may
be called the method ofphiosophy. 33 ° Courts are better equipped than
legislatures to reflect upon and analyze issues in isolation from contemporary prejudices, and thus are better equipped to be the voice of conventional morality within the political arena.33 '
327. Wellington, supra note 6, at 244.
328. See id. at 245-46.
329. Id. at 245 (emphasis in original).
330. Id. at 246 (emphasis in original). It is unclear whether "it" in the quote refers to the
society or to the conventional morality. It should be noted that Wellington believes legislative decisions provide evidence for, but are not conclusive as to, the features of conventional
morality. Id. at 287. Wellington states elsewhere that judges act inadequately when they
are not sufficiently sensitive to the "political environment [which] is a legitimate aid for the
judge in his difficult judicial task of deciding how to count particular values." H. WELLINGTON, supra note 319, at 19.
331. See Wellington, supra note 6, at 246-49. See also Wellington, JudicialReview,supra
note 317, at 493-94. Note that although courts are the best equipped to be the voice of the
conventional morality, they need not have the last say. Wellington appears to envision a
dialectical relationship between the courts and other voices of the people, similar to that
described by Perry. "When the Justices are right about the moral ideals of the community,
their decisions become settled and accepted. . . . When the Court is wrong, criticism and
analysis help to reveal the mistake-so do the turmoil, the threats, the approval and the
resistance, from all the sources that make up our community. Remember, it is the moral
ideals of the community and not of the wise philosopher that concern the Court. And it is a
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Conventional morality, according to Wellington, evolves slowly,
absorbing the best thought of each generation, and adjusting to the new
conditions that meet each generation. There is no guarantee that the
conventional morality will be as sophisticated as some modem formulations of the hierarchy of moral principles, nor that it will be the
"best" morality, because it changes so slowly. 3 32 Yet, Wellington must
feel that this slow absorption of each generation's best produces a sufficiently good morality to be worthy of guiding the politics of the nation.
Wellington points out that our conventional morality is not utilitarian
in nature. 333 Efficiency alone, although it may provide a basis for policy, is not part of our conventional morality.33 4 Therefore, the principle of utility should not be the guideline by which the Court apportions
legal rights. Wellington is skeptical as to the potential for success of
any critical moral theory, or at least of any "individual rights theory,"
in explaining or describing the scope of constitutional rights, 3 5 or the
3 36
connection between morals and politics.
4. Owen Fiss
The conceptual framework of Owen Fiss may in some ways be
likened to that of Perry. Fiss presents both a political scheme for judicial activism, and also some substantive principles to guide decisionmaking. In Fiss's framework, various aspects of constitutional
adjudication involve interpretation of the Constitution through "mediating principles."
This ... mode of constitutional interpretation deemphasizes the
text. Primary reliance is instead placed on a set of principleswhich I call mediating because they "stand between" the courts
and the Constitution-to give meaning and content to an ideal
embodied in the text. These principles are offered as a paraphrase of the particular textual provision, but in truth the relationship is much more fundamental. They give the provision its
only meaning as a guide for decision. So much so, that over time
one often loses sight of the artificial status of these principlesthey are not "part of" the Constitution, but instead only a judicial
gloss, open to reevaluation and redefinition in a way that the text
wise court that pays attention to the community-not out of fear, but out of obligation." Id.
at 516.
332. See Wellington, supra note 6, at 280.
333. Id. at 231.
334. See id.
335. See Wellington, supra note 10, at 1125-26. See also Wellington, importance,supra
note 326, at 430.
336. See Wellington, supra note 10, at 1134-35. For a definition of "critical morality" see
infra text accompanying note 366.
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of the Constitution is not.
Fiss finds the Constitution to be virtually vacuous. Only the barest
shape of constitutional values is perceivable. To bring about constitutional standards for judicial decisionmaking, substance in the form of
principles must be imported into constitutional law. These principles,
however, are not sacred, and will change. Given the notion of a vague
Constitution and the need for mediating principles, Fiss's affinity with
the other members of this group of new commentators is apparent. Not
only does he, like the others, embark on a search for content, but he
also gives the Court a major political role in providing this content in
the form of principles.
The values that we find in our Constitution-liberty, equality,
due process, freedom of speech. . . -are ambiguous. They are
capable of a great number of different meanings. They often
conflict. There is a need-a constitutional need-to give them
specific meaning, to give them operational content, and, where
there is conflict, to set priorities. All of us, both as individuals
and institutional actors, play a role in this process. In modem
society, where the state is all-pervasive, these values determine
the quality of our social existence--they truly belong to the public-and as a consequence, the range of voices that give meaning
to these values is as broad as the public itself. The legislative and
as well as private institutions,
executive branches of government, 338
have a voice; so should the courts.
337. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT 84-85 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel, & T. Scanlon eds. 1977) (emphasis in original).
338. Fiss, supra note 7, at 1-2. In a later article Fiss expands on his notion of constitutional interpretation. He states, "Adjudication is interpretation: Adjudication is the process
by which a judge comes to understand and express the meaning of an authoritative legal text
and the values embodied in that text." Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 159, at 739. With the
notion ofjudge as interpreter, Fiss seeks to combat skepticism as to the legitimacy ofjudicial
policymaking. Id. at 740. Objectivity in interpretation can be attained if interpretation is
constrained by "disciplining rules" authoritative in the relevant "interpretive community."
There is an interpretive community for legal interpretation, of which judges are members.
See id. at 744-47. Thus the Court may pursue legitimate policymaking through objective
interpretation of the Constitution. "The ultimate authority for a judicial decree is the Constitution, for that text embodies public values and establishes the institutions through which
those values are to be understood and expressed. When asked to justify why the schools of a
community must be desegregated, reference will first be made to some lower court decision,
then to a Supreme Court decision, and finally to the Constitution itself, for it is the source of
both the value of equality and the authority of the judiciary to interpret that value." Id. at
751.
In this view of adjudication as interpretation, the text of the Constitution may be vague,
but not wholly devoid of content. "My defense of adjudication as objective interpretation
.assumes that the Constitution has some meaning-more specifically, that the text embodies the fundamental public values of our society. . . .The idea of adjudication requires
that there exist constitutional values to interpret, just as much as it requires that there be
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With regard to these mediating principles, Fiss, like his comrades,
seeks "substance" and not "procedure." This is apparent from his discussion criticizing the "antidiscrimination principle" and favoring the
"group-disadvantaging principle" as a foundation for equal protection
rulings. The antidiscrimination principle is a statement that "similar
things should be treated similarly."3 39 This is intended to be simply a
procedure, something that may be seen as value-neutral, and thus
something that can be applied by a court without injection of preference. 340 However, just as modem moral philosophers have complained
that the utilitarian calculus, as a procedure, at best does not lead to
correct solutions, and at worst is a camouflage for improper value judgments leading to incorrect solutions, so argues Fiss regarding constitutional principles. Fiss complains that the antidiscrimination principle
is not value-neutral, and that the values it does represent are invalid. 341
He argues that the group-disadvantaging principle, which states that
there should be no laws or practices that hurt disadvantaged groups,
should underlie equal protection decisions instead.342
Fiss appears at first glance to justify his principles and value judgments with consequentialist arguments.343 The dominant mode of justification, however, does not lie in consequentialism, but rather lies in
an appeal to something like conventional morality. It is this type of
justification that provides the bedrock for his consequentialist arguments. The fact that Fiss employs such nonconsequentialist "analytic
tools" as "nonallowable interest" and "compelling benefit" demonstrates that he is not a consequentialist (and therefore not a utilitarian).
That is, when attempting to justify his group-disadvantaging principle,
Fiss claims that certain interests should not be given any weight no
matter how much attention to them would increase total welfare. An
example of such a nonallowable interest is "the interest of whites to
keep blacks in a subordinate position." 3 " Similarly, an ordinary benefit to the society will not justify (a slightly less than) equivalent harm to
a disadvantaged
group; only a compelling benefit could justify such
34 5
harm.

constraints on the interpretive process. Lacking such a belief, adjudication is not possible,
only power." Id. at 762-63.
339. Fiss, supra note 337, at 85.
340. See id. at 97.
341. See id. at 99-123.
342. See id. at 134.
343. See, e.g., Fiss, A Theory ofFairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 258-61
(1971); Fiss, supra note 337, at 128.
344. Fiss, supra note 337, at 142.
345. See id. at 143.
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Although Fiss is somewhat unclear on this topic, he appears to rely
on a notion of conventional morality as the foundation for his legal and
moral principles. In a discussion as to whether the antidiscrimination
principle or the group-disadvantaging principle should be preferred
when adjudicating under the Equal Protection Clause, he states,
[S]ome might argue that the antidiscrimination principle should
be given priority.
because equal treatment is a more widely
accepted goal of personal and social action (or more in accord
with traditional American values, such as individualism). But
the argument seems wrong, even if the informal Gallup Poll
came out as imagined. It is not the job of the oracle to tell people-whether it be persons on the street or critical moralistswhat they already believe.
For one thing, the public morality may be only an echo: the
concept of equal treatment may be the more widely accepted subgoal of the ideal of equality because it more nearly accords with
the concept of equality previously propounded by the Supreme
Court and because it is the one embodied by the law.... Of
course, the relationship between law (viewed as pronouncement
rather than directive) and popular morality does not deny the
existence of the latter; an echo is still a sound. But it does mean
that the group-disadvantaging principle may also be widely accepted once it too is r0pounded to be the chosen strategy of the
Supreme Court. . . .
Fiss does not appear in this quote to put too much stock in the "public
morality" because it seems too susceptible to influence. In later work,
however, he does argue that the Court must involve itself with "constitutional values" or "public values." Perhaps the distinction between
the public morality of the earlier article and the public values of the
later article is the distinction between present community sentiments
and the "underlying values and attitudes" or "underlying moral vision" of Wellington and Perry. This distinction surfaces in the following quote:
The judge is not to speak for the minority or otherwise amplify
its voice. The task of the judge is to give meaning to constitutional values, and he does that by working with the constitutional
text, history, and social ideals. He searches for what is true, right,
or just [citing Dworkin].
He does not become a participant in
interest group politics. 34 7
346. Id. at 150-51.
347. Fiss, supra note 7, at 9. Fiss here cites to Dworkin, No RightAnswer?reprintedin 53
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1978), where one finds the following: "[A] proposition of law is sound if it
figures in the best justification that can be provided for the body of legal propositions taken
to be settled. I argue that there are two dimensions along which it must be judged whether a
theory provides the best justification of available legal materials: the dimension of fit and
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These constitutional values need not be "embodied in textually-specific
prohibitions." The Equal Protection Clause and the Free Speech
Clause, for example, are not very specific. Rather, such clauses "simply
contain public values that must be given concrete meaning and harmo3 48
nized with the general structure of the Constitution."
In Fiss's theory, as in the theories of Sandalow, Perry and Welling-

ton, the text of the Constitution does not, without supplement, provide
sufficient guidance to the Court in its decisionmaking. As a result, each
of these commentators sees a need to define a role for the Court that is
consistent with what is seen to be the actual source of principles used in

constitutional adjudication. Fiss's concept of the proper role for the
Court is based on two potentially conflicting notions. The first is that
the Court is one of several political policymakers, and is left to assert its
influence in any way that it can. The second is that the Court is only

structurally well suited to make certain kinds of value-forming decisions.3 49 "Judges have no monopoly on the task of giving meaning to
the dimension of political morality. The dimension of fit supposes that one political theory
ispro tanto a better justification than another if, roughly speaking someone who held that
theory would, in its service, enact more of what is settled than would someone who held the
other.. .. The second dimension--the dimension of political morality--supposes that, if
two justifications provide an equally good fit with the legal materials, one nevertheless provides a better justification than the other if it is superior as a matter of political or moral
theory; if, that is, it comes closer to capturing the rights that people in fact have." Id. at 30
[footnote omitted]. Fiss's reliance on Dworkin is interesting because Dworkin appeals to
conventional morality but does not rest on it. Both Fiss and Dworkin seem to be ambivalent
concerning reliance on conventional morality. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105.
As is apparent from his 1981 symposium, supra note 11, Perry too is ambivalent in this
regard. He rejects resort to conventional morality by the Court, yet he seemingly rests moral
validity on the convergence of existing systems of moral thought. See supra text accompanying notes 310-14. In that article, Perry states that the theory Fiss provides in his Forewordis
"largely harmonious" with Perry's own. See Perry, supra note 11, at 323.
On the other hand, instead of explaining Fiss's appeal to values in terms of Perry's
theory, one may attempt to explain it in terms of Fiss's theory of objective interpretation of
the Constitution. See supra note 338. That is, perhaps for Fiss the source of values to be
used by the Court is not the conventional morality per se, but rather the society's "public
values," which are embedded in the Constitution. "Interpretation does not require agreement or consensus, nor does the objective character of legal interpretation arise from agreement. What is being interpreted is the text, not what individual people believe to be the
good or right. An individual is. . . morally free to dispute the claim of the public morality
embodied in the Constitution and its interpretation. . . but that possibility does not deny
the existence or validity of either that morality or its interpretation." Fiss, Objectiviy, supra
note 159, at 751-52. See also id. at 753. But, as with Perry's new theory, it is unclear how
*Fiss's public morality differs from conventional morality.
348. Fiss, supra note 7, at 11.
349. Fiss states that his observations concerning the role of the Court "imply a view of
judicial function that is not easily cabined. . . . They suggest that courts be seen as a
coordinate source of government power with their own sphere of influence, one that is defined in terms that unify both the occasion andfunction of the exercise of power. The judi-
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the public values of the Constitution, but neither is there reason for
them to be silent. They too can make a contribution to the public de-

bate and inquiry." 350 Judges are just one group of political actors who
attempt to give definition to public values.
One area in which such value-defining adjudication has taken
meaningful steps in the past, and in which it should be allowed to venture inthe future, according to Fiss, is the area of "structural reform."

Structural reform involves adjudicating guidelines for the operation of
large-scale, generally state-controlled, organizations, primarily through
the use of injunctions. The Court's actions in Brown v. Boardof Educa-

tion3 51 provide the paradigm for this type of adjudication. 352 In such
cases, as in all cases, the existence of determinate public values pro-

vides legitimacy for the Court's active role. To the extent that there is
no moral or political truth aside from the result of any particular vote
tally, the Court has no coherent role.
We have lost our confidence in the existence of the values that
underlie the litigation of the 1960's, or, for that matter, in the
existence of any public values. All is preference. That seems to
be the crucial issue, not the issue of relative institutional competence. Only once we reassert our belief in the existence of public
values, that values such as equality, liberty, due process, no cruel
and unusual punishment, security of the person, or free speech
can have a true and important meaning, that must be articulated
and implemented-yes, discovered-will the role of the courts in
our political system become meaningful, or for that matter even
intelligible.35 3
cial role is limited by the existence of constitutional values .....
Id. (emphasis in
original).
350. Fiss, supra note 7, at 2. Like Perry, Fiss envisions a "pluralistic or dialectical relationship" among the various governmental branches. Id. at 15.
351. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
352. See Fiss,supra note 7, at 2-8. See also 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1-12
(1978). "Structural reform" is a form of adjudication that is contrasted with the "dispute
resolution" model of adjudication. Whereas the dispute resolution model assumes two individuals in disagreement seeking out an umpire, structural reform allows the participation of
various groups, which may themselves be internally divided on the issues. More important,
the dispute resolution model seeks to accommodate the private desiies of the individuals,
whereas structural reform litigation vindicates the values that form the "core of a public
morality," which are identified by the Constitution. Fiss, The SocialandPoliticalFoundation
of/djudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 122-24 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Foundation
of-4djudication]. Fiss states, "Just as the dispute resolution model shares the assumptions of
social contract theory and the night watchman state [eg., that 'ends are private, power is
legitimated through individualized consent,' Id. at 127], structural reform and the modem
activist state share a common political theory ....
Both are grounded on the belief in the
existence and importance of public values and a recognition of the need to translate those
values into social reality .
Id. at 128.
I..."
353. Fiss, supra note 7, at 16-17. See also Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 159, at 762-63.
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The question that might be raised here is why the Court should
have much of a role here at all in the implementation of public values.
Should not a policymaking monopoly be granted to legislatures, except
perhaps for those cases involving "legislative failure?" Fiss avoids
these questions, for he rejects the very premise that forms the foundation of constitutional law doctrine based on legislative failure, which is
that the only legitimate source of values employed in policymaking is
people's preferences.
[F]ootnote four and the theory of legislative failure that it announces is radically incomplete. . . . First, the footnote gives no
account of the judicial function even in the acknowledged cases
of legislative failure. It never explains why legislative failure is to
be corrected by judicial action. Second, the footnote never justifies its major normative premise, the one positing the supremacy
of the majoritarian branches even when constitutional values are
at stake. At the root of both failings is, I believe, a denial of the
special character of our constitutional values.3 54
There is no reason, then, to grant a monopoly to the legislature.
Majoritarian influence is only one type of legitimate input into governmental policymaking. Another source of legitimate input is constitutional, or public, values. Courts properly provide an influence in any
area in which such values exist. "The judicial role is limited by the
existence of constitutional values, and the function of courts is to give
meaning to those values."3'55
Due to structural features, courts are better suited to provide such
input than are other governmental organs. Unlike legislators, judges
are guided by social and institutional expectations to ignore their own
preferences, or the preferences of others, and to decide justly or truthfully.3 6 In addition, judges, by the nature of adjudication, must give
principled justifications for their decisions, and must come to decisions
only after participating in "a dialogue about the meaning of the public
values."35' 7 It is a bit ironic, perhaps, that it is actually judicial process
that lends legitimacy to the Court's role as a decisionmaker.358 Thus, at
least to some extent, it is process and not substance that becomes the
354. Fiss, supra note 7, at 8-9.
355. Id. at 11.
356. See id. at 12-13. Yet a court may lose its independence, and its ability to engage in
dialogue, as it becomes involved in the restructuring of institutions under the remedial aspect of structural reform litigation. Fiss, FoundationofAdjudication, supra note 352, at 12627.
357. Fiss, supra note 7, at 13. Also, courts possess a special competence for textual interpretation. See Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 159, at 755.
358. See Fiss, supra note 7, at 16. The courts' "expertise is derived from the special
quality of the judicial process-dialogue and independence." Id. at 34. See also Fiss, Ob-

Winter 1983]

NEW SUPREME COURT COMMENTATORS

focus of this constitutional doctrine as well.3 59
5. Summary

Karst and Brest argue that there exist specific moral and legal
principles that are in some sense valid, and thus should be applied by
judges. From this it may be inferred that there exists some body of
valid principles, some content of morality, but this is inference only.
Sandalow, Perry, Wellington and Fiss proceed one step further by allowing the content of morality as a whole to serve as an integral part of
their theories. Whereas knowledge of individual moral principles
would direct the courts in individual areas of the law, knowledge of the
source of morality as a whole compels a certain type of role for the
courts. A more complete moral theory allows a more complete constitutional doctrine.
It is important to appreciate how changes in moral philosophy
away from utilitarianism might have helped these constitutional law
commentators to construct their theories. Certainly utilitarians as well
as nonutilitarians believe that at any given time a correct moral stance
exists. Within the utilitarian framework, one might say that there is a
best policy in light of the morality defined by utilitarianism. The way
in which the best policy can be found is through the use of the utilitarian calculus. No one is terribly adept at performing the required calculations, but perhaps a vote is the best way to approximate the
hypothetical correct results of the calculations. Therefore, policymaking should be left to the majoritarian organs of government.
Modem moral philosophy, by offering alternative theories for the
correct means of identifying moral truths, can provide constitutional
law commentators with at least two types of alternative constitutional
doctrines. For instance, philosophers like Dworkin and Scanlon present modified utilitarian approaches to the discernment of moral imperatives.360 Such theories may be used to support the notion that, while
the preferences of the members of the society may be morally relevant,361 there are problems with simply monitoring those preferences at
jectivily, supra note 159, at 754-55; Fiss, FoundationofAdudication, supra note 352, at 12526.
359. Of course, Fiss can say that what makes a judicial decision correct is substancethat is, faithfulness to the public morals. The traditional commentator cannot make such a
claim, and will find a judicial decision to be correct if it is properly deferential to
majoritarian procedure, and if it is proper with respect to logical exposition.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45, 71-92, 118-20.
361. Scanlon's theory is of aid here only in spirit, since in his view of utilitarianism,
preferences do not provide the input for the utilitarian calculus, but rather "benefits and
burdens" do. See Scanlon,supra note 15, at 95. For this reason, his utilitarian theory would
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a given time and aggregating them. It might be the case that simple
polling would take into account irrelevant preferences, or would not
take sufficient account of certain underlying moral values.362 So, to the
extent that the basic moral values of a society are not expressed faithfully in the preferences monitored in the polling place, a modified utilitarian theory could support the validity of the popular morality without
supporting the validity of the results of majoritarian processes. In this
way, modified utilitarian theories may provide the constitutional commentators with the basis for a theory of the judicial role grounded in
conventional morality, where "conventional morality" refers to the
body of moral rules accepted as such by a society, without forcing the
commentator to accept notions of legislative deference. Also, Dworkin's theory of adjudication, which calls for constraint of judges by the
"community morality," which is defined as a theory that best explains
relevant community events and institutions, provides another model
for the commentators who base their theories on conventional
363
morality.
Philosophers like Rawls, Nozick and Fried have presented theories that cannot be tied so closely to consensus, but which attempt more
theoretical justifications, such as resort to coherence theory.36 As a
matter of design, such theories, historically based on appeals to reason
or on the preferences of some social elite, 365 will not automatically support the validity of popular values, but rather will provide a means for
evaluating them. Such theories can provide constitutional commentators with the basis for a theory of the judicial role grounded in critical

morality,3 66 where "critical morality" refers to a body of moral rules
not support prima fade moral validity of voting or legislative decision in the first place, and
his revision of utilitarian theory would not support the underlying conventional morality.
362. See R. DwORKi, supra note 42, at 276-77; Scanlon, supra note 15, at 98-101.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105.
364. Consensus of some form arguably will enter into all such theories at some level
Perhaps even our notions concerning which statements follow logically from others is based
on consensus. Certainly, Rawls's theory involves the theoretical consensus of those in the
original position. The distinction between those theories which are or are not closely tied to
consensus involves the extent to which consensus is relied upon, or the proximity of the
discernment of moral truth to some sort of popular manifestations of approbation.
365. That moral truth might be identified by observation of some sort of elite is found in
D. HUME, Ofthe Standardof Taste in OF THE STANDARD OF TASTE AND OTHER ESSAYS 45, 17-19 (J. Lenz ed. 1965); PLATO, Crito 46c-48d in THE COLLECTED DiALOGUES OF PLATO
31-33 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns eds. 1961).
366. This is not meant to imply that the theories of Dworkin and Scanlon, or even utilitarian theories, are not examples of theories of critical morality. The focus of this discussion is
the extent to which such theories support heavy reliance on some sort of consensus. Conventional morality is certainly more consensus-bound than critical morality and less so at
any particular time than vote-based (approximated utilitarian) morality. This latter point is
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that is used to criticize or support
that is the consequence of a theory
367
rules of conventional morality.

For the commentators who have been labeled "the political," the
first of the above two types of theories would be extremely useful.
These four commentators seek to find a means of justifying appeals to
the basic values shared by members of the community, that is, to conventional morality, that will not bind them absolutely to espouse deference to legislative decisions. The modified utilitarian theories of
Dworkin and Scanlon could be used in the formulation of such theories. As long as there exist public values that can be discerned, but
which are not necessarily discerned through majoritarian processes,
there is no reason to believe that determinations by the Court are necessarily less valid than determinations made by legislatures. Yet, at the
same time, there is no need to place trust in the arcane arguments of
professional philosophers, for the people themselves are the source of
true values. In this way, the modified utilitarian theories can provide
these commentators with just what they are looking for: an argument
for the existence of democratic values, values derived from the people,
that does not call for excessive deference to be paid to legislatures.
Specific values may be designated as popular values, if sufficiently argued for, despite the fact that votes and legislative decisions inhibit the
expression of those values. For instance, Dworkin in his modified utilitarian theory places great value on racial and other equality, thereby
eliminating the possibility of a utilitarian justification of, for example,
any form of racial discrimination, 368 and Scanlon introduces the values
369
of "fairness" and "equality" into his modified utilitarian framework.
Dworkin, unlike the other philosophers, has devised a theory of
the role of the Supreme Court built upon his own moral theory. For
Dworkin, the Supreme Court Justice, like any other judge, is granted
3
1 "Arguments of
the task of adjudicating on the basis of principlesY.
principle justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some individual or group right," as opposed to arguments of policy which 'justify a political decision by showing that the
correct because any particular vote may not be consistent with time-worn social norms. It
might even be the case that a society would have norms to which a majority of the members
would not at any given time profess allegiance.
367. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LmERTY AND MORALiTY 82 (1963); S. HAMPSHIRE, Two
THEORIES oF MORALITY 67-70 (1977). See also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 10-15; D.
LYONS, FoRMs AND LmI=s OF UTILITARIANISM 145-50 (1965).

368. See R. DwoRKn, supra note 42, at 234-38.
369. See Scanlon, supra note 15, at 98-101.
370. See R. DwoRxIN, supra note 42, at 148.
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decision advances or protects some collective goal of the community as
a whole." 371 Dworkin argues that judicial decisionmaking should be

based largely on principle, and to the extent that it is, it does not run
afoul of democratic political theory.3 72 The reason that such judicial
decisionmaking is democratic, is that Dworkin's moral theory calls for
the existence of community rights that function to protect citizens in
specific ways from the tyranny of public interest or majority rule, as
discussed earlier.3 7 3 Therefore, when a judge makes a decision based
on arguments of principle, and thus on features of existing community
morality, the judge is neither assuming power by inventing new
"rights," nor usurping power from the majority in a way inconsistent
with the community morality. The function of the judge is not undemocratic in any democracy that recognizes rights that do not change
with every new vote.
The Constitution, according to Dworkin, is an institution for setting out a body of such rights. 74 For him, the Constitution is the primary source, but not the sole source of rights for Supreme Court
adjudication, since independently existing rights must be respected
also.37 5 Dworkin's willingness to depend significantly on the text of the

Constitution derives from his view that the vague standards set out in
the text were chosen intentionally to establish "concepts" of moral
'
standards, rather than "conceptions."376
This distinction377 allows one
to argue that the Constitution binds the Court only to the general notion, or concept, of, for instance, cruelty, and does not bind the Court
to a specific formulation, or conception, of cruelty. The Court is left to
formulate its own modem conception of cruelty, for cruelty as a concept is understood merely by virtue of speaking the common language,37 8 and is not restricted to what the Framers would have
considered to be cruel.
Given this set of assumptions, there seems to be little difficulty in
justifying an activist judiciary. The Court acts legitimately when it
makes decisions founded on arguments of principle, arguments conceming the already existing rights of the parties before it. These rights
derive from the Constitution and the community morality. For at least
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Id. at 82.
See id.at 85.
See supra text accompanying notes 71-92.
See R. DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 106, 133.
See id. at 234-39.
See id. at 133-35.
See supra note 105.

378. See R. DwoRIN, supra note 42, at 127.
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two reasons, the Court is a no less proper body than a legislature for
discerning rights. First, the role of rights is to protect people from the
majority. A legislature is a voice of the majority, and it is unfair to
have the majority judge its own cause.3 79 Second, rights are features of
political theories, and the discernment of rights involves the formulation of such theories. The Court is no worse, and in fact probably better, adapted to the formulation and testing of such theories than is a
legislature. There is a risk that the Court will make the wrong decision,
but such decisions will be eroded in time if they are sufficiently
unpopular. 8 °
C.

The Philosophical

As should be clear by now, one of the central features of some of
these new constitutional theories is a theory of morality. Yet, there are
two ways in which "morality" might be used in this context, and thus
two types of theories that might qualify as a "theory of morality." The
differences between the theories employed by Sandalow, Perry, Wellington and Fiss and those employed by Tribe and Michelman are illustrative of this dichotomy.
One use of "morality" is as a label for a body of society-specific
norms. Within a society, various manifestations of coherence and cohesiveness among the members evolve. Two such significant manifestations are law and morality. From this perspective, a theory of
morality is a theory that discerns norms from the fact of acceptance or
allegiance of the members of the society as a whole. Accordingly,
moral validity is a matter of testing whether certain rules are accepted
by the society as part of its body of moral rules. Theories based on this
concept of morality are theories of conventional morality. Sandalow,
Perry, Wellington and Fiss employ such theories of morality.
Another use of "morality" refers to the body of rules dictating acts
or goals that are "correct" in an ultimate, not society-specific way (although the rules themselves may be society-specific). When one speaks
of "moral truth," "the morality of war," or "a society's immoral legal
system," one may not be speaking of conformance with that society's
norms, but rather may be making evaluations of a more universal or
general character."' Moral validity from this perspective would lie in
the correctness of the norm rather than allegiance to the norm. Many
do not believe that such ultimately correct moral norms exist, yet we
379. Id. at 85, 142-43.
380. See id. at 148.
381. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 367, at 17-24.
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refer to such norms in everyday speech. One can ask, without sounding
peculiar, "Well, I agree that this law reflects our society's view of punishment, but is it moral?" Similarly, one might ask of someone holding
a theory of morality based on conventional morality, "The Supreme
'Court decision reflects the people's view of punishment, but is it correct?" For a person who believes that some correct critical morality
exists, attempts to justify Supreme Court decisions through reliance on
conventional morality will not be considered responsive to the request
for justification. The fact that society assents is not relevant for such
people, since society may be wrong (look at Nazi Germany, for example).38 2 They must seek some other type of justification. Tribe and
Michelman appear to fit into this category of people concerned with the
justi#cation of moral and legal assertions.
L

Laurence Tribe

For Laurence Tribe, as for the four scholars just viewed, the
Supreme Court is a political organ, a governmental policymaker. The
Justices cannot be seen simply as facilitating procedure. Any decision
as to whether a certain piece of legislation is worthy of deference is
itself a substantive governmental policy decision. 383 The Court as a
policymaker has legitimacy distinct from, and not dependent on, the
legitimacy attaching to the majoritarian organs of government. 3 Accordingly, citizens have two distinct types of legitimate governmental
expectations, one satisfied by the courts and one by legislatures: citizens
have a right to participate as litigants and the right to participate as
voters.3 85 Thus, as noted by Perry and Fiss, there is a duality to governmental decisionmaking, which creates policy through a dialectical
382. Rather than say that Nazi Germany's citizens acted morally, the conventional moral
theorist might say that the people there were immoral for they did not act in accord with
their own ideals. This might possibly be true for that society, but it is unlikely that it is true
for every "bad" society. For the conventional moral theorist there must be some empirically
observed link between the people and their moral standard. If no "bad" society is ever
moral, for the conventional moral theorist, the connection between a society and its moral
standard must be attenuated indeed. In such a case the conventional moralist would appear
to be a critical moralist.
383. See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 453; Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities:
The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1065, 1085-87 (1977) [hereinafter cited as New Federalism].
384. See Tribe, Seven PluralistFallacies: In Defense ofthe AdversaryProcess-A Reply to
JusticeRehnquist, 33 U. MiAMi L. REv. 43, 46 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fallacies].But see
Tribe, JurisdictionalGerrymandering: Zoning DifavoredRights Out of the FederalCourts, 16
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129, 131-32 (1981).
385. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 1068.
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process.386
Tribe challenges the traditional view of the role of the Court in
several ways. First, he questions the connection between the text of the
Constitution and the policy decisions of the Court. Tribe takes a moderate view of the use of the Constitution by the Court.
[To say that a principle, however durable and appealing, must
not be imposed by the Supreme Court "ifit lacks connection with
any value the Constitution marks as special" [quote from Ely] is
to say nothing false-but it reveals very little of what is true ...
And to say, at the other extreme, that judicial protection of
human rights "would be better justified by explication of contemporary moral and political ideals not drawn from the contitutional text" [quote from Gray] adds little in this context, for in
the end it is the text that invites a collaborative inquiry, involving
both the Court and the country, into the contemporary contents
and demands of freedom, fairness, and fraternity. The text does
so through majestic generalities that plainly summon judges and
lawmakers alike to a task which simply cannot be understood as
deciphering of an ancient scroll, however much the image of passive interpreter might
8 7 suit an enterprise whose legitimacy is
sometimes doubted.
It appears, then, that although Tribe does want the Court to remain
somewhat faithful to the text of the Constitution, perhaps as a device
for setting the agenda for inquiry, he does not feel that the Constitution
can serve as the sole source of content in the decisionmaking process.
This view itself is not terribly informative. On the one hand, he speaks
of the Constitution's prescription for certain types of policy formation.38 8 On the other hand, he speaks of the "Constitution as a mandate for a process that seeks to incorporate evolving visions of law and
society into constitutional principle,"3 8 9 a notion that perhaps betrays a
view of an open-ended or indeterminate text which provides only "delphic" messages.3 90 It appears that, at the very least, Tribe joins the
other commentators viewed in rejecting an interpretivist or textualist
theory of the judicial function.
The second way in which Tribe challenges the traditional view is
by criticizing the idea that the majoritarian process is the "sole touch386. See Tribe, Fallacies,supra note 384, at 54.
387. L. TaRmE, supra note 10, at 566.
388. See Tribe, supra note 12, at 291. Tribe states: "Mhe Constitution constrains and
shapes the choice among alternative processes of policy-formation and decision no less than
it controls either the content of the specific policies formed or their accurate application to
particular cases." Id. at 291 n.63.
389. Id. at 293.
390. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword"Towarda Model of Roles in
the Due Processof Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14 (1973).
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stone of legitimacy." On one level, he argues that the process is not
wholly successful in monitoring consensus. 391 Even assuming that legislators are capable of monitoring consensus accurately, it is unlikely
that the substance of this consensus will always survive legislative compromise.3 92 On a more fundamental level, the majoritarian process can-

not be the sole source of legitimacy because it does not necessarily lead
to the use of valid substantive values in policymaking.
[I]t is significant that the Court never wholly abandoned the position that legislatures, at least in their regulatory capacity, must
always act in furtherance of public goals transcending the shifting summation of private interests through political process. The
pluralist thesis that there exists no public interest beyond that
summation never became judicial dogma in economic life any
more than in other sectors of human concern. Thus, even when
deferring to legislative actions, the Court continually pointed to
reasons that could
393 justify such actions in terms of the general
public interest.

In short, Tribe rejects intuitionism, and does not find validity in policy
decisions simply because they result from democratic process. "Decisions are legitimate.

. .

because they are right." 394 Thus, questions of

which values are fundamental are "logically and morally prior"
to
395
questions of who will prevail in pluralistic political struggles.
Tribe, like others viewed in this article, does not believe that
majoritarian procedure can necessarily be the source of "right" decisions, since it is only a "contentless" procedure and thus lacking in conscious direction. Tribe addresses himself to the constitutional doctrine
inspired by footnote four-namely, the traditional view that the Court
may step into the world of policymaking by asserting itself (when there
is no clear constitutional mandate) only in order to aid the majoritarian
process when there has been some legislative failure.
[I]t is not difficult to show that the constitutional theme of
perfecting processes of governmental decision is radically indeterminate and fundamentally incomplete. The process theme by
itself determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are
specified, and its content supplemented, by a full theory of sub391. See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 51.
392. See id. at 1091. See generally Tribe, Fallacies,supra note 384, at 43.
393. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 451 (emphasis in original). Although this statement is
merely descriptive, it is clear that Tribe makes it with approval. Further on in the same
discussion Tribe states that as opposed to the "pluralist approach," he supports "a substantive acceptance of certain regulatory laws as supportive of human freedom, rightly understood, and therefore not violative of due process." Id. at 452.
394. Id. at 52.
395. See Tribe, Fallacies,supra note 384, at 44-45.
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sort of theory the processstantive rights and values-the very 396
perfecters are at such pains to avoid.
As an example, Tribe discusses the notion of discrete and insular minorities and how values must be employed in order to distinguish those
minorities from other losers in majoritarian political struggles.3 97 Decisionmaking, then, is inextricably bound up with values. A constitutional doctrine that forces the Court into a minor role out of deference
to process is faulty, for the adoption of such a doctrine would constitute
the triumph of unarticulated, and thus unexamined, values. Another
problem with a doctrine that appeals to "contentless" process as the
source of legitimacy is that the Constitution itself does not teach deference to process, but rather contains many substantive commitments. 398
The basic question Tribe asks of the process-perfecting theorists, as all
of the commentators viewed in this article might ask, is
Why should politics be open to equal participation by all?
Doesn't that norm itself presuppose some substantive vision of
human rights? Why wouldn't a vision rich enough to support a
reasonably complete theory of political openness also suffice to
generate a theory of which substantive claims individuals may
make against the majority? 39 9
The assertion that processes which provide policy answers all have
distinct substantive commitments serves Tribe well in attacking areas
other than majoritarianism. Like Fried, Tribe attacks economic analyses of rights for having unexpressed assumptions as to the nature of
distributive rights and other rights. Whereas Tribe criticizes majoritarianism qua contentless procedure as not being committed to proper values, he criticizes economic analyses of rights qua contentless procedure
for being committed to hidden, improper values. The problem, as he
sees it, with economic analyses of rights stems from their focusing on
the end results of processes, like the functioning of the market, rather
than on the value of the processes themselves. 4 °° With respect to such
processes, it is important to focus not only "on where one ends up but on
how one gets there."4 1 Tribe is led by such reasoning to an attack on
utilitarianism itself also.
396. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1064.
397. See id. at 1073-77.
398. See id. at 1065-67. This might be a little unfair, since the legislative failure doctrine
arose partially out of notions of the emptiness of the Constitution, which Tribe himself
might share. Ely's legislative failure theory is a good illustration of that development. See
I. ELY, supra note 134, chs. 1-4.
399. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1077-78 (emphasis in original).
400. See Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of InstrumentalRationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 628-33 (1973).
401. Id. at 631 (emphasis in original).
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From many perspectives, the procedures that shape individual
and social activity have significance independent of the final
products they generate. Yet the traditional approach of both
moral philosophy and welfare economics has been to focus exclusively on the end results of social and institutional processes in
assessing their value. Thus classical utilitarianism, for example,
has asked simply whether a particular process or distribution produces the greatest net balance of satisfaction.4 °2
Utilitarianism and economic analyses of rights betray (incorrect)
assumptions about the nature of rights not only because they are concerned solely with results, but also because they are concerned solely
with preferences. The utilitarian calculation-a procedure that focuses
only on the satisfaction of human wants-has a value orientation by
virtue of this fact. Yet this orientation is improper because it is simply
not the case that all values that we hold can be expressed in terms of
human preference.1°3
Treating all values as based on personal preferences results in a
major shift in focus: Attention is no longer directed to the ostensible content of the value but rather to the fact that it is a more or
less abstracted indicium of self-interest. Even if one ultimately
chooses the same action under such a shift of focus, one may well
end with the feeling that one has chosen them not out of obligation or for their own sake, but because their opportunity cost in
terms of one's range of personal interests was low enough,
thereby distorting the meaning of the choice and of the actions
chosen. 4°4
The emphasis on valuing procedure for its substance, for what it is
and can be, has led Tribe to a view of how courts should operate, which
he calls "structural due process." Tribe recognizes the irony here, that
those traditional commentators who seek to base constitutional doctrine on process do not pay sufficient attention to the process itself,
while those like Tribe who are interested in substantive directions for
constitutional law must concern themselves with process as something
which is valuable in itself. °5 Fiss's theory, it may be remembered, led
to a similar irony.4 6 In Tribe's formulation, "Ifprocess is constitutionally valued. .. it must be valued not only as a means to some independent end, but for its intrinsic characteristics: being heard is part
of what it means to be a person. Process itself, therefore, becomes
402. Tribe, supra note 11, at 79 (emphasis in original).
403. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 1329.
404. Id. at 1329-30.
405. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 1071.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 357-59. This can be seen to some extent in
Rawls also. See supra note 32.
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substantive."'' 4 7
The goal of structural due process is to have a system of adjudication which, by virtue of procedure, will adapt to changing values and
changing law.4" 8 A constitutionally dictated process, perhaps more so
than constitutionally dictated protection of substance, would be well
equipped to reflect such substantive changes. Such a process would
cause each generation to confront the legitimacy of its laws. Over time,
the evolution of values, rather than the stagnation of laws, should result. The role of the judiciary in this procedural system would be to
promote such evolution through facilitating dialogue concerning the issues at hand." 9 In such dialogue,
[a] citizen whose basic liberty is subject to control is always entitled to some answer (as a matter of minimum rationality-substantive due process) when she asks why the control is being
enforced at all, just as she is entitled to be told (as a matter of
procedural due process) why the control applies to her. In accounting for this demand, structural due process adds only a
twist: the citizen inquiring about why a control has continued in
force is entitled to a responsive answer from the state, not a hypothetical answer from a reviewing court. From the dialogue-centered perspective of structural due process, the proposition that
"a law serves no purposes its defenders are now willing to articulate" (the ground for invalidation under the articulated rationale
approach) is thus equivalent to the proposition that "a law serves
no imaginable purpose" (the usually accepted "neutral" ground
for substantive due process invalidation).1n °
A dialogue that would lend legitimacy to governmental control could
not be cut short by pre-ordained deference to a rule provided in the
past by a governmental body. If a court is allowed to decide a controversy merely by invoking some rule of thumb, it need never confront
the "norms or factual assumptions that are widely shared" at that particular time.4 1
[The commitment to real dialogue which this Article locates at
the heart of an adequate notion of legitimacy represents in part
"an agreement to limit liberty only by reference to a common
knowledge and understanding of the world," an agreement that
avoids creating "a privileged place for the view of some over
others. 4 12
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

Tribe,supra note 9, at 1070-7 1.
See Tribe, supra note 12, at 293.
See id. at 300-02.
Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305-06 (quoting J. RAwLs, supra note 24, at 213).
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The scenario for adjudication under structural due process would
be as follows. If a controversy involving some fundamental rights
comes before a judge, and there is "widely perceived moral flux affecting [those] rights (whether of property or liberty) widely agreed to be
fundamental,"4 3 then the judge would be constrained not to rely on
pre-formed rules concerning the now questioned rights. Rather, the
judge would confront the controversy anew, and settle it in a way that
seems just in that particular situation, after engaging in a dialogue with
the parties.4 14 A coherent explanation for the decision would be expected of the judge. The process would recur until a new consensus is
attained. 4 5 The goal of the process would not be to reject the use of
preconceived ways of dealing with controversies, but rather to insure
that whatever approach is used is tailored to the controversy, taking
into account such factors as context, time, and place.4 16
The role of consensus in this program merits attention. The failure of consensus notifies the judiciary that more individualized treatment of certain issues is called for. The judiciary does not, however,
resort to consensus in order to be informed as to how the cases should
be decided.4 17 By hypothesis, there is no overwhelming consensus to
direct the court in the general case. Yet, rather than trying to approximate actual consensus in some way, even by resorting to evidence of
underlying conventional morality, the court is encouraged to confront
the case on an individual level. By arguing for the removal of any
generalizable feature from such adjudication, Tribe appears to suggest
that the court should act in these cases on the basis of reason, and little
else.
Tribe is clearly concerned with the existence of determinate substantive values, and their application in the lawmaking process. It is
this concern which leads him to be so interested in the unmentioned
foundations of procedures, and which leads him to the notion that policy decisions can be "right." Values, according to Tribe, are not immutable; they change along with changes in society.4 18 In addition, values
cannot all be reduced to some basic value substratum, quantifiable and
413. Tribe, Childhood,Suspect Classpicationsand Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked
Riddles, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8, 27 (1975).
414. See id. at 25. Cf. H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 21-23 (1968)
(courts ought not upset the status quo when there are no relevant pre-existing standards).
415. See Tribe, supra note 413, at 25.
416. See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1137-39.
417. This assumes that the statements in Tribe, supra note 12, at 301-02, are a description
of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and not an assertion that public consensus
indicates what is right or legitimate. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 304 n.108, 314-15.
418. See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 892.
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measurable, so that a little is good and a little more is that much better.
The value of some things is not equivalent to the sum value of any
possible list of attributes in isolation; various values are not commensurable with the satisfaction of preferences, and thus any moral theory
must take into account the existence of "discontinuities." 4'19 Tribe's
view that values are not "continuous" is incompatible with utilitarian
theories, which rely on a measurable common basis for all valuesnamely pleasure or the satisfaction of preferences. Despite the complexity that Tribe attributes to the structure of values, he believes, and
this must be seen as one of the foundations of this theory overall, that
reason may lead one (correctly) to choose one set of values over another. 420 Tribe states that "both the relations within a set of values and
the internal structure of a particular value are amenable to much the
same sort of disciplined insight and rational inquiry that can characterize discussions of factual questions."' 42 1 Not only, then, is Tribe not a
participant in intuitionism, but he seems to be a critical morality
theorist.
Tribe does not always speak of values as a critical morality theorist
would. He speaks of the Constitution as being a vehicle for directing
policymaking by virtue of its being a reflection of the "deep beliefs" of
the society.422 More important is the fact that he supports the application of general rules by courts only when the rules reflect "an underlying set of widely shared values. 42
fI]t is only the existence of communally shared values expressed
as rights and rules that can hope to reconcile the tension between
formal and fraternal conceptions of justice. When substantive
rules cease to represent faithful expressions of communally
shared ideals, they come to enforce-and to be perceived as enforcing--the interests and ends of others, and thereby to destroy
even the most temporary and tentative harmony between the rule
of law and the spirit of community-a harmony one can hope to
sustain only in the presence of shared values and ends.42 4
It appears, however, that this consensus is related to, but secondary to,
a more basic source of values. The idea of such a relationship, which
puts consensus into context in Tribe's framework, is expressed in the
following quote:
419. See Tribe, supra note 11, at 94-97. Compare Taylor, The Diversity of Goods in
UTiriTRiAlisM AND BEYOND 135 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982).
420. See Tribe, supra note 400, at 640.
421. Tribe, supra note 11, at 99.
422. See L. TRmF,supra note 10, at 10.
423. Tribe, supra note 12, at 312.
424. Tribe, supra note 413, at 28 (emphasis in original).
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[Iln the end the analytic approach [i.e., the application of "policyanalytic and microeconomic techniques to the legal problem of
how to assign basic rights and liabilities," p. 628] proves to be
self-defeating and indeed wrongheaded even if it assigns rights in
accord with those underlying feelings["as to what rights should
exist," p. 629], for being "assigned" a right on efficiency grounds
fails to satisfy the particular needs that can be met only by a
sharedsocial and legal understandingthat the right belongs to the
individualbecause the capacity and opportunity it embodies is organicalyandhistoricallyapartof theperson that he is and not for
any purely contingent and essentially managerial reason.4 25
This is not a strong point, and certainly Tribe is not forceful in asserting the existence of some underlying source of value. In fact, he is
virtually silent in this area, probably in awe of the problems attaching
to policy analysis, which he criticizes on several occasions. This silence
betrays a breach in his theoretical framework, and is the source of legitimate confusion as to what holds his theory together. But the assertion
that Tribe assumes an underlying source of values, distinct from any
form of consensus, is given further credence by two related stances that
he takes. The first is his rejection of conventional morality theories.
[A]ttempts to ground constitutional rights of privacy or personhood in conventional morality [citing to Wellington], or in
broadly if not yet universally shared ideas of public welfare [citing to Perry], are helpful but have inherently limited power. For
we are talking, necessarily, about rights of individuals or groups
against the larger community, and against the majority--even an
overwhelming majority--of the society as a whole. Subject to all
of the perils of antimajoritarian judgment, courts-and all who
take seriously their constitutional oaths-must ultimately define
and defend rights against government in terms independent of
consensus or majority will.426
The second stance, as discussed earlier,427 is his allegiance to reason as
the key to the discovery of authentic values.
Now of course the initial definition of values and rights may be
arrived at through a kind of plebiscite. After all, the initial legitimacy of our Bill of Rights depends in part on the fact that it
received a degree of popular sanction and was not simply dictated autonomously from on high. But if one looks closely at the
groups who were denied any voice in approving even this basic
charter, it becomes clear that the legitimacy of such a catalog of
rights cannot turn simply on the fact that more people favored
than opposed the values it expressed. And this is as it must be.
425. Tribe, supra note 400, at 629-30 (emphasis added in part).
426. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 896.
427. See s-pra text accompanying notes 418-21.
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For the legitimacy of any starting point of basic values or basic
rights must rest in the persuasiveness of the reasons that can be
adduced for them.42
Although Tribe is not specific as to the foundation of values, he believes that correct values will be discovered, or more and more correct
values will be distilled, as the result of an "evolving process of interac-

tion and change. '

429

The constitutional-legal framework presumably

exemplified by the workings of the Court, makes such evolution

possible.430
2

FrankMichelman

Frank Michelman is concerned primarily with understanding our
laws and legal system in light of the means available for evaluating
fundamental features of our society. Michelman explores the vantages

that economics and moral philosophy provide for a critical view of judicial decisionmaking. He examines not only what economic and phil-

osophic perspectives reveal about law, but also what imits may be
inherent in those perspectives. Michelman argues that courts in gen-

eral do not sufficiently uphold welfare rights advocated by moral philosophers,4 31 and that courts do not and should not enforce the dictates

of economic efficiency alone.
In his Forewordto the 1968 Term, Michelman seeks to explain the

"judicial 'equality' explosion of recent times" 432 not as a quest for
equality (a somewhat "procedural" notion), but rather as an assertion
of the value of minimum welfare.433 Michelman confronts this explanatory task by showing what kind of moral theory could potentially underlie the "explosion." He describes his project as follows:
428. Tribe, Fallacies,supra note 384, at 45. Reason can be used to discern conventional
morality too. Yet for the conventional moralist it must be the fact of acceptance on some
level, and not the evaluation as reasonable, that is the starting point for rights and values.
This assumes, of course, that there is some aspect of reasonableness that is not determined
by that society's peculiar inclinations.
429. Tribe, supra note 6, at 1338.
430. See id.
431. Michelman is not alone in this search for judicially created and enforced welfare
rights. Tribe also has argued for such entitlements. See Tribe, New Federalism, supra note
383,passim; L. TRiNE, supra note 10, at 918-21.
432. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term--Foreword" On Protecting the Poor
hrough the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 7, 9 (1969).
433. Michelman's argument for "minimum protection" as opposed to equal protection in
wealth discrimination cases is quite similar to Fiss's arguments in favor of the group-disadvantaging principle as opposed to the antidiscrimination principle. Michelman points out
that his minimum protection concerns would require no more of the courts in terms of substantive "value-sculpting" than would the supposedly more procedural equal protection
concerns. See id. at 45.
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Perhaps the best description of what ties these paragraphs together is provisional adoption, as inchoate legal doctrine, of a
theory of social justice which prima facie seems capable of rationalizing an important group of equal protection decisions without positing equality or evenhandedness
as the guiding value (or
43 4
discrimination as the target evil).
The theory that assists him in this task, and which assists him in several
articles, is John Rawls's theory of justice.4 35 The theory leads
Michelman to the conclusion that certain needs can be identified as
"just wants," meaning that it is unjust for society to allow those needs
to be involuntarily unfulfilled. The workings of the marketplace cannot be marshalled by those who would argue in favor of the nonfulfillment of those needs, for the marketplace is not per se just.4 36 The role
that the Court has adopted when raising the banner of equality in some
cases is in fact to protect citizens from unjust workings of the marketplace.
We do better by the Court to regard it, not as nine (or seven, or
five) Canutes railing against the tides of economic inequality
which they have no apparent means of stemming, but as a body
commendably busy with the critically important task of charting
some islands of haven from economic disaster in the ocean of
(what continues to be known as) free enterprise.43 7
Not only the idealistic late Sixties but also the cynical late Seventies find Michelman arguing for the existence of constitutional rights to
minimum entitlements based on moral rights, and revealed in Supreme
Court decisions.4 38 Michelman admits that he cannot prove his "welfare-rights thesis" (that there is a constitutional right to basic entitlements) empirically, since there are judicial statements to the
contrary,4 3 9 yet it is important for him to keep the moral foot in the
constitutional door.
Many or all of the ostensibly contradictory decisions can be
explained away, and the alternative grounds cited by the Court
for many or all of its decisions that do, in fact, vindicate welfare
claims can be shown to be unsatisfactory. These explanations
and showings are too laborious to support a claim that the cases
434. Id. at 10.
435. It is interesting that Rawls's landmark, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, had not yet been
published at the time that the Foreword was written. Michelman cites various early articles
by Rawls in the Foreword See, e.g., id. at 15 n.20.
436. See id. at 30-31.
437. Id. at 33.
438. See Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutationsof "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165,passim (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Permutations]; Michelman, supra note 12,passim.
439. See Michelman, supra note 12, at 663.
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themselves fully make out the existence of any constitutional welfare rights. .... The "tension" among their "rhetoric, reasoning,
and results," as Professor Tribe puts it, does "reflect an unarticulated
perception that there exist constitutional norms establishing
minimal
entitlements to certain services.". . . [T]he cases alone
do not establish the welfare-rights thesis, but they do go far to
answer the first two objections against it-that it is purely fanciful and that it thrusts inappropriate tasks on the courts." 0
Indeed, Michelman has argued that in several areas of the law the

existence of specific legal rights reveals a distinctly moral attitude on
the part of the Court, and thus an underlying morality embedded

within the law. This is the case with respect to the right of access to
state prolitigation (despite inability to pay fees),441 the right to44certain
3
vided services,44 2 and the right to adequate housing.

Michelman's ultimate goal in showing that certain moral attitudes
underlie certain types of cases, and that certain theories might rational-

ize these attitudes, is most likely not merely descriptive. 444 One may
assume from the tenor of his writings that his descriptive point-that a
possibly coherent body of moral values is to some extent vented in judicial opinions-is meant to provide a basis for his normative point44that
5 It
the courts should realize more fully these particular moral values.
is unclear as to whether Michelman does actually assert the existence
of, for instance, constitutional welfare rights. He does, however, make

theoretical preparations for such an assertion. Michelman documents,
for example, utterances by the Supreme Court in favor of minimum
440. Id. at 664 (footnotes omitted) (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1074 (1978)).
441. See Michelman, The Supreme Court andLitigationAccess Fees: The Right to Protect
One's Rights-PartI, 1973 DuKE L.., 1153, 1194-97.
442. See Michelman, Permutations, supra note 438, at 1187-91.
443. See Michelman, FormalandAssociationalAims in ProceduralDue Process, 18 NoMOS 126, 144-45 (1977).
444. It is important to note that this article imputes a position to Micheman which is not
acknowledged specifically in his articles. Some of the articles on the basis of which such
inferences are drawn were written before most of the other writings highlighted in this article. It may be somewhat unfair to attribute to Michelman a definite position based on writings that appeared possibly before thought on value-asserting constitutional commentary
crystallized. Therefore, the inferences drawn from his writings in order to describe an overall approach should be considered with this historical caveat.
445. See Michelman, supra note 443, at 144-45; Michelman, supra note 12, at 660-63.
Note that Michelman does not intend that the courts could realize such moral values unassisted. See Michelman, supra note 443, at 144; Michelman, supra note 12, at 663, 684-85.
For evidence that Michelman is cognizant of the Humean warning against inferring "ought"
from "is," see Michelman, supra note 9, at 1043.
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entitlements. 446 He searches for a theory, a moral theory, that can lend
some coherence to this body of diverse data, keeping in mind that some
data will not conform and may have to be explained away.
The theory is of great importance because it allows inference as to
what is consistent with the relevant decisions and what is not. Courts
are expected to produce decisions that are theoretically consistent." 7
Therefore, it is consistency which can provide Michelman with the
grounds for normative assertions. Michelman describes judicial consistency, or "neutrality of principle in constitutional adjudication," in
light of Rawls's work as follows:
One tries to understand various legal claims and entitlements in a
certain way-that is, as reflecting "natural rights" which in turn
are suggested by principles of justice in a coherent theory of justice. Then neither rights nor principles can stand in isolation
from any other rights or principles contained in or suggested by
the same theory.
Accordingly, Michelman may applaud decisions that do, or criticize
those that do not, conform with his principle of justice anchored in
precedent." 9 In addition, derivation of the principle allows extrapolation and examination of whether the projected, hypothetical applications of the principle meet the dictates of common sense.450 If they do,
this renders the original decisions and the theory even more
451
acceptable.
In order for Michelman to be able to show that courts or the Court
have certain moral assumptions or commitments that should lead them
to preserve certain rights, he must counter arguments that the law is
committed to one value only--economic efficiency, the flip side of utilitarian pleasure maximization. 452 Michelman adopts the position that
446. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 432, at 24-27, 40-46; Michelman, supra note 12, at
686-93.
447. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1003, 1015.
448. Id. at 1015. Michelman cites to works by Bickel and Wechsler as illustrations of the
expectations of "neutrality of principle" in adjudication. See id. at 1015 n.156.
449. See Michelman, supra note 432, at 9, 47-59.
450. See id. at 37-39.
451. If, indeed, the foregoing description is true to Michelman's strategy, then it is further evidence of the influence of Rawls on Michelman. Applying a theory based on a primary set of cases to new cases and at the same time testing the primary cases and the theory,
in terms of the appropriateness of the new cases, is reminiscent of coherence theory.
452. For evidence that Michelman perceives a link between utilitarianism, or at least
theories positing the existence of subjective values only, and economic theories of law and
rights, see Michelman, supra note 145, at 496-97; Michelman, supra note 11, at 153-54. That
Michelman finds it important to characterize actual or desired legal results as the product of
(other) moral stances and not economic reasoning can be seen in Michelman, supra note 6,
at 1015.
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while a concern for efficiency may enter into judicial decisionmaking, it
is not the basis for all judicial decisions. He argues, at least in the context of local government public law, for "the co-existence in the judicial
mentality of two different, and contradictory, models of local government legitimacy . . . -an economic or 'public choice' model and a
noneconomic
'public interest' or 'community self-determination'
45 3
model."
In the economic or public choice model, all substantive values or
ends are regarded as strictly private and subjective. The legislature is conceived as a market-like arena in which votes instead of
money are the medium of exchange. The rule of majority rule
arises strictly in the guise of a technical device for prudently controlling the transaction costs of individualistic exchanges . . .
there is no right answer, there are only struck bargains ....
The opposed, public-interest model depends at bottom on a
belief in the reality--or at least the possibility-of public or objective values and ends for human action. In this public-interest
model the legislature is regarded as a forum for identifying or
defining, and acting towards those ends. The process is one of
mutual search through joint deliberations, relying on the use of
reason supposed to have persuasive force.454
These two models, intended to be overly simple, represent the ways in
which judges may view the political system as a whole, and thus how
they may view the legitimacy of their own decisionmaking.
Michelman chips away at a descriptive economic theory of law by
uncovering distinct areas of the law that are not well described by such
a theory. He finds that the economic or public choice model does a
poor job by itself of explaining the public purpose and delegation doc45 5 Simitrines found in public law, as well as current local zoning law.
larly, he finds that economic efficiency will not be useful in explaining
the strict liability of landlords for injuries resulting from hazardous
conditions in leased dwellings.4 56 Specific facets of community morality, he suggests, provide a better explanatory tool.
Further, Michelman argues that we would not really be happy
with a Court that sees its function as consisting solely of facilitating
453. Michelman, supra note 11, at 148 (footnote omitted).
454. Id. at 148-49 (footnote omitted).
455. See id. at 164-77, 182-206. Some economic theories of law claim that common law
adjudication, as distinct from public law adjudication, is governed by a judicial desire to
facilitate economic efficiency. In response, Michelman argues that public law adjudication
is in no important way different from common law adjudication, thus casting doubt on the
theories' explanatory power. Michelman, supra note 151.
456. See Michelman, supra note 9, at 1016-28. See also Michelman, supra note 441, at
1185-89.
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wealth maximization. There are many types of laws that many of us
would want the courts to uphold, such as those protecting endangered
457
species or family values, which probably are not wealth maximizing.
Economic theorists recognize that there may be values that are not easily quantifiable---"moralisms"--but cannot incorporate them into their
theories. A pure notion of efficiency will not explain these moralisms
within the law, but theories of law that abandon pure efficiency, ac45 8
cording to Michelman, lose their explanatory and predictive power.
Although economic theories of law might pave the way for simple or
reductionist descriptions of the law, simplicity per se is not that attractive a quality.459 (In fact, the descriptive theory of law that attracts
Michelman is rather Byzantine in nature. That is the theory propounded by Ronald Dworkin.) 46 0 Finally, Michelman protests the assumption of acceptability which usually is granted economic efficiency.
The idea that efficiency is the ultimate moral principle assumes that
"all values are arbitrarily private,'' a moral principle to which
Michelnan will not assent.
If courts or the Court are not best described as governmental organs bent on facilitating economic efficiency, and if they do operate
from some (other) moral inclinations or values, then the next inquiry
should be, what would be a good and plausible moral framework for
the Court to adopt that would meet the requirements of judicial consis457. See Michelman, supra note 145, at 507-10.
458. See Michelman, supra note 9, at 1035-37; Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses
andAbuses ofEconomics in Law, 46 U. Cm. L. RFv., 307, 310-11 (1979); Michelman, supra
note 151, at 445. In addition, Michelman finds fault with the wealth-maximization criterion
itself which, "may seem a contradictory and unfathomable amalgam of individualisti'c methodology and collectivist morality: 'value' taken to be nothing but private exchange value,
measured by individual willingness to pay, but the optimal social state taken to be that in
which the sum of the private exchange values ('wealth') across society is as high as it can be,
never mind what is the case respecting any individual." Michelman, supra note 151, at 435
(emphasis in original).
459. Michelman, supra note 9, at 1046. Michelman might also argue that this simplicity
is misleading, since efficiency alone is insufficient to justify or criticize the foundations of our
legal system, the starting point from which reallocation begins. Therefore, economic theories of law may be simple because they are incomplete. See Michelman, supra note 151, at
445-46, 448 n.54. See also C. F iED, supra note 15, at 93-94; supra text accompanying note
35.
460. See Micheliman, supra note 9, at 1044.
461. See id. at 1042. See also Michelman, supra note 151, at 432, 435. The economic
theorist's values are arbitrarily private since the assumption is that the only test for value is
whether and to what extent an individual would be willing to purchase such an item or
privilege. This is quite similar to the classical utilitarian's assumption that the only test for
value is whether and to what extent an individual will derive "pleasure" from an item or
privilege.
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tency and impartiality?' 62 Michelman's assault on this issue takes him
again to the philosophy of John Rawls, 463 whose work has greatly influenced Michelman's work. This is especially true of the articles written by Michelman in the first part of the last decade. In an article
written in 1973 about Rawls's book, Michelman introduces himself as a
student of the book.
Some sort of focused interrogative strategy may help one come to
grips with Professor Rawls' monumental utterance. I have chosen to seek understanding through this not-so-philosophical
question: How does the book bear upon the work of legal investigators concerned or curious about recognition, through legal
processes, of claimed affirmative rights (let us call them "welfare
rights") to education, shelter, subsistence, health care and the
like, or to the money these things cost?'
Michelman employs Rawls's theory in order to examine whether a
plausible moral theory could provide the Court with a reasoned basis
for opinions that would establish constitutional welfare rights.
Michelman looks first to Rawls's "difference principle," found in
the second principle of justice,"6 5 in order to find a justification for the
existence of "insurance rights. ' ' 466 He finds that while the difference
principle would lead to the right to a minimum level of income, it
would not lead to more easily justiciable and more attractive insurance
rights. 467 However, the lexically prior part of the second principle (as
ordered by the Second Priority Rule), which Michelman dubs the "opportunity principle," 46 8 does bring the desired results. The opportunity
principle states in effect that social or economic inequalities may be
considered just only if each citizen has a fair equal opportunity for attaining a position of social or economic advantage. This principle
should create a constitutional right to a certain level of education, and
462. In an earlier article Michelman expresses doubt that the courts are equipped to act
as the guardians of constitutional morality in some cases. See Michelman, Property, Utility,
andFairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAgv.
L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1967).
463. A plausible moral framework like Rawls's, if nothing else, provides a judge seeking
a consistent theoretical basis for a decision with "a principled way of organizing and directing the search for an answer." Michelman, supra note 6, at 1016.
464. Id. at 962 (footnote omitted). See also the revision of this article in READING
RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE 319, 321 (N. Daniels ed.
1974).
465. See supra text accompanying notes 50-70. For a full delineation of the two principles of justice see supra note 52. The "difference principle" is (a) of the second principle.
466. An insurance right, also called a "specific welfare guaranty" is defined by
Michelman as a right "to provision for a certain need-on the order of shelter, education,
medical care-as and when it accrues." Michelman, supra note 6, at 966.
467. See id. at 981.
468. Id. at 971.

412

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[VoL 10:315

perhaps to certain levels of subsistence, health, and housing.4 69 Similarly, the lexically prior first principle of justice, which Michelman calls
the "liberty principle," 47 ° conveying the right to basic liberties, carries
along with it certain biological entailments or prerequisites. Basic
wants must be met before basic liberties can meaningfully be
granted, 471 just as certain educational requirements must be met before
there can be equal opportunity. Similarly, the highest good in Rawls's
system, self respect, would carry along with it a panoply of biological
entailments. 472
According to Michelman, the fact that a widely acclaimed theory
such as this would call for some constitutional welfare rights, if
adopted by the Court, is cause for some hope. He argues that such a
theory could be used by the Court since it might qualify as a source of
"neutral principles."4 73 Furthermore, Rawls's theory may be sufficiently successful to call into question the popular belief that no moral
theory could be adequately coherent or comprehensive to provide a
theoretical base for the Court. Whether the Court should actually
adopt the theory, however, depends on exactly how valid the theory is.
This is an issue that, understandably, Michelman does not take on.
However, the thesis that such a theory would be able to guide the
Court, is not insignificant.
At the very least, the thesis may counsel skepticism toward any
insistence that the legal and moral orders are, logically and intrinsically, worlds apart, separated if not by a void then by an
ether through which (at most) only occasional and inarticulate
influences can pass. . . . It suggests that the difficulty we experience is not with the logical possibility of interlacing moral speculation and law, but with the state and condition of moral theory
itself-a state characterized by complexity causing inaccessibility
and irresolvable controversy. Who dares predict that this state
can never be transcended?. . . I will confess that Professor
Rawls persuades me to keep my mind open.4 74
Later in the decade, perhaps as confidence in Rawls's theory
waned, Michelman argued that even Ely's somewhat traditional theory
of judicial review4 75 might lead one logically to accept that insurance
rights should be granted constitutional status. Ely's notion of "repre469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.

See id.at 988-89.
Id. at 973.
See id. at 989-90.
See id. at 990-91.
Id. at 1015-17. See also supra text accompanying notes 187-90.
Michelman, supra note 6, at 1018-19.
See supra text accompanying notes 200-06.
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sentation-reinforcing rights"-that the Court may enforce rights that
insure or facilitate broad political participation, despite the fact that
such rights may not be found in the text of the Constitution-suits
Michelman's purpose well. If one's basic needs are not met, or if one is

not sufficiently educated, it is unlikely that that one will be able to participate effectively in a "democratic" or "representative" government.47 6 Similarly, being part of a disadvantaged group--"the poor"-

may bring a stigma, like a racial stigma, which in itself may be politically debilitating. 47 7 Therefore, welfare rights should be considered

constitutional rights under Ely's label of representation-reinforcing
rights. It is interesting to note that in this discussion of the logical
ramifications of Ely's theory, Michelman leans on the rights theories of
Dworkin and Fried, in addition to that of Rawls.4 78
Michelman is a noninterpretivist; he believes that the Court should
assert values not specified within the text of the Constitution.4 7 9 Ac-

cording to Michelman, the provisions of the Constitution, as they
stand, are indeterminate and thereby incapable of presenting the Court
with all that it needs for the fulfillment of its function. 480 Therefore, the
Court is left in search of values that can guide it in a principled disposition of the claims before it. Whereas Ely, a noninterpretivist cited
often by Michelman,4 8 1 settles on "process writ large," embodied in the

value of representation-reinforcement, Michelman sees nothing magi476. See Michelman, supra note 12, at 674-77. See also Michelman, supra note 261, at
1109, 1112 (arguing for the existence of constitutional rights to property to the extent that
they affect the capacity for political participation); Michelman, ProcessandPropertyin ConstitutionalTheory, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 577, 584-89 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Processand
Property]. Note the connection between this type of analysis and Rawls's use of "primary
goods." See J.RAwLS, supra note 24, at 92-93; Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods in
UTILrrIANISM AND BEYOND 169-73 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982).
477. See Michelman, supra note 12, at 678-79.
478. See id. at 670, 681-84.
479. See Michelman, supra note 145, at 489; Michelman, supra note 5, at 1003; see supra
note 160.
480. See Michelman, supra note 145, at 505. For instance, with regard to "property," as
in the "taking clause" of the Fifth Amendment, Michelman states, "What kinds of interests
or relations, respecting what kinds of valued objects, fall within the category of protected
interests or relations that the Constitution knows as 'property'? The constitutional text itself
does not begin to answer the question. Judges adjudicating claims under the property
clauses of the Constitution can answer it-as answer they must-only by attributing to the
Constitution some political theory, some principle or principles of political morality, that it
does not itself enunciate." Michelman, supra note 261, at 1099. See also Michelman, Constancy to an Ideal Object, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 406, 408-10 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Constancy].
481. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 145, at 489-90, Michelman, supra note 12, at 66676. Note that Michelman cites Dworkin, Tribe and Grey as noninterpretivists whom he
views favorably. See Michelman, supra note 145, at 489 n.9.
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cal in that sole value.482 Consequently, Michelman is willing to set the
Court loose on a more widescale search for values. He envisions the
Court as a body that will not only search, but also distill. One must see
the task of the Court as involving "value-sculpting. ' 483 The reason that
the Court must have a creative role, and the reason that the Court
should not be overly constrained by legislative deference, is that politics is not solely a matter of monitoring personal preferences. The
Court, as we know it, in at least some of its dealings, operates from the
assumption that
values are an intended outcome of politics: they are public as
well as private in origin, originating in political engagement and
dialogue as well as in private experience that supposedly preexists political activity and enters into it as a given. . . .[In this
view] majoritarian politics cannot be only the individualistically
self-serving activity "realistically" portrayed by economicsminded [or, perhaps, representation-minded] political scientists
and theorists. Politics must also be a joint and mutual search for
good or right answers to the question of directions for our evolving selves84

If the goal is not the monitoring of preferences, but rather the correct
statement and enforcement of values, then policy interplay between the
Court and legislatures will be more useful than deference by the Court
to legislative bodies.485
Michelman assumes that one of the values to be guarded by the
government is that of political participation. Therefore, this dialectic
arrangement of legislatures and the Court may be seen as facilitating a
balance between participatory values (legislatures) and other political
482. In fact, unlike Ely, Michelman finds nothing magical in processper se. "I agree
completely with Ely's critics such as Laurence Tribe and Paul Brest, when they suggest that
the need for substantive, political value judgements is in no way avoided or lessened by
casting constitutional issues in terms of process rather than result." Michelman, Processand
Property,supra note 476, at 589. However, according to Michelman, there is a point to
discussing constitutional rights as "process" rights, for "there seems to be a pragmatic virtue
in process talk: a virtue of sometimes making worthwhile conversation possible, of feeling
right and persuasive when talk about preferred results would feel weak and arbitrary, or
futile and hopeless, in the face of disagreement." Id. at 590.
483. See Michelman, supra note 432, at 45. See also Michelman, supra note 11, at 19899.
484. Michelman, supra note 145, at 509.
485. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1013-15. See also Michelman, supra note 441, at
1214, for his statement that the goal is interplay, not subjugation of the Court, or of Congress. Congress' input into political values is important since it may be advantaged in monitoring changing moral sentiments. Recall the dialectical relationship between the Court and
legislators suggested by Perry, Fiss and Tribe.
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or moral values such as justice (the Court).4 86 To the extent that there
is an emerging legitimate moral theory for the society, the court would
be well equipped to help promote the moral values embodied
therein. 487 The moral theory would presumably be an evolving but
4 88
coherent body of doctrine, much like Dworkin's view of the law.
The Court, which is accustomed to presenting neutral explanations for
why specific acts do not conform with the evolving law, could make
neutral explanations for why acts do not conform with, for instance, the
principles of justice.48 9 The extent to which the Court legitimately
could act in this way might depend on the integrity of the moral theory
used, a subject with which Michelman does not deal fully. Yet, significantly, the Court's legitimacy as an organ involved with distilling morality depends on its potential for rendering adequate theoretical
justifications, and not wholly on the hidden meaning of the Constitution, nor on the sanctity of the legislature, nor on the sanctity of economic efficiency. Michelman does not doubt that the Court will not be
able to come up with a moral theory that reads like a statutory code.
However, the fact that background moral rights remain somewhat nonjusticiable does not void the Court's moral purpose.
Judicial responses to [e.g.,] due process claims in the housing and
other welfare contexts. . do suggest the workings of a legally
inchoate entitlement to be adequately housed or whatever-an
entitlement rooted in moral consciousness or in systematic moral
theory which may serve as an ideal backdrop against which the
legal order is viewed and comprehended but which is imperfectly
represented in the actual legal order. Though courts as such are
incapable of full and direct recognition and enforcement of the
right (they can not bring about the provision of ideally required
housing which the political order fails to provide), they are quite
able to recognize and act on the entitlement once embodied even
486. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1009-10. Michelman states, "Chief among the
traits that distinguish adjudication from other modes of decision is the judge's duty to render
the decision that is normatively right-the one that best comports with, and is in that sense
compelled by, a body of normative material that is publicly identifiable as authoritative for
the judge in virtue of pedigree or some other objective mark. That conception of the judicial
role is all that separates the rule of law from judicial dictatorship in the liberal legal theory
attributed to the Constitution by each recurrent episode of judicial review." Michelman,
Constancy, supra note 480, at 412. See also Michelman, supra note 261, at I101.
487. But see Michelman, supra note 462, at 1171, 1257, where Michelman suggests that
rules appropriate for judicial decision are too rigid to bring an ethically satisfying solution to
just compensation cases.
488. See Michelman, The Supreme Court andLitigationAccessFees: The Right to Protect
One's Rights-PartII, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527, 528; Michelman, supra note 11, at 151-52 n.30;
Michelman, supra note 443, at 151; Michelman, Constancy, supra note 480, at 412, 414-15.
489. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1008-10.
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imperfectly in legislative action.490
The fact that Michelman sees one of the functions of government
as being to develop values rather than monitor them indicates that he
might more readily fall into the camp of critical moralists than conventional moralists. When arguing for the establishment of constitutional
welfare rights, he does not assert that the people truly believe that such
rights should exist, nor that welfare rights are implied by traditional
moral principles. Rather he states that moral intuitions have led the
Court part of the way, 49 1 and that theoretical consistency, or perhaps
an adopted moral theory, might lead the Court the rest of the way correct, to establish constitutional welfare rights. 492 This is not to say that

Michelman's view of values is wholly divorced from the notion of
popularly held values. In fact, one of the conditions for the existence of
a "preinstitutional" or "background" right in Michelman's view seems
to be that it conform with "widely held intuitions of inherent personal
rights. 49 3 Intuitions, however, are not quite commitments. It is unlikely that the perfected poll would do Michelman's theories much
good. Michelman speaks of "latent consensual notions of justice"
4 94
which are accepted by the society "only intuitively and abstractly."
The role of the judge, then, might be one of "catalyzing, evoking, and
formulating the community's conscious recognition of values and rights
which the community is forever, if inexplicitly, engaged in collectively
evolving."4 95 Further, the fact that the public might potentially hold
certain moral views does not mean that the public will have access to
the theoretical apparatus that would allow them to crystallize their
moral intuitions into coherent moral stances.4 96 Therefore, the Court
might be in a position, assuming that it has found a moral theory that is
coherent and which expresses the latent, consensual, evolving notions,
to discern the moral intuitions of the society in a way that society itself
could not.
490. Michelman, supra note 443, at 144.
491. See Michelman, Permutations,supra note 438, at 1186-88; Michelman,supra note 6,
at 1005-06.
492. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1010-15.
493. Michelman, supra note 12, at 681. In an earlier article Michelman rejects the "notion of rights-as-shared-values." Perhaps Michelman's more recent articles can be seen as
more under the influence of Dworkin (than Rawls), and thus more receptive to the notion of
community morality. See Michelman, supra note 488, at 529.
494. Michelman, supra note 6, at 964 (emphasis added).
495. Michelman, supra note 443, at 151. See also Michelman, supra note 261, at 1106;
Michelman, Processand Property,supra note 476, at 592.
496. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1009.
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Like Tribe, Michelman is a bit hazy as to the theory of rights and
values that underlies his theory. One cannot fault Tribe and
Michelman too much for not having well developed value theories that
will support particular stances by, or a particular role for, the Court.
After all, this is a Herculean task. Michelman does not even express
total confidence in Rawls's attempt at it. Nevertheless, the importance
of Tribe's and Michelman's theories does not evaporate because the
theories are ultimately incomplete. The theories are worth viewing
simply (among other reasons) because they integrate notions of critical
morality into theories of constitutional law, even if they have not perfected those notions.
D. Summary
As discussed earlier, "conventional morality" describes the moral
code of a society.4 97 This moral code presumably is rooted in tradi-

tional moral doctrine, and presumably would be revealed by an examination of the beliefs of the members of the society. "Critical morality"
describes the consequences of a moral theory used to challenge (or support) the validity of the content of conventional morality.4 9 8 Utilitarianism can be a source of critical morality. If some of the moral rules of
a society do not appear to further the maximization of utilitarian pleasure, critical morality based on the utilitarian calculus would reject
those conventional moral rules. As assumed throughout this article,
however, utilitarian theory can also be used to support the moral validity of "decisions" made by the voting public, by a legislature, or by the
marketplace. To this extent, utilitarian theory may be used to support
results that are arguably expressions of the conventional morality.4 99
Therefore, the fact that Tribe and Michelman are critical morality theorists is important to the theme of this article because, first, they reject
the utilitarian arguments that are commonly marshalled to support
these expressions of conventional morality, and, second, because they
reject intuitionism, or at least the quasi-intuitionism supported by
utilitarianism.
497. See supra text accompanying note 381.
498. See supra text accompanying note 367.
499. Of course, Sandalow, Perry, Wellington, and Fiss would dispute the extent to which
these various polling devices actually do reveal the nature of the society's conventional morality at any given time.
500. The "quasi-intuitionism" referred to is the stance that values are inescapably personal-that there are no valid public values, but only the particular tabulations of the preferences of individuals.
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Adopting a potential theory of critical morality is not the only consistent way of rejecting the utilitarian-backed results of institutions
such as the vote, the legislatures, and the marketplace. Instead, one
could argue that these institutions do not approximate the strictures of
the conventional morality well because the institutions themselves are
flawed. One might argue, for instance, that because fewer than fifty
percent of adults vote in elections, or because legislators attend more to
their prospects for reelection than to the needs of their constituents, or
because externalities or transaction costs isolate the preferences of economic actors from economic results, these institutions are not to be
granted the assumption of legitimacy. Alternatively, one could argue
along with Perry and Wellington, as supported perhaps by Dworkin
and Scanlon, that the poll itself, whether it is political or economic, will
not be a good means of discovering the conventional morality because
the conventional morality simply is not wholly revealed through voting
or spending behavior. For Perry and Wellington, conventional morality is more closely identified with the traditional values of a society,
and there is no guarantee that people will vote in accord with those
traditional values. The voters may be swayed by certain morally irrelevant desires. 50 1 Therefore, although discerning conventional morality
is the goal, there is no special reason for acting in deference to the vote,
legislatures, or the marketplace.
The critical moralist, however, may reject the decisions of these
institutions because the conventional morality itself, however expressed, may be open to criticism. And, if in addition one rejects utilitarianism, even the institutions that seem to approximate the utilitarian
calculus are suspect. So, one may join Rawls, Fried, Dworkin and
Scanlon in rejecting the decisions of those hallowed majoritarian or
free market institutions, on either ground, at least insofar as they are to
be afforded thepresumption of moral validity, and search for substantive moral truths. This is the path taken by Tribe and Michelman.
For Tribe and Michelman, as for the other commentators viewed,
there is a need to reject the status quo. Each finds major political
trends that are immoral, and which might be rectified by a more moral
Court. They are therefore led to reject outcomes of the "representative" governmental organs. It would be mistaken, however, to assume
that they reject democracy. Both speak in favor of the value of popular
participation. Yet they reject the notion that valuing participation implies that popular or representative decisions are per se correct.
Neither argues for a government run only by, or mostly by, the judici501. See supra text accompanying notes 303-07, 327-32.
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ary. They do, however, argue for a rethinking of the present balance of
authority. They question the theoretical underpinnings of stances of
judicial restraint, and suggest ways in which the Court could assert legitimately a more comprehensive authority.
That they do not reject democracy and the importance of consensus can be seen in at least two features of their theories. First,
Michelman and Tribe, like Perry and Fiss, see a dialectic process involving the Court and Congress, or courts and legislatures, as the best
means of developing policy. For neither Tribe nor Michelman does the
Court have the corner on the policy market. Second, both Tribe and
Michelman suggest that consensus must be viewed when discerning
public values. Both view the development of values as a society-specific, evolutionary process that must, among other things, monitor the
moral intuitions of the public. Both, to some extent, find legitimacy in
widely held popular values, although where the notions of "widely
shared values" or "widely held intuitions of inherent personal rights"
fall on the spectrum that stretches from actually held values to potentially held values, is not always clear. For Tribe, proper adjudication
through structural due process involves monitoring community sentiments in order to discern when an issue is in popular moral flux.
Tribe and Michelman, more than the other commentators, present
theories that typify constitutional law commentary influenced by modem anti-utilitarian moral philosophy. Both explicitly attack utilitarianism or utilitarian-based theories such as economic theories of rights or
of law. They discuss the shortcomings of such theories in basing moral
decisions on supposedly contentless procedures, rather than on substantive principles. They also attack such theories as having hidden
and invalid moral premises under the guise of objectivity or parsimony,
such as the premise that all values are inescapably personal. Tribe and
Michelman discuss the writings of anti-utilitarian philosophers, most
notably Rawls, Dworkin and Fried. They seem to see themselves as
participating in the enterprise of these philosophers, certainly as critics
if not as theorists. There can be little doubt that these two commentators perceive a link between moral philosophy and constitutional law,
and have made use of the anti-utilitarian philosophies in shaping their
assaults on traditional constitutional doctrine.
Conclusion
In the dispute between the traditional commentators and those
suggesting new theories of the Supreme Court's role, one question is
central: Where do we find the values to be applied by this third branch
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of the government? The Court finds itself in a position where it must
resolve disputes brought before it. The question must arise, therefore:
What justification exists for deciding one way instead of another? If we
may assume that "because I felt like it" is not a sufficient justification
for a Supreme Court Justice to present for his or her position 5 2 then to
what may the Justices refer in support of their decisions? Which values
may properly lead a Supreme Court Justice to choose one alternative
over others?
Those who advocate judicial deference to legislatures prefer that
the Court uphold the value of political participation and also the values
expressed at any particular moment by the people's vote and therefore
by the people's choice of representatives. Those who advocate judicial
activism prefer that the Court uphold other values in addition. The
dispute between the traditional commentators, who are for the most
part advocates of judicial restraint, and the new commentators, who are
for the most part advocates ofjudicial activism, concerns, therefore, the
choice of one set of values (or approach towards values) over the other
as being the most deserving of attention by the Court.
Let us not question, for the moment, the value of political participation, since all involved seem to agree that it must be upheld, and let
us focus instead on the other values to be upheld or respected by the
Court. The traditional commentators state, in essence, that the preferences of the people as manifested by the election of representatives, and
502. This assumption cannot be made if one believes that there are no legitimate sources
of values for judicial decisionmaking. As noted earlier, Brest is exploring this path of despair. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59. Even if some acceptable notion of moral
validity could be developed, Brest doubts that the resulting general moral principles could
be applied by the judiciary without manipulation and the introduction of spurious values.
See Brest, supra note 8, at 1089. According to Brest, the Court and the nation are caught in
an irresolvable dilemma inherent to the liberal state-a dilemma between respect for the
individual (individual rights) and respect for others (majority rule). This tension motivates
an endless search for values that will protect the individual, and a futile search for legitimacy or validity which will placate the people. See id. at 1101-09. Brest is not alone in his
despair, other academic lawyers have evidenced similar feelings. Arthur Leff argues that
without God, or perhaps without proof of the existence of God, there can be no moral
validity. Accordingly, unless the Constitution (however conceived) is God, it cannot be the
ultimate source of legal or moral values. Consequently, arguments concerning the existence
of constitutional rights cannot be valid. They must be accepted, if at all, as a matter of
convention. Like Brest, Leff finds the notion of the liberal state or of constitutional democracy to be inherently contradictory. See Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, UnnaturalLaw, 1979
DUKE L.J. 1229. Bruce Ackerman appears to agree with Leff that there can be no objective
good or legitimate value without God, although he does believe that there is a preferred way
to view society. See B. AcKERMAN, supra note 264, at 355-58, 364-69 (1980); Ackerman,
Agon, 91 YALE L.J. 219 (1981); Cf. Barry,supra note 5, at 645 (concern with moral status or
moral integrity without connection to God and soul becomes a form of narcissism).
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therefore by the decisions of those representatives, are of greater merit
in decisionmaking than are other values. For the Court, as for other
governmental bodies, the only extra-constitutional values that may
properly be used in decisionmaking are those that emanate from the
voting behavior of the people, channeled through their representatives.
The foundational value to be employed in all governmental policymaking, and therefore in judicial decisions as well, is the value of acting in
accordance with that for which most of the voters have expressed their
approval. This traditional ideal of legislative supremacy in the field of
policymaking has much in common with utilitarian thought. Utilitarian thought provides that the best way to make policy is to monitor the
people in order to find which policy alternative will satisfy the greatest
number of individual preferences. The sole value that leads the utilitarian decisionmaker to choose one alternative over others is the value of
satisfying (the most) individual preferences.
Recently, some moral philosophers have attacked the soundness of
utilitarian thought. They have argued, in part, that utilitarianism, because it merely aggregates the pleasures or preferences of individuals in
a society, does not take sufficient account of the individual as a moral
entity. The moral worth and personal integrity of the individual get
lost in the aggregation. Further, utilitarianism does not grant the individual basic minimal rights, and thus, in providing for the interests of
the many, may cause some to lead subhuman lives. Since the utilitarian calculus is merely a "procedure," it does not really guarantee any
particular results, and this is viewed as a shortcoming in a moral system. Also, because utilitarianism is merely a "procedure" it must accept as given some state of affairs on which it may act, and may not
choose which initial state of affairs is best. For this reason, it is argued
to be incomplete as a moral system. Utilitarianism has also been attacked because it is consequentialist and therefore does not allow for
the possibility that certain acts might be just plain right or just plain
wrong. Instead, utilitarianism evaluates all acts by their effects on aggregate personal preferences or pleasure.
As an alternative to utilitarianism these moral philosophers have
proposed theories based on specific moral principles that are valid irrespective of their immediate effect on the aggregate of pleasure. Further, they have suggested theoretical means for the justification of these
principles, such as resort to the original position and coherence theory.
Resort to "community morality" as a means for justifying moral principles, has been suggested as has a turn to traditional Western morality.
Some have suggested that consequentialist arguments, somewhat like
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utilitarian arguments, may lead to the acceptance of specific nonutilitarian rights or moral principles.
In much the same way that modem philosophers have criticized
utilitarianism, a group of constitutional law commentators has found
fault with the prevailing traditional commentary. This new group of
commentators has also constructed alternative theories of the judicial
role built on foundations that resemble the newly formulated theories
of the modem moral philosophers. Three types of theories have issued
from this new group of constitutional law commentators within the past
ten years, each with a particular stance concerning which values may
be used in judicial decisionmaking.
The first of these three types of theories, presented by commentators who, for the purposes of this article are called "the principled," is
prompted by frustration with the weakness of constitutional "rights"
within the traditional scheme. "The principled" contend that decisions
in constitutional law should be made on the basis of what might be
called "substantive" moral and legal principles, not necessarily found
within the text of the Constitution, which will compel the Court to find
certain governmental acts simply unallowable. These theories recommending "substantive" principles-principles that provide for specific
types of results in judicial decisionmaking-are presented in contrast to
the traditional constitutional law commentary, which shies away from
the notion of judicially created "substantive" policy, and which favors
procedural solutions. The assertion of specific principles by "the principled," and their implied criticism of the traditional view's avoidance
of extra-constitutional guarantees, parallels the work of the anti-utilitarian philosophers. The anti-utilitarians present moral principles that
are not conditioned on their effects upon aggregate pleasure, and criticize utilitarianism because it is merely "procedural" and as such does
not guarantee basic rights. If we were to ask of "the principled" which
values the Court should apply in its decisionmaking, they would reply
that the Court ought to apply "substantive" moral and legal principles
and values such as the ones presented in their own writings.
The theories of "the political" seem to be prompted by frustration
with the subservience of the Court to legislatures, and the subservience
of intellectually derived policy to popularly chosen policy. "The political," like "the principled," assume that there exist "substantive," extraconstitutional moral and legal principles which the Court may apply in
the controversies before it. However, starting with this assumption,
"the political" proceed to devise theories that define the proper role for
the Court as an actor in governmental policymaking. The fact that the
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Court, by virtue of the reasoned nature of adjudication, has access to
such "substantive" moral principles lends the Court legitimacy as a
governmental policymaker, much like legislatures. Legislatures have
their peculiar source of policy and the Court has its peculiar source of
policy. National policy is to result from the political exchange between
these two types of policymakers. "The political" are characterized by
their reliance upon conventional morality as the source for their moral
principles. Conventional morality provides "the political" with a comprehensive source of moral principles that is distinct from the source of
value employed by the traditional commentators-popular vote, and
derivatively, legislative decision. Therefore "the political" need not
honor the arguments of the traditional commentators favoring
majoritarian policymaking. Yet reliance on conventional morality allows "the political" to maintain the prominence of the people as the
source of values to be used in political decisionmaking, for conventional morality is the expression of the underlying values held by the
society.
The view held by "the political"-that the Court might be able to
arrive upon good policy as the result of reasoned discourse about law
or morality-is shared by the new moral philosophers who construct
ethical theories or theories of adjudication based on, for instance, coherence theory. Also, the choice of conventional morality as the source
of values is similar to the resort to "community morality" as the basis
for moral principles suggested by at least one of the modem moral philosophers, and the reliance on conventional morality is supported by
the modified utilitarian theories proposed by some of the philosophers.
To the question of which values should be applied by the Court, "the
political" would answer that the Court should make its decisions on the
basis of "substantive" values derived from the conventional morality.
The theories of "the philosophical" appear to be motivated by the
view that an unsophisticated and invalid moral perspective seems to
dominate governmental policymaking. "The philosophical," like "the
political," argue that the Court has a legitimate role in governmental
policymaking by virtue of its ability to discern and distill values in a
way that a legislature cannot. According to "the philosophical," the
values sought by our society and thus by our political organs need not
be reflections of eternal principles, but neither need they be inaccessible
to reason. In fact, "the philosophical" claim that part of the function of
our government is to facilitate the pursuit of rationally defensible public values. The Court is primarily qualified for assisting in this task
because of the reasoned and dialogical way in which cases are
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presented before the bench, and because of the fact that judges engage
in characteristically theoretical inquiry when resolving the disputes
before them.
"The philosophical" differ from "the political" in that "the philosophical" do not find that a value is necessarily valid simply because
that value is part of the underlying values and attitudes held by the
society. As might be anticipated, "the philosophical" seem to prefer
more philosophical approaches to moral validity. The search by "the
philosophical" for a way to apply reason to the choice of values in
Supreme Court adjudication is quite consistent with a primary goal of
modem moral philosophers, which is to apply reason to the discernment of determinate moral principles. "The philosophical" refer to the
philosophical literature extensively, and attack either utilitarianism or
the economic analysis of rights by name. Especially bothersome to
"the philosophical" is the premise in utilitarian thought that values are
inescapably personal and subjective, and that all values can be quantified in terms of some one basic, continuous measure, like pleasure.
Both of these criticisms are akin to the philosophers' complaints that
utilitarianism does not take into account the moral worth and integrity
of the individual. For instance, respect for the individual as a moral
entity may dictate the fulfillment of basic needs or the protection of
basic rights, no matter how much others may disapprove at any given
time. To the question of which values should be employed by the
Court in adjudication, "the philosophical" would reply that the Court
must enforce those values which are theoretically the most valid, or
which fit into the most comprehensive moral theory, or which best facilitate societal moral progress, given the perspective of the society at
that stage in its moral evolution.
Each of the three groups of new constitutional law commentators,
"the principled," "the political," and "the philosophical," opposes the
"merely procedural" nature of the role assigned to the Court by the
traditional commentators. That role severely limits the types of values
that legitimately may be enforced by the Court. Except to the extent
that the text of the Constitution is believed to be sufficiently specific to
guide Supreme Court adjudication and dictate an outcome, the role
assigned to the Court by the traditional commentary is largely procedural. The Court is allowed to assert itself only when there is, for instance, manifest irrationality (in the attainment of a given goal) or
(procedural) unfairness, or a malfunction of the majoritarian processes.
Further, the Court is to be limited for the most part to the scrutiny of
procedural faults in statutes, and is to limit its own decisions to those
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which can pass the procedural test of "neutral principles." In another
way, the traditional view of the Court's role is procedural because it
relies on a procedural moral concept--that the best governmental policy will be revealed by popular vote, popular representation, or the
workings of the marketplace. "Balancing of interests" is the notion, a
procedural notion, which forms the center of the traditional commentators' view of policymaking.
The new constitutional law commentators would appear to object
to this procedural orientation for two basic reasons. The first is that
nothing is guaranteed by a well working procedure except for the functioning of the procedure itself. Thus a procedural moral system, or a
procedural role for the Court, as such, will not guaranteebasic rights or
basic freedoms. The new constitutional law commentators argue that
basic rights should form the core of our constitutional protections,
rather than be treated as accidental products of our constitutional system. The second objection to this procedural orientation is that no
procedure that can lead to the choice of one alternative over another,
can be "merely" or "purely" procedural without substantive foundations. It is the supposedly neutral or unbiased nature of these procedures which commends them to those concerned with democracy. Yet
these "procedural" means of decisionmaking are in fact no more neutral than any others. Therefore the values that actually underlie these
procedures should be exposed and examined. We should support or
criticize these "procedural" means of decisionmaking on the basis of
the underlying values, and on the basis of what they can in fact guarantee. All three groups of the new commentators would like to focus the
debate over the role of the Supreme Court in terms of "substantive"
value choices.
Lawyers, however, have never been able to deny their fascination
with procedure. Some of the new constitutional law commentators, notably Fiss and Tribe, while rejecting the "contentless" procedures of the
traditional commentators for the reasons just stated, propose different
kinds of decisionmaking procedures as being more morally responsible,
more sensitive to the dictates of morality. These procedures are formulated with the courtroom in mind. They capitalize on courtroom dialogue, either between two parties or between the judge and a party.50 3
503. Bruce Ackerman has proposed a procedure involving dialogue, constrained in certain ways, as the proper model for decisionmaking in the liberal state. According to Ackerman, the moral (or liberal) approach to the exercise of power by one over another or to the
distribution of scarce resources to one instead of another, involves engaging the contestants
in dialogue about the legitimacy of such an act. Rights emerge from such dialogue. See B.
ACKERMAN, supra note 264, at 3-6. Like courtroom dialogue, liberal dialogue is to consist of
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They demonstrate, even among those value-oriented, new constitutional law commentators, the lawyer-like preference for decisionmaking over settling upon specific decisions.
Placing primary importance on the process of problem solving and
only secondary importance on the results of the process is reminiscent
of the philosophy of John Dewey. Dewey saw his task as philosopher
as providing aid to people in their problem solving rather than providing people with the correct solutions to moral problems. People and
societies encounter obstacles in their pursuit of things valuable to them
in their everyday lives. They do not need philosophy to explore what is
valuable, but rather to explore how intelligence can be exploited in
overcoming the obstacles." ° Problems that must be overcome change
from situation to situation. The process of gaining increasing facility
with the various resources and opportunities at hand in order to deal
more reasonably with various problems-the very process itself-is the
most general good. 505 Each situation presents both a unique opportunity for the attainment of desired results and a unique obstacle to their
attainment. Anything valuable deriving from a situation is a function
of the interaction of the person or society with the situation, and thus
includes not only the results of the situation but also the activity leading to the results. Ends and means cannot meaningfully be distinguished with respect to the good or valuable."° In Dewey's writings
one finds the following:
Moral goods and ends exist only when something has to be done.
The fact that something has to be done proves that there are deficiencies, evils in the existent situation. This ill is just the specific
ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else. Consequently the good of the situation has to be discovered, projected and attained on the basis of the exact defect and trouble to
be rectified. . . . Morals is not a catalogue of acts nor a set of
rules to be applied like drugstore prescriptions or cook-book recipes. The need in morals is for specific methods of inquiry and of
contrivance: Methods of inquiry to locate difficulties and evils;
the presentation of reasons for one's position, and is grounded in prima facie equality of the
parties. Id. at 34-45. Additional constraints are presented by Ackerman in order to define
the talk that qualifies as liberal dialogue. As defined, liberal dialogue is not a means for
arriving at moral truth, but rather is the end in itself. Liberalism, the ultimate goal, is not
the adoption of a set of values, but is rather "a way of talking about power, a form of
political culture." Id. at 6 (emphasis deleted).
504. See J. GOuINLOCK, THE MORAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DEWEY xix (1976); J.
GOUINLOCK, JOHN DEwEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE 162 (1972).
505. See J. GouiNLOCK, MORAL WRITINGS, supra note 504, at xxxix-xl; J. GouINLocK,
PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE, supra note 504, at 237.
506. See J. GOUINLOCK, PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE, supra note 504. at 233-35.
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methods of contrivance to form plans to be used as working hypotheses in dealing with them.
No individual or group will be judged by whether they come
up to or fall short of some fixed result, but by the direction in
which they are moving. The bad man is the man who no matter
how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less
good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally
unworthy he has been is moving to become better. . . . [T]he
process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than the
static outcome and result, becomes the significant thing ...
The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. It is the
active process of transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting,
maturing, refining is the aim in living. ... Growth itself is the
only moral "end."50 7
Dewey's contempt for the formulation of "fixed results" or determinate values applicable to all situations is certainly not shared by Fiss
or Tribe. Each believes that there are some things other than process
that can be valued generally. Yet, Dewey's writings are still quite relevant to the task of each of the commentators highlighted in this article.
Although most of the commentators appear to believe in determinate
moral principles such as those presented by Rawls, 508 they are also
quite aware of the fact that the Court makes decisions in the here and
now. And without presenting complete moral theories, these commentators (for the most part) want to see an increased role for the Court in
confronting policy questions. One might think that one who believes in
determinate moral principles would advise restraint until an acceptable
statement of those principles, probably in the form of a moral theory,
arose. The fact that these commentators advise activism instead of restraint in the absence of a moral theory 50 9 may suggest that they find
value in the mere intellectual confrontation of policy questions, an approach to policy that can be provided by the Court but which cannot be
provided by Congress. 1 0 Perhaps these commentators believe, along
with Dewey, that intellectual confrontation of moral problems is the
morally responsible path for a society to take, and that other ways of
507. J.DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 169-70, 176-77 (enlarged ed. 1948).

508. Gouinlock presents Dewey and Rawls as philosophers of diametrically opposed
moral views. See J.GOUINLOCK, MORAL WRITrNrs, supra note 504, at li-liii.
509. It might be thought that the constitutional commentators appealing to conventional
morality would have no need for a coherent moral theory. But at least we might ask of the
conventional morality theorists some explanation of how underlying moral views are to be
distilled by an everyday Justice, and why these views (or distillations) are to be presumed
free of the morally irrelevant influences plaguing voting and spending behavior. This explanation would look much like a moral theory.
510. See Brest, supra note 8, at 1105-07, for a different interpretation.
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confronting moral issues are not as desirable morally.51 '
The parallels drawn in this article between the theories of the role
of the Court proposed by the new constitutional law commentators and
the ethical theories proposed by the selected moral philosophers might
be important in at least three ways. First, in terms of intellectual history, the fact that movements within two distinct fields concurrently
resist basing decisions on subjective, personal preferences and instead
tend towards basing them on objective, public rights and values is indicative of a change in the intellectual climate. Perhaps this signals the
rebirth of a natural law perspective, in which both the marketplace and
the individual prerogative are to be more tightly reined by a stronger
moral order. Second, in terms of legal theory, it is informative to view
instances in which the development of legal concepts is dependent on
the development of ethical theories. How useful such abstract moral
theory might be to legal theorists is a question addressed by some of the
commentators viewed here, and is a question which should be important to those who see the development of law as an important policymaking function of a government, or as an important moral function
of a society. Third, the parallels shown might be important in developing theories of judicial review and of the proper function of the
Supreme Court. It is this third possible significance which demands
further consideration.
As discussed throughout this article, there are many ways in which
the theories supporting judicial restraint in the face of legislative decision or the workings of the marketplace can be linked to utilitarian
ideas. The views that the Court can have at best only a tenuous hold
on what is correct in terms of policy-that polling the citizens or their
representatives is the best way of solving policy questions, that the
workings of the marketplace are prima facie proper-all carry certain
assumptions. Among these assumptions is the premise that good policy
or morality is a function not of substantive, definite values, but only of
personal, subjective preferences aggregated through the use of one procedure or another. It is for this reason that outcomes of a vote, a legislative act, or the marketplace are assumed to be better policy or more
morally valid than any possible nonmajoritarian decision by the
Supreme Court Justices. Votes, legislative decisions, and economic results all involve accepted procedures for monitoring and aggregating
511. Dewey, of course, was a fervent supporter of democracy and the democratic process.
He valued democracy for providing an environment conducive to the joint resolution of
social problems by the individuals within the society, and rejected the imposition of one
person's solutions on others. See J. GOUINLOCK, MORAL WRITINGS, supra note 504, at xlv.
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the personal preferences of the individuals involved. Determinations
by the Court are not made in accord with any such aggregating procedure, and thus, in a moral ontology that includes only subjective, personal values, such determinations do not originate from a prima facie
legitimate means of arriving upon good policy or the dictates of morality. It is not difficult to see that utilitarianism carries along with it the
same assumption-that morality is a function only of personal pleasure
or the fulfillment of personal preferences, and that this pleasure can be
monitored by simple aggregation. To the extent that all moral theories
based on the simple aggregation of pleasure or preference fulfillment
can be labelled utilitarian, it seems, therefore, that the traditional doctrine of the role of the Supreme Court assumes a utilitarian theory.
How would one seek to justify or support one of the versions of the
traditional theory of judicial function? Could this be done without appealing to utilitarian values? 512 I believe that the answer is a qualified
"no." In order to justify a theory of the judicial role that calls for deference to the vote or the legislature, except perhaps in the face of one
form of representational process failure or another, one must argue that
the vote or the legislature has some connection with the best policy or
the best moral answer under the circumstances. Of course, one could
support representational values only; that is, one could argue that no
decision is better than any other, and that the representative organs are
to be favored because, for instance, political participation is the good.
This assertion need not rely on utilitarian assumptions (although perhaps it could), but note what a strange assertion it is. If no decision is
really better than any other, then any "decision" might be reached by
the government as long as it is the result of voting, or perhaps legislation. There would be absolutely no grounds for overturning a vote or
statute, no need for a constitution or constitutional court. There would
certainly be no need for a theory of legislative failure. If legislatures
are tolerated at all, it cannot be because they are bound to say what the
people would have said. The people could say that themselves. (Efficiency, remember, is not a value in this system.) It must be instead
because electing legislators is itself a form of "political participation."
If this is the case, once the legislators are elected, it is irrelevant what
kinds of decisions the legislature makes, by hypothesis.
512. It would not be of much use to say in defense of traditional Court doctrine that
there are no moral values. How could such a position lead to a defense of the doctrine?
Even secondary effects arguments--for instance, that there is no best policy but that it is nice
to have citizens participate-must rely ultimately on some theory of the good. Why is it
good to allow people to participate? The question must be faced at some point.
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Although this approach could provide a justification for judicial
restraint, I do not believe that this justification would appeal to many
of the advocates of judicial restraint. 1 3 It is more likely that the advocates of judicial restraint would have in mind a more democratic justification-that preferences expressed by a vote, by the citizens'
representatives, or by the citizens' investments, provide the government
with the best approximation of good policy or morality. "Good policy"
here may mean only that it is the best guess for satisfying the most
people in the near future; that is sufficient. As long as this type ofjustification is proposed for judicial restraint, with the assumption that no
means other than an aggregating procedure could possibly provide an
equally good guess, it is clear that the justification would rely on utilitarian values. The assertion that a preference-monitoring procedure no
matter how flawed (except in cases in which it is arguably not monitoring preferences at all)-is a better source of policy than any theoretical
investigation into policy-no matter how perfect-is a restatement of
the principle that all values are subjective and that good policy or
moral truth is derived ultimately from aggregating personal preferences. This is the basis of utilitarianism.
If it is true that the traditional theories of the judicial role are intimately bound up with utilitarian theory, and that justifications for the
traditional theories are necessarily tied to justifications for utilitarianism, then the parallels between anti-utilitarian philosophy and the new
theories of the judicial role are important. To put it simply, it may be
that to the extent that modem philosophers are correct in attacking
utilitarianism, these commentators are correct in their attacks on the
traditional theories.
The power of a United States Supreme Court Justice to change
American society has inspired much scholarly debate. The sheer potential of the Court to do justice not only renders the Court a fitting
object for the scrutiny of the student of policy, but also inspires interest
among those who still believe that there may exist a moral right and
wrong. The Supreme Court is unique in having both the opportunity
to affect society greatly, and the widely appreciated duty to make intel513. One could imagine other possible justifications for judicial deference that are likewise not dependent on a notion of good decisions. One could, of course, assert that judicial
deference is the good. A perhaps more palatable assertion would be that the government
ought to act in a manner consistent with its historical foundations. Perhaps this value could
be combined with the value of political participation. The problem with this approach is the
same as the problem with the adoption of political participation as the sole value. Any view
of historical consistency that is strong enough to be of use is likely to disqualify the traditional commentary as well as the rival commentary.
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lectually defensible decisions. The question of how the Court should
ultimately go about deciding cases is, therefore, tantamount to the
question of how practical we can make our notions of moral validity
within a society. For this reason it is natural to investigate the potential, if not the actual, connections between the decisionmaking of the
Court and theories of the nature of morality.

